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SUMMARY 
MAIN FEATURES 
Our medium-term forecast for the period 1991-96 is 
for a pattern of resumed, steady growth in GNP, after a 
temporary slow-down this year. The average rate of 
growth should be in the region of 3.5% per annum, a 
slower growth than was anticipated prior to the down-
ward revisions of the prospects for the world economy 
made over the last two years. In particular, the rise in 
German interest rates, consequent on unification, has 
reduced the prospective Irish growth rate in the 
medium-term by 0.5%. 
This level of modest, steady growth will sustain a 
surplus on the balance of payments of about 2 % of GNP, 
due to the high export orientation of Irish industry and 
the maintenance of recent gains in cost competitiveness. 
A high level of profit outflow will also continue, 
exerting a downward influence on the value of GNP. 
Payments of interest on the foreign-held component of 
the national debt will only increase slightly, and will fall 
as a percentage of GNP. Factor income flows from the 
build-up of Irish-owned foreign assets will increase, and 
the net effect of all three factor income components of 
the balance of payments will not impart a downward 
bias between GNP and GDP growth, as it did in the 
1980s. 
When privatisation receipts are taken into account, 
the exchequer borrowing requirement, at a level of 2% 
of GNP in 1990, will stay unchanged as a proportion of 
GNP this year, but will rise to about 3% next year. 
Thereafter, it will decline slowly, but will still be in 
deficit to the extent of almost 1.5% of GNP by 1996. A 
gradual reduction in the debt/GNP ratio is forecast to 
continue, but it is likely that the stated target of 100% 
by 1993 will not be reached until one year later, and that 
the ratio will still be above 90% by 1996. 
By any standards, Ireland's record of low wage and 
price inflation of recent years is impressive. We forecast 
that price inflation will continue at a low level of under 
3% per annum for the next five years, driven by a 
relatively stable world inflation picture and the likely 
stability of the Irish pound within the EMS. However, 
wage inflation is likely to pick up slightly from the very 
low rates that held over the 1987-90 period of the 
Programme for National Recovery. Rates for the period 
1992-96 are likely to average just over 5% per annum, 
a value not likely to compromise seriously recent 
competitiveness gains. 
Total employment will grow by about 50,000 jobs 
over the five-year period, or by Jess than 1 % per annum. 
The growth in employment might have been closer to 
80,000 were it not for the high interest rates consequent 
on German unification. Against a background of a rapid 
natural growth in the labour force, and lower net 
emigration, due to a depressed UK labour market, this 
will result in a rise in the unemployment rate from its 
1990 level of 14 percent of the labour force to a sustained 
level of 16%. There is little prospect that it will fall 
below that level for the next five years. 
SECTORAL DETAILS 
This is the first issue of the Review that makes use 
of the greater sectoral detail of the latest version, of the 
ESRI economic model which permits us to examine the 
performance of the different sectors in the economy 
where production activities occur. 
Industry was the driving force of the recovery from 
the recession of the 1980s. Over the period 1987-90, 
activity in all sub-sectors grew rapidly, driven by a very 
buoyant world economy (particularly in the UK), and 
the beneficial effects to confidence of the fiscal 
adjustments of 1987-89. 
The medium-term prospects in the important 
high-technology sector of manufacturing are for con-
tinued growth, but at a lower rate than the exceptionally 
high levels enjoyed in the last two decades. The 
traditional sector of manufacturing, after its traumatic 
performance during the 1980s recession, will continue 
it's strong recovery, benefiting particularly from Ire-
land's more competitive climate. The food processing 
sector, however, is likely to show a fall in employment 
with very little change in output, as the reforms of the 
CAP constrain agricultural production and rationalisa-
tion of plants proceeds. In aggregate, employment 
growth of 20,000 is expected in manufacturing over 
1991-96. 
Unlike manufacturing, growth in the building and 
construction sector is determined by domestic demand. 
The infrastructural programmes being carried out under 
the Community Support Framework (EC Structural 
Funds) will also continue to boost construction activity 
out to 1993 and to sustain it thereafter, on the assumption 
of a renewed CSF-type programme. However, growth 
in this sector is likely to display cyclical behaviour, 
typical of previous recovery periods. Employment is 
expected to grow by about 11,000 over the period 
1991-96. 
The market services sector of the economy has been 
growing in importance in all developed economies as 
well as in Ireland. Three main sub-sectors are identified 
in our analysis: distribution (wholesale and retail), 
transport and communication, and other market services 
(professional, personal, financial). 
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Developments in the EC Single Market process 
(1992) are likely to cause some restructuring within 
distribution, and to slow growth. While demand for 
transport and communication services is likely to con-
tinue to grow rapidly, employment growth may be more 
modest clue to the likely restructuring of the postal 
system. The highest growth will arise in the area of 
professional, personal and financial services. In 
aggregate, employment growth of about 30,000 is 
expected in market services over 1991-96. 
The remaining two sectors, agriculture and the 
public sector, are greatly constrained in their possibi-
lities for growth. Agriculture will be subject to major 
reform of the CAP and this issue is explored fully in a 
separate article in this Review. Employment is expected 
to continue to fall, and agriculture is expected to shed 
almost 25,000 jobs over the period 1991-96. The con-
tinuing constraints on the public finances are almost 
certain to restrict public sector expansionary initiatives 
. into the medium term, and the likely jobs growth in the 
public sector (health, education, public administration) 
is unlikely to exceed about 10,000. 
BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 
Underlying our central forecast are a set of 
assumptions concerning key external variables and the 
stance of domestic policy. In the case of the world 
economy, we are forced to rely on the work of a number 
of major international organisations (such as the OECD, 
EC, IMF) and private international forecasting agencies. 
The behaviour of the world economy is the single 
most important influence on the potential for Irish 
growth. Here, our assumptions were conditioned by two 
key factors: the slow-down and recession in the US and 
UK economies, with their knock-on effects on the rest 
of the world, and the events in Eastern Europe (in 
particular the unification of Gennany). 
The severity of the UK recession, in particular the 
rise in unemployment, still has serious consequences for 
Ireland, even though trade diversification and our 
long-term membership of the EMS have attenuated 
Irish-UK inter-dependence. In addition, the dominance 
of US multinational investment in Ireland makes us 
particularly sensitive to developments in the US econ-
omy, over and above the dominance of the US in other 
world markets. We assume that the UK and the US begin 
to pull out of recession in 1992, and that annual real 
growth in OECD industrial output will be just under 
2.5% from 1993-96. Inflation in the UK and the US is 
also likely to moderate towards an annual rate of about 
3% in the latter part of our forecast period. Our added 
assumption that the Irish pound remains essentially 
linked to movements in the OM will ensure that Ireland 
too enjoys continued low inflation. 
The situation with respect to developments in the 
re-unified Germany are at once more serious and more 
clifficultto forecast. The imperative of bringing previous 
East German regions up to the same level of develop-
ment as the Federal Republic will place enom10us 
political and economic strains on Germany and on the 
entire European Community. German fiscal policy will 
need to be expansionary in order to redevelop the 
Eastern lander, necessitating a massively increased 
level of public expenditure and some considerable 
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raising of taxes. This will cause the Germany economy 
to grow faster than most other OECD economies, bring 
about large exchequer deficits, and has already caused 
the Gennany balance of payments to go into deficit. 
Consequently, we assume a growth rate of over 4% 
per annum on average for the period 1991-96, with some 
slight rise in the rate of German inflation to 4% in 1992, 
falling back to 3% thereafter. The likely policy of high 
interest rates pursued by the Bundesbank will keep 
nominal rates at 8% or above out into the medium term. 
For domestic policy, we attempt to interpret the 
official statements and hints about the likely course of 
public expenditure and taxation planning for the 
immediate future, and implement a process of "policy 
indexation" furtherout into the medium term (i.e., where 
future policy is maintained at fixed real levels). 
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 
In our Review we take a somewhat provocative look 
at a possible long-te1m scenario for the Irish economy 
out to the year 2000. Given modest steady world growth 
and a domestic policy of indexation, the scenario points 
clearly to a serious long-term problem in the Irish labour 
market. 
Ireland inherits a rate of growth at the upper end of 
that forecast for the OECD area, together with a low and 
stable rate of price inflation, a maintained modest 
surplus on the balance of payments, elimination of the 
EBR and a debt/GNP ratio of about 70 per cent of GNP. 
Nevertheless, the net annual addition to total employ-
ment runs at only 10,000, well below the natural growth 
in the labour force. This results in resumed emigration 
(rising from 10,000 in 1992 to just under 40,000 per year 
by 2000), which serves to lower the rate of unemploy-
ment by the year 2000 to the same value it had in 1990, 
i.e., 14 per cent of the labour force. 
In effect, this is the labour market scenario outlined 
by the National Economic and Social Council in their 
report A Strategy for the Nineties, and declared to be 
"entirely unacceptable" . Our Review concludes with a 
critical examination of how policy and behaviour 
changes are needed in order to prevent this ex ante 
scenario becoming an ex post reality. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Any solution of the ills identified in the scenario to 
the year 2000 must be addressed under three major 
headings: 
(a) The relationship between employment, unem-
ployment, competitiveness and pay; 
(b) The nature of the constraint facing public sector 
initiatives, and how these constraints must be addressed; 
(c) The scope for long-term development policies to 
address underlying structural problems 
We see incomes and competitiveness policies as 
going to the core of how a faster rate of employment 
creation might be encouraged. If the benefits of pro-
ductivity rises are devoted entirely to raising the real 
wages of those in employment, then the scenario points 
SUMMARY vii 
TABLE 1. : Central Forecast - Major Aggregates 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GNP% Change 1.4 5.0 6.1 2.0 3.7 4.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 
Balance of Payments, % of GNP 2.3 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.9 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement, % of GNP -3.3 -2.3 -2.0 -1.9 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.9 -1.4 
Debt / GNP Ratio 130.4 119.4 111.8 108.4 105.6 101.8 99.5 96.4 92.6 
Total Employment (OOO) 1091 1090 1120 1123 1136 1151 1158 1167 1174 
Unemployment Rate % 16.7 15.7 14.0 15.8 15.9 15.7 16.0 16.0 16.0 
Consumer Prices % 2.5 3.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 
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to the likely consequences: low employment, enduring 
high unemployment and emigration. However, if a 
virtuous circle of competitiveness, investment, growth 
and employment can be brought about by more rational 
and socially desirable evolution of wages and costs, then 
the prospect opens for a transition towards a high 
employment, high living standard society. 
In this respect, it is disturbing that, at present, rising 
public expenditure is being used partly to fund higher 
wage increases in the public sector relative to those in 
the market sector. This action militates against the stated 
aspiration of public policy to reduce the rate of unem-
ployment in the long run, and will undoubtedly bring 
pressure to bear on trades unions to seek higher wage 
increases in the market sector than might otherwise have 
applied. 
MEDIUM TERM REVIEW: 1989-1994 
The central danger of Ireland's high level of public 
debt is that movements in world conditions can trigger 
disruptive corrective measures, as occurred in the early 
1980s. The minimum requirements for public policy on 
indebtedness are a rapid reduction of the debt/GNP ratio 
to under 100 per cent, mainly on prudential grounds, 
followed by continuous, if gradual, reduction thereafter 
towards average EC levels of 50-75 percent. 
Finally, we stress the valuable contribution that the 
National Economic & Social Council has made to the 
search for longer term policies on development that will 
both attempt to push the Irish economy towards a path 
of faster growth, and ensure the maximisation of 
employment creation. We draw attention to the need for 
a pragmatic quantification of the likely benefits of these 
policies, and an assessment of how likely they are to 
make inroads into our endemic level of unemployment. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"no )) .. rov 'taµtas ZEUS 'EV 'O\uµnro 
7t0A./\.(X o' '<XEA.7t'C(J)S Kpmvoum 8£0t. 
K<Xl 'CCX 001CT]8EV'C' o'UK 'E'CEA.ECT8Tl, 
'C(J)V o' '<XOOlCTj'C(J)V nopov ll'UpE ei::os ."· 
In classical times in Greece it was traditional to 
consult the Delphic oracle before commencing any 
major new undertaking. This consultation was no mere 
forecasting exercise but took on the nature of a 
quasi-religious experience. No doubt the oracle learnt a 
lot of secrets from this process and improved her 
forecasts as a result! We make no such exalted claims 
for this Review. 
No more than the oracle, what we have tried to do is 
to learn from past experience and to identify the prob-
lems and possibilities for the Irish economy in the 1990s. 
Chapter 2 of this Review looks at our experience over 
the last fifteen years. This analysis of past policies and 
their effectiveness provides the essential basis for any 
forecast of the next five years. 
While the forecasts which we provide are useful to 
a wide range of organisations and individuals in 
planning for the future, everyone recognises the 
uncertainty which must attach to them. However, 
judgements about the future must be made so, in Chapter 
3, we examine developments in the outside world. We 
consider what the likely environment for the Irish 
economy will be over the period to 1996 and what are 
the major factors giving rise to uncertainty about this 
future. 
Having established a view as to the external econ-
omic environment Ireland faces, we then use the ESRI 
Medium-Term Model of the economy to develop a 
consistent central forecast for the period 1991-96. The 
first of a series of separate articles in this Review by 
Bradley and Fitz Gerald gives a non-mathematical 
description of how the model works. It outlines the key 
mechanisms in the model and explains the logic behind 
its specification. 
In preparing a forecast, the first task is to decide on 
a set of assumptions concerning the key variables 
driving the economy. For example we look at growth in 
Germany and the UK, German interest rates, UK 
unemployment, domestic fiscal policy, etc. The model 
is then applied to these assumptions and a forecast is 
* Euripides Medea: 
Many are the fates which Zeus in Olympus dispenses; 
Many matters the gods bring to surprising ends. 
The things we thought would happen do not happen; 
The unexpected god makes possible; 
produced. It is at this point that the authors' judgement 
is applied to the model's results . Extensive adjustments 
are made to take account of additional information 
concerning the likely behaviour of the economy and to 
allow for factors which the model can not take into 
account. 
In this Review the forecast for 1991 is taken directly 
from the spring issue of the Quarterly Economic 
Commentary. The central forecast for the next five years 
is described in Chapter 4. It suggests that the Irish 
economy can look forward to steady, if unspectacular, 
growth in GNP over the 1990s. However, the unem-
ployment rate will continue rising up to the middle of 
the decade posing the major problem for economic 
policy in the medium term. The state of the public 
finances, which merited less attention in the last Review 
in 1989, is again a cause for concern in the immediate 
future. Unless policy is changed the bo1rnwing 
requirement may actually rise in the next two years. 
In Chapter 4 we also use the model to examine how 
our forecast would be modified by changes in our 
assumptions about EC interest rates and economic 
growth in the USA and the UK. The model allows us to 
explore in a consistent manner the full effects on the 
economy of such shocks to the external environment. 
In many ways more important than our forecasting 
role is the task of identifying the problems and possible 
obstacles to development which Ireland may face in the 
medium to long term. There is a danger that the 
immediacy of current problems may act as blinkers on 
our vision of the future. What we wish to do in this 
Review is to raise our own vision slightly, to see these 
problems from the perspective of a wider time frame. 
Chapter 5 considers the problems that will be faced by 
the Irish economy to the end of the decade and discusses 
how policy should be modified to deal with them. 
The major theme of Chapter 5 is the need to act on 
the supply side to increase the Jong-term productive 
potential of the economy. This chapter examines some 
of the themes in the NESC report Strategy for the 1990s 
which is the only approach capable of producing a 
lasting increase in employment over and above that 
which will occur under existing policies. It considers 
different areas where efficiency may be increased and 
competitiveness improved. 
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Two areas where Ireland faces special problems over 
the next decade are considered in separate articles. An 
article, by Fitz Gerald and O'Connor, looks at the likely 
effects on Ireland of one approach to reforming the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This article 
suggests that the reform package examined could result 
in a substantial reduction in GNP in the medium term 
of the order of 1 to 1.5 percentage points. The effects 
would also be felt beyond the agricultural sector. 
An article by McCoy considers Irish policy on acid 
rain. It examines the likely impact on the economy of 
different policies to deal with the problem and suggests 
that the current policy may be seriously flawed. It 
suggests that a new multilateral approach is called for 
and it shows that a transfer of funds to Eastern Europe 
could prove more efficient at meeting what appears to 
be the government's objective than the policy currently 
being implemented. 
The last article in this Review by Barry provides a 
review of the literature on the problem of slow 
employment growth in Ireland. It argues that while 
conventional demand-side effects of policies have 
adversely affected employment growth in the past, the 
supply side of the economy must be seen as the engine 
of growth. The paper further argues that the impact of 
structural change on unemployment needs to be 
researched more fully. 
The Record of the Medium-Term Review 
This is the fourth Medium-Term Review to be pub-
lished since the series began in 1986. While humbling 
for the authors, it is useful to consider the forecasting 
record of the Review over the period both to improve 
the quality of future forecasts and to understand the 
likely margins for error in the major aggregates. Because 
the Review provides forecasts five years ahead this is a 
much more stringent test than that normally applied to 
short-term forecasts. 
Table 1.1 shows the forecast for the average growth 
in GNP from the last three Reviews. These forecasts are 
compared to the average growth over the same period 
using historical figures, where available. For 1991 and 
later years the latest forecasts from this Review are used 
and compared to the earlier ones. 
While at the time of their publication the first two 
Medium-Term Reviews were considered to be unduly 
optimistic, in fact, they underestimated the growth in 
the economy by between 0.75% and 1.0% a 
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TABLE 1.1: Comparison of Forecasts 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
Forecast Forecast Latest Estimate 
Period % % 
Reviewl986 1986-91 2.46 3.24 
Review 1987 1988-92 2.64 3.69 
Review 1989 1989-94 4.88 4.10 
year for the forecast period. The 1989 Review erred in 
the other direction. While it con-ectly forecast the very 
rapid growth in 1989 and 1990, it failed to predict the 
1991 slow-down. In addition, it showed the underlying 
growth rate in the economy in the 1990s as being around 
4% a year, about 0.5 percentage points above the cmTent 
forecast. 
In the case of the slow-down in 1991 the last Review 
took too optimistic a view concerning the trend of public 
policy in the USA and the UK. Both these economies 
failed to deal with the problems apparent in 1989 and 
recessions ensued. Their depth was magnified by 
unexpected developments in the Middle East. The 
forecast large fall in the Irish savings ratio also failed to 
materialise, partly because interest rates were higher 
than forecast. The uncertainty concerning movements 
in the savings ratio continues and this must be a priority 
for further research. 
As explained later, another reason for the reduction 
in the forecast potential growth in output in the economy 
lies in the changes in Eastern Europe. The effects of 
German unification have raised interest rates in the EC. 
Failure to predict the major upheavals in Eastern Europe 
was not surprising and was shared with every other 
forecasting body. 
While the margin of error in the forecasts for the 
average growth in GNP in previous Reviews was 
between 0.75% and 1.0%, the possibilities of error on a 
year by year basis are greater. The last Review was fairly 
succesful in forecasting growth in 1989 and 1990 but it 
failed to predict the turning point in 1991 when the 
slow-down occurred (Table 1.2). The first two Reviews 
were correct in predicting that the Irish economy would 
show a reasonable recovery from the recession of the 
1980s but were not very accurate in forecasting the 
timing of the recovery. This highlights the fact that while 
medium-term forecasting is useful in predicting broad 
trends, it is likely to prove unreliable on the precise 
timing of developments in the economy. This Review 
should be read with this caveat in mind. 
TABLE 1.2: Comparison of Forecasts for GNP Growth Rate 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Review 1986 2.5 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.0 - - - -
Review 1987 - - -0.4 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.6 - -
Review 1989 - - - 4.0 7.1 5.6 4.6 4.8 3.2 
Review 1991 - - - - - 2.0 3.8 4.3 3.3 
Latest CSO Estimate -1.2 5.0 1.4 5.0 6.1 - - - -
CHAPTER2 
RECESSION AND RECOVERY: IRELAND IN THE 1980s 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the dust has scarcely settled on the 1980s, it is 
probably premature to attempt to characterise this recent 
period in any definitive way. However, history will 
probably interpret Ireland of the 1980s in terms of two 
factors: 
(a) the very deep world recession associated with the 
OPEC-II price rises at the beginning of the decade 
and; 
(b) the manner in which domestic policy makers 
attempted to contain and reverse the public debt 
consequences of the extravagances of the previous 
decade against a background of the more buoyant 
world growth of the late 1980s. 
Only now do we have data sufficiently complete (if 
not yet totally reliable) to give us a picture of how the 
economy behaved during the 1980s, in particular during 
the crucial latter years of recovery. Our objective in 
Section 2.2 is to present an overview of what actually 
happened and to suggest some possible explanations for 
the strange roller-coaster behaviour of many measures 
of Irish economic activity: the violent gyrations of 
growth in GNP; the rapid decline in inflation; the switch 
from a chronic balance of payments deficit to a sus-
tained, if modest, surplus; the virtual elimination of the 
exchequer borrowing requirement; and the rapid rise in 
unemployment to a seemingly ever-enduring high level. 
As well as suggesting factors which explain the 
performance of the economy in a qualitative sense, we 
also attempt to quantify the role played by these factors 
in causing recession and recovery during the 1980s. In 
a very slylised way, three main elements can be 
identified in such analysis: 
(a) the direct and indirect effects of the world economy, 
over which Irish agents had no effective control; 
(b) domestic policy actions, which are determined, at 
least to some extent, by deliberate and explicit 
choices of Irish policy makers, and finally; 
( c) the manner in which agents in the private sector react 
to stimuli from world and domestic policy 
influences. 
In Section 2.3 we explore the role of "world" factors 
in the behaviour of the Irish economy during the 1980s, 
while in Section 2.4 we examine the role of domestic 
policy actions. In Section 2.5 we carry out some coun-
ter-factual analysis of Ireland's recent period of 
recovery, focusing specifically on the years 1987-90. 
These counter-factual experiments attempt to re-play 
history, but changing certain crucial assumptions, in an 
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effort to understand the driving forces in the economy. 
Alternative explanations of this recovery have also been 
offered and we comment on these, comparing and 
contrasting them with our own analysis. 
Our analysis in these three sections is conditioned 
by the manner in which we handle the third crucial 
element above, i.e., the behavioural response of the 
private sector. Here we are on more controversial 
ground in that we make use of the framework of analysis 
contained in the ESRI Medium-Term model of the 
economy, an introductory description of which is given 
in a separate article in this Review. 
There is no such thing as a perfect and com-
prehensive economic model. Nevertheless, the ESRI 
model is in the public domain, has been extensively used 
and tested in two previous Reviews and has a structure 
that is, we believe, intuitively plausible and coherent. 
Hence, its use in carrying out counter-factual analysis 
and a decomposition of the major influences operating 
during the 1980s is of some relevance. It is also 
important to note that the key focus of the ESRI model 
is on the production ( or supply) side of the economy, an 
area that is crucial to understanding Irish economic 
behaviour in the medium term, but one that is somewhat 
neglected in quantitative research on Ireland and else-
where. 
Central to our analysis of the causes of recession and 
recovery in the Ireland of the 1980s is the assumption 
that the reactions of the private sector to world and 
domestic policy stimuli has remained predictable within 
the framework of analysis used by the ESRI model. In 
fact we anticipated at least two important changes in 
behaviour for the late 1980s, these years being outside 
the range of data used to calibrate the model; the first 
associated with the determination of wage increases and 
the second with consumer behaviour. 
In the case of wages, it seemed initially likely that 
the conjunction of adverse labour market conditions and 
the crisis in the public finances in the mid- l 980s might 
have led to a significant change in the manner in which 
trades unions and employers settled on the three-year 
wage deal negotiated as part of the Programme for 
National Recovery. In fact, no such break in behaviour 
was found, and the model continued to explain the main 
elements of wage bargaining throughout the late 1980s, 
as we describe below. 
In the case of private consumption expenditures, the 
simple model we use does indeed systematically 
underpredict the growth in consumption for the recovery 
period 1988-90 (equivalently, it overp1·edicts the sav-
ings rate). Since this is signalling a change of behaviour 
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which we do not yet fully understand, an ad-hoe 
adjustment was made to the model to force it to track 
recent consumption growth. 
Our examination of the 1980s, particularly the latter 
part, is very relevant in evaluating our prospects for the 
1990s, the presentation of which later fmms the central 
element of this Review. In Section 2.6 draw together our 
main conclusions on the 1980s with a view to setting 
the scene for the detailed forecasts of the period 
1991-1996 (Chapters 3 and 4), and our more speculative 
exploration of the likely prospects for the latter part of 
the decade (Chapter 5). 
2.2 OVERVIEW: 1980-90 
2.2.1 Output and Expenditure 
The broadest aggregate measure of production 
activity in the economy is Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), being the summation of output in all the pro-
ducing sectors. In Figure 2.1 we show the growth rate 
of real GDP for the 1980s, using the expenditure-based 
CSO measure. The dismal and erratic perfonnance of 
the first half of the decade is only too apparent, as is the 
robust recovery from 1987 out to 1990. 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
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However, for Ireland during the 1980s, performance, 
even judged by this GDP measure, was misleadingly 
flattering. A sizeable fraction of domestic product was 
required to fund both interest payments on the foreign 
component of the national debt and profit repatriations 
from foreign-owned branches of Irish-based multi-
nationals. These two outflows from the economy grew 
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rapidly during the 1980s and were much larger than any 
inflows of income from abroad to Irish residents arising 
from ownership of foreign assets. Subtracting the real 
net outflow abroad from GDP, the resulting real Gross 
National Product (GNP) growth rate is shown as the 
dotted line in Figure 2.1. 
Further understanding of the growth of GDP can be 
obtained by looking at the sectors of the economy which 
produce it. In Figure 2.2 (a-d) we show the growth rate 
of output in four main sectors at factor cost (i.e., 
excluding taxes and subsidies): industry, market ser-
vices, agriculture and non-market services. The two 
dominant producing sectors are industry ( over 42 per 
cent share of total GDP by 1990) and market services 
(35 per cent share), while the share of agriculture 
declined over the 1980s to about 9 per cent by 1990. 
The pattern of industrial growth reflects (indeed, 
dominates) the aggregate picture: a slow-down during 
the first half of the decade, followed by a very vigorous 
recovery over the period 1987-90. A similar pattern is 
seen in the performance of market services, although 
the recovery phase is somewhat attenuated. 
The erratic behaviour of agriculture (with some 
remarkably good years - 1982 and 1984 - and some very 
bad years, often weather related - 1985-86 and 1989) is 
fairly typical of any primary producing sector. The small 
share of agriculture in the economy (9 per cent by 1990 
compared with 15 per cent in 1960) means that the rest 
of the economy is somewhat less sensitive to shocks 
originating in agriculture than was the case, for example, 
in the 1960s. 
Finally, Ireland entered the 1980s with a greatly 
increased level of public sector output and employment 
and consequently, of expenditure on public goods and 
services (also referred to as "non-market" services). 
Many of the subsequent problems with the public 
finances can be inferred from the behaviour of public 
sector output. Even by 1982, when aggregate GNP 
growth was negative, real public sector activity was still 
growing by over 3 per cent. Over the period 1983-87, 
the real level of public services remained relatively 
static (with a temporary rise in 1986). The cuts in the 
levels of services (initiated after the 1987 general 
election) were concentrated in the years 1988-89 (-4.3 
and -2.5 per cent respectively), with service levels 
growing by a modest half per cent in 1990-91. 
In summary, any explanation of the low and erratic 
growth in aggregate GDP over the 1980s should be 
based on the mechanisms of growth in the producing 
sectors: low growth in industry for the period 1980-86, 
followed by a rapid recovery; a similar pattern in 
marketed services; erratic growth in agriculture, the 
causes of which have little connection with the 
non-agricultural economy; and a frozen real level of 
public sector services to 1987, followed by two years of 
real cuts. We now examine these mechanisms under two 
broad headings: the behaviour of the public sector and 
the behaviour of the private sector. 
2.2.2 The Public Sector during the 1980s 
The output measure of public sector activity (i.e., 
services of public administration, health and education) 
appears on the expenditure side of the national accounts 
as public consumption. Since funding public con-
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sumption represents ultimately a burden on the rest of 
the economy (a burden that can only be delayed and 
increased by debt rather than tax finandng), we show 
in Figure 2.3 the share of public consumption in the 
value of GNP. Starting at 20.5 percent in 1980 (up from 
14 per cent in 1970), this ratio stayed high during the 
first half of the decade, peaked in 1986 at 21 per cent, 
and declined to just under 18 per cent by 1990 as a result 
of job shedding in the public sector (Figure 2.4 ). 
Figure 2.3 
Share of Public Consumption in GNP 
Figure 2.4 
Public Sector Employment 
- Public Admin. · - Health & Educ. 
The above ratio is a "narrow" measure of the size of 
the public sector in the economy. A wider measure 
consists of total public expenditure, obtained by adding 
public consumption, subsidies, current and capital 
transfers (such as debt interest payments, unemploy-
ment benefits and IDA grants to industry), and public 
investment expenditures (such as housing, roads, etc). 
In Figure 2.5 we show this "broad" expenditure measure 
as a ratio to GNP. It peaked at just under 56 per cent in 
1985, and by 1990 had fallen back to under 46 per cent 
(it was 39 per cent in 1975). 
While theoretically this expanded level of public 
expenditure could have been financed by raising taxes 
and keeping the exchequer borrowing requirement 
roughly in balance, in fact resort was made both to tax 
financing and to borrowing during the 1980s. Figure 2.6 
shows the exchequer surplus (i.e., the negative of the 
borrowing requirement, EBR) as a proportion of GNP 
while Figure 2. 7 shows total taxation revenue as a 
proportion of GNP. 
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Financing the burgeoning EBR required the state to 
borrow both domestically and abroad, and the accu-
mulated national debt as a proportion of GNP (the 
"debt/GNP" ratio) rose from just under 80 per cent of 
GNP in 1980, to a peak of over 137 per cent in 1987, 
and had declined to 112 per cent by 1990 (Figure 2.8). 
The high level of borrowing was further exacerbated by 
the rise in nominal and "real" interest rates (i.e., the 
"nominal" or actual rate corrected by subtracting the rate 
of inflation), movements in which are shown in Figure 
2.9. In the previous Figure 2.6 we show the "primary" 
surplus (i.e., the actual exchequer surplus less interest 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
payments on the national debt), which became positive 
in 1987, and is now rnnning at some 7 per cent of GNP, 
as against a continuing actual deficit. 
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A genuine fear existed during the early 1980s that 
the debt/GNP ratio might grow out of control, as 
increased b01Towing was required to fund the growing 
interest bill, opening the possibility of default, debt 
rescheduling and externally imposed adjustment pro-
grammes. However, just as bad luck (in the form of the 
OPEC-II recession) exacerbated the debt problem at the 
encl of the 1970s and into the 1980s, a combination of 
long-delayed domestic fiscal reform and a buoyant 
world economy eased the process of adjustment towards 
the end of the 1980s. 
The bulk of the adjustment, in terms of expenditure 
cuts, took place in the years 1988-89. However, the 
budget of 1990 relaxed this process of adjustment, kept 
expenditure roughly constant in real terms, and provided 
only a modest reduction of the EBR from 2.3 to 2 per 
cent of GNP. 
In summary, the experience of the 1980s brought 
home to Irish policy makers and people in general that 
public and private sectors are mutually linked and that 
a successful mixed economy requires an elusive balance 
to be struck between them in order to maximise 
aggregate growth opportunities. During the fiscal 
expansions of the 1970s and early 1980s this balance 
was upset and the requirement to reverse growth in the 
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inherited greatly expanded state sector in the leaner, 
more competitive, 1980s made an already difficult 
situation worse. 
2.2.3 The Behaviour of the Private Sector 
The analysis of the behaviour of the private sector 
is very different from that of the public sector discussed 
above. As shown in the separate article on the ESRI 
medium-term model later in this Review, we attempt to 
explain the behaviour of the private sector in terms of 
the outcome of purposeful directed actions. 
So, for example, a private firm is assumed to produce 
a given output at minimum cost in terms of inputs 
needed. Hence, anything that reduces the desired pro-
duction target (say, a decline in world demand), will 
cause a fall in the requirement for all inputs. Also, 
anything that raises the cost of labour (i.e., the wage 
rate) will force such a finn to use less labour in 
production. Firms that ignore these signals simply lose 
profitability and ultimately may go out of business. 
A better understanding of the functioning of the 
private sector requires more detail than the above 
three-way breakdown into industry, market services and 
agriculture. Starting with industry, three sub-sectors can 
be distinguished: manufacturing, building and utilities. 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show employment in manufac-
turing and in building over the 1980s (employment in 
utilities - electricity, gas and water- was relatively 
constant at 14,000 throughout the decade). The shedding 
of 33,000 jobs in building and 39,000 in manufacturing 
over the years 1980 to 1987 are dramatic illustrations 
of the economic and social consequences of Ireland's 
recession. 
Figure 2.10 
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Three further subdivisions of manufacturing are also 
relevant: 
(a) a high technology sector (multinational, capital and 
R&D intensive, totally export oriented, repatriates 
its profits); 
(b) afood-processing sector (mostly indigenous, linked 
to agriculture via its material inputs, moderately 
export oriented), and; 
(c) a traditional sector (drink, textiles, wood, publish-
ing, etc), which has a high dependence on the 
domestic and UK markets. 
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Employment in these subsectors is shown in Figure 
2.12, where it is apparent that the bulk of manufacturing 
job losses occurred in the traditional and food sectors. 
Figure 2.12 
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The manufacturing sector component of industry has 
now become the key driving force of the Irish economy. 
It has a massive exposure to world trade: Figure 2.13 
shows industrial exports as a proportion of gross 
national product. Given that exposure, there are two 
main detenninants of manufacturing activity: 
(a) the state of demand in the global economy, and 
(b) cost competitiveness relative to trading partners. 
In Figure 2.14 we show the Irish industrial growth 
rate compared with that in the OECD, where OECD 
growth is a good proxy for "world" demand. The 
combination of small size and high external exposure 
to the world economy means that Irish industrial prices 
are set largely in world markets and not as a mark-up 
on domestic industrial costs. Hence, the relevant 
measure of international competitiveness is cost-based, 
and in Figure 2.15 we illustrate how Irish wage rates 
moved relative to German and UK rates, on a 
common-currency basis. The erosion of competitive-
ness during the first half of the 1980s is apparent, a 
process that was not reversed until after 1985 relative 
to Germany and after 1987 relative to the UK. The 
period 1987-1990 is seen to be one where some of the 
previous losses were recovered. 
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The relatively strong performance of the manufac-
turing sector, combined with a weak domestic demand 
for imports ( due to tight fiscal policy), led to the build-up 
of a large balance of trade surplus during the 1980s, thus 
reversing the deficits of the 1970s (Figure 2.16). 
However, the move to surplus on the balance of inter-
national payments took longer, due to the high and rising 
foreign debt and profit repatriation outflows, as shown 
in Figure 2.17. 
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Turning to market services, this is now the largest 
sector of the economy in terms of employment. Unlike 
manufacturing, with the exception of tourism and some 
other services it is largely sheltered from direct exposure 
to world markets. Nevertheless, it thrives when the 
exposed industrial and agricultural sectors thrive and 
domestic demand is buoyant. In the short run it is 
broadly able to pass on higher costs in terms of higher 
prices. 
Two offsetting forces operated on market services 
during the 1980s: 
(a) a negative effect due to recession in the inter-
nationally trading sectors, and; 
(b) a positive effect due to restructuring in industry, 
where many activities shifted from industry to ser-
vices as, for example, originally in-house activities 
were replaced by bought-in services. 
The resulting employment behaviour in industry and 
services is shown in Figure 2.18, where the relatively 
buoyant perfmmance of services contrasts with the 
dismal performance of industry. 
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Figure 2.18 
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2.2.4 Wages, Prices and Profits 
We have seen that Irish industrial output and export 
prices are largely determined abroad, and firms are 
unable to pass on higher domestic costs of production 
unless these cost rises are also being experienced abroad 
(i.e., as a general world-wide inflation). Hence, a firm's 
competitiveness will depend on its input costs and the 
efficiency with which it uses inputs (including non-price 
elements like design). 
A key input cost consists of wages, particularly for 
"labour intensive" sectors. In Figure 2.19 we show the 
wage bill as a proportion of output (added-value) for the 
three-way breakdown of manufacturing. The traditional 
sub-sector is clearly the most labour intensive, with the 
high-technology sector being the least. However, given 
the way in which wage-rounds have been determined 
(or, at least, influenced) by economy-wide agreements, 
and the national coverage of trades unions, not sur-
prisingly changes in wage rates tend to show a con-
siderable similarity between sectors. 
80 1 
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In Figure 2.20 we show the rate of wage inflation in 
total industry (the leading sector), together with the rate 
of consumer price inflation. Between 1980 and 1986, 
the growth rate of average annual earnings in industry 
fell from 18 per cent (in 1981) to 5 per cent (by 1986), 
and has remained at or below about 5 per cent per annum 
since then. To a considerable extent the process of 
disinflation was driven by world disinflation throughout 
9 
the 1980s (Figure 2.21 ). However, this process was 
assisted by the other downward pressures on wage 
demands, which we now examine, using the findings on 
wage bargaining discussed in the special article on the 
ESRI model later in this Review. 
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In Figure 2.22 (a-d) we show the four elements 
determining wage inflation in the ESRI model, weighted 
so as to represent their short-run contribution to wage 
inflation. The solid line in each graph shows the actual 
path of wage inflation. The dotted line shows the effect 
on wage rates of the particular factor under investiga-
tion. 
(a) The biggest determinant is clearly output price 
inflation, which was falling globally as well as in 
Ireland. In the seven year period between 1980 and 
1987, world price deflation appears to have reduced 
wage inflation from its high 1980 level of about 20 
per cent by about 15 percentage points, other things 
being equal. 
(b) The tax wedge tended to add about 3 per cent to wage 
inflation each year from 1980 to 1988, with little or 
no net contribution thereafter. 
( c) The systematic rise in unemployment in the first half 
of the decade may have reduced wage inflation by a 
maximum of 3 percentage points per annum during 
the years 1982-1984. Once unemployment started 
falling after 1987, a modest annual upward pressure 
on wages was induced. 
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Figure 2.22 
Determinants of Wage Inflation During the 1980s 
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(cl) Finally, between 1981 and 1989, labourproductivity 
growth tended to contribute an average 5 percentage 
points per annum to wage inflation. However, the 
sharp drop in productivity growth in 1990 and 1991 
(from a trend growth of 4 per cent per annum to 
between zero and 2 per cent) served to depress wage 
inflation at the end of the decade. 
In summary, the Irish price disinflation of the 1980s 
is almost totally explained by global price deflation and 
the relatively fixed exchange rate of the Irish pound 
within the EMS. The dominant force for wage disin-
flation also came from world price disinflation, par-
ticularly when expectations adjusted to the lower and 
more stable world inflation environment. The 
inflationary effects of tax increases in the years to 1987 
tended to be offset by the deflationary effects of rising 
unemployment (the so-called "Phillips curve" effect). 
The fall in productivity growth towards the end of the 
decade was probably associated with the resumed 
growth of the more labour-intensive traditional manu-
facturing sector, together with an wider maturing of 
manufacturing after more than a decade of 
high-technology dominated growth. 
The surprising finding is that the mechanism 
describing wage bargaining over the period of the 1960s 
and 1970s proved adequate and robust for explaining 
wage determination during what were widely perceived 
as innovative "corporatist" wage setting agreements of 
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the late 1980s. The stability and predictability of the 
world inflationary pressures probably assisted in the 
creation of the type of accurate expectations about the 
future which are so necessary in formulating and 
underpinning three-year pay deals. However, the 
benefits to the nation of the pay deal were probably 
associated more with industrial peace and stability 
rather than with strictly lower wage increases. 
2.2.5 Employment and Unemployment 
The number of people unemployed is the difference 
between total employment (or the demand for labour) 
and the total labour force (or the supply of labour). We 
have seen above that demand for labour fell precipitately 
during the years 1980-1987, and only picked up mildly 
by 1991. A net loss of over 33,000 jobs occurred over 
the period of the 1980s. 
During this same period, the supply of labour grew 
by a little under 78,000. Part of this increase was simply 
due to an increase in the population of working age 
(14-64 years) of about 140,000, a slight rise in the 
participation rate (i.e., the proportion of the working age 
population actively seeking employment), both offset 
to a slight degree by a steady rise in numbers attending 
full-time education. However, a crucial factor moder-
ating labour force growth (and hence unemployment) 
was the numbers leaving the country as emigrants 
~ 
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(Figure 2.23), a cumulative loss of over 240,000 
between 1980-91, about two thirds of whom were 
assumed to be of working age. 
Thousands 
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The resulting rate of unemployment (numbers 
unemployed as a percentage of the labour force) is 
shown in Figure 2.24, where we use the Labour Force 
Survey measure rather than the less accurate Live 
Register, or entitlements based, measure. From a value 
of 7 .3 per cent in 1980 (a value that was even then 
considered high!), the unemployment rate rose by 
almost 10.5 points (or 141,000 persons) by 1987, and 
had only declined to 14 percent by April 1991. It is now, 
in 1991, beginning to rise again. 
Figure 2.25 
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The rise in unemployment was not unique to Ireland: 
to a greater or lesser extent all other OECD states also 
experienced some degree of deterioration in their rates 
of unemployment. Given the traditional links between 
Ireland and Great Britain, the destination of most Irish 
emigrants, we show in Figure 2.25 the difference 
between the Irish and British rates. 
After a long period of stability in this differential in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, the improvement in it 
between 1977-80 (a period of rapid public and private 
sector employment growth in Ireland) was followed by 
a serious deterioration (to the extent of almost 10 points 
difference) in the period 1982-89. This was one of the 
main factors serving to attract emigrants from Ireland 
to the British labour market. For a further treatment of 
the forces determining Irish unemployment, and an 
evaluation of explanations offered, see the separate 
article later in this Review. · 
2.3 WORLD INFLUENCES DURING THE 
1980s 
Having described the performance of the economy 
during the 1980s, and suggested qualitative reasons for 
its behaviour, we now examine in more detail some of 
the key explanatory factors underlying Ireland's 
recession and recovery. These factors can be usefully 
considered under two headings: 
(a) the impact of events in the world economy, and; 
(b) the role played by domestic policy aGtions. 
In this section we examine world influences, and 
take up the policy issues in the next section. In both cases 
our methodology is as follows: 
(i) we first take some aspect of the world or policy 
environment and propose changes from the his-
torical path. For example, we eliminate the 
OPEC-II recession by constructing a more benign 
hypothetical growth path for OECD output (an 
external variable in the ESRI model); 
(ii) we then recalculate the behaviour of the Irish 
economy on the basis of this changed hypothetical 
assumption; 
(iii) this new behaviour is compared with the historical 
behaviour, and the isolated effect of the changed 
assumption can be isolated. 
Such experiments are usually termed "counter-fac-
tual" simulations of the model. However, if Irish poli-
cymakers have little or no influence on the world 
economy, what is the point of carrying out 
counterfactual analysis where specific aspects of the 
world economic environment are changed? Two 
important justifications can be offered: 
(a) it is interesting to be able to quantify the role played 
by world factors in order to study their transmission 
to Ireland. The counter-factual simulation enables 
this to be done; 
(b) it permits one to isolate the role, if any, played by 
Irish policymakers. For example, if one finds that 
world influences can explain much of Irish behav-
iour, then one can more precisely establish the scope, 
albeit marginal, for corrective domestic policy 
actions. 
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In highly stylised terms, three particular deviations 
characterised the world economy of the 1980s: 
(a) The low, even negative, growth in the main OECD 
economies in the early years, followed by a 
reasonably steady recovery, strong growth in the UK 
and USA cases (Figure 2.26). 
Figure 2.26 
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(b) The switch from negative real interest rates in the 
early part of the decade to high positive real rates in 
the latter part (Figure 2.27) 
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(c) The dramatic rise in the UK unemployment rate in 
the first half of the decade, followed by a steady fall 
to one of the lowest rates in the OECD by the end of 
the decade (Figure 2.28) 
It is of interest to quantify the extent to which these 
deviations from trend behaviour influenced the Irish 
economy, and this is done using the ESRI model. The 
counterfactual assumptions used are also illustrated in 
Figures 2.26-2.28, as dotted lines. So, for example, the 
"alternative" world is characterised by steady positive 
growth and modest UK unemployment during the first 
half of the decade and lower real interest rates in the 
second half. 
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Figure 2.28 
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It should be noted that simulations like these alter-
native world scenarios are likely to push the ESRI model 
towards the limits of its reliability. As noted in the 
separate article on the model in this Review, making 
such radical changes to the external world economy 
would logically require changes in the very underlying 
structure of the model (the so called "Lucas" critique). 
In addition, making isolated specific changes to certain 
variables probably invalidates assumptions about other 
external variables. This means that our analysis provides 
a type of "ball-park" estimate of consequences of 
changes, and must be interpreted with caution. How-
ever, no other approach can hope to identify these 
effects. 
The Effects of Higher World Growth 
We present our counter-factual simulation results in 
Figure 2.29 (a-f), in terms of deviations from the actual 
(or historical) outturn. We see that the elimination of 
the OPEC-II clown-turn in world growth (illustrated in 
Figure 2.26 above) would have been likely to have had 
a dramatic effect on the Irish economy. Since the 
population would have changed ( due to migration 
changes), we show in (a) the likely effects on GNP and 
consumption on a per capita basis. Both GNP and 
consumption could have been stimulated, the former by 
a cumulative 3 per cent by mid-decade. 
The probable leakages out of the economy would 
have served to moderate the boost to personal disposable 
income, so there would probably have been little or no 
permanent improvement in per capita consumption. 
Both the government and international surpluses would 
have been greatly improved, by about 2.5 per cent of 
GNP (b ), with the debt/GNP ratio lower by over 20 
percentage points of GNP by 1990 ( c). 
Wage rates and prices would have been modestly 
higher in the first half of the decade, due mainly to the 
tighter labour market (i.e., higher employment, lower 
migration and lower unemployment), (d), (e) and (f). 
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Figure 2.29 
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The Effects of Lower Real Interest Rates 
We saw in Figure 2.27 that real interest rates did not 
reach high positive values until 1983. In this coun-
ter-factual simulation, for the period up to 1984, interest 
rat~s t~ke tl:eir historical values, and are only kept below 
their lustoncal values (at 4 per cent in real terms) from 
1985 out. 
As shown in Figure 2.30 (a-f), the effect on the 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
eco?<;nny would have been stimulatory, . The likely 
positive effect on growth, the improvement in the 
government and international balances and the lower-
ing of the debt/GNP ratio are particularly apparent. The 
negative effect on consumption would have been due 
largely to the reduction in domestic payments of interest 
on the national debt which form a sizeable component 
of personal disposable income. 
Figure 2.30 
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(The term "Benchmark" refers to the historical outturn) 
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The Effects of Lower UK Unemployment 
The hypothetical path of UK unemployment is 
shown in Figure 2.28 and the likely implications for the 
Irish economy are illustrated in Figure 2.31 (a-f). 
The central influence of the UK rate of unemploy-
ment on the Irish economy operates through the 
migration mechanism. Lower UK unemployment 
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signals a more attractive UK labour market, and 
increased outflows of migrants from Ireland result. This 
lowers the Irish rate of unemployment, drives up wage 
rates, and lowers employment. While the effects on 
GNP are likely to be negative, the probable drop in 
population would result in a significant increase in per 
capita GNP. 
Figure 2.31 
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In summary then, the above counter-factual simu-
lations illustrate that the severe OPEC-II related 
down-turn in the world economy placed the Irish 
economy under serious strain, at a time when coun-
ter-cyclical fiscal policy, as we shall show, was exerting 
further downward pressure. For example, the 
combination of a better pattern of world growth in the 
1980-84 period, lower real interest rates and the absence 
of high UK unemployment would have been likely to 
have reduced the Irish unemployment rate by over four 
percentage points in 1986. The exchequer surplus could 
have been 7 percentage points of GNP higher (equiv-
alently, the EBR lower), with a debt/GNP ratio 30 
percentage points of GNP lower than actual. 
2.4 POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 
In the pre-OPEC world, the orthodox, mainly 
demand-side, Keynesian orientation to policy assumed 
that the public sector could be used to stimulate the 
private sector through the multiplier effects of public 
expenditure policies on private activity. The fiscal 
expansions of the 1970s drew their inspiration from this 
approach to economic theory, albeit with a seriously 
flawed under-evaluation of the leakages from the 
economy through imports and financial outflows. 
Advances in applied economic theory and more 
detailed study of the Irish economy have changed that 
earlier point of view. More attention is now given to 
ways in which state activity (e.g., public sector · 
employment increases, tax rises, etc) may crowd out 
activities in the private sector, thus generating offsetting 
forces to the Keynesian demand expansion ones. We 
have seen above that the determination of wages is one 
such crucial mechanism that can be influenced by public 
sector activity, mainly through the tax "wedge" and 
unemployment effects. These crowding-out, or off-
setting, forces were particularly important in the period 
1980-1987. 
Ireland entered the J 980s after a decade of expan-
sionary public policy, a stance that was strongly 
pro-cyclical in the latter part of the 1970s (i.e., it boosted 
growth at a time when the world business cycle was 
already generating strong growth). This placed policy 
makers in a very invidious position when the OPEC-II 
recession struck in that a contractionary fiscal policy 
had to be followed if the escalating growth in the 
debt/GNP ratio was to be contained. We have seen above 
that the downturn in the world business cycle was 
simultaneously inducing a business downturn in Ire-
land. 
During the period 1980-87, the level of public 
expenditure rose moderately in real terms and resort was 
made to sharp increases in taxation. After 1987 an 
political consensus emerged which permitted sharp cuts 
in real public expenditure against a broadly neutral 
taxation policy. In order to examine the separate and 
joint role of tax and expenditure policy on the economy 
during the 1980s, two counter-factual fiscal experi-
ments are suggested: 
(a) in the first we simply index tax rates, i.e., freeze 
income tax rates and VAT rates and index excise tax 
rates, while leaving expenditures and all other 
external variables at their historical levels for the 
period of the 1980s and; 
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(b) in the second we reverse the process, i.e., freeze 
expenditures in real ( 1979) terms and keep tax rates 
and all other external variables at their historical 
levels. 
The summary results are shown in Figures 2.32 and 
2.33, while Figure 2.34 shows the case of simultaneous 
tax and expenditure indexation. 
Tax Indexation Scenario 
The tax indexation simulation scenario is one where 
tax revenues are considerably lower than the actual 
revenues, since the hypothetical indexed tax rates are 
very much lower than actual rates. The most striking 
implications of this scenario for the economy are shown 
in Figure 2.32 (a-f). 
Per capita consumption would have been greatly 
increased relative to the actual outturn; there would have 
been a massive deterioration in the exchequer and 
international balances, with consequential escalation in 
the debt/GNP ratio. The labour market effects could 
have been dramatic: employment up by almost 100,000 
jobs, much lower emigration, a more modest fall in 
unemployment, and lower wage rates. 
However, this scenario was never a realistic option 
for Irish taxation policy since the simulation indicates 
that it would have been almost certainly ruled out by the 
huge deterioration in the public and international bal-
ances, and the consequential massive foreign borrowing 
needed to sustain them. Long before reaching the levels 
shown in the scenario, Ireland's credit worthiness is 
likely to have collapsed and responsibility for policy 
decisions placed in the hands of international lending 
agencies. 
Expenditure Indexation Scenario 
The expenditure indexation scenario is one where 
most programmes are maintained in constant base year 
terms (i.e., at 1979 levels). So, for example, public sector 
employment is kept fixed throughout the 1980s at its 
1979 value; social welfare transfer rates are indexed; 
Public Capital Programme investment expenditures are 
also indexed. Nevertheless, national debt interest pay-
ments are still determined within the model as a function 
of the level of debt and interest rates. An assumption is 
also made that interest rates are unchanged from their 
historical values. 
The effects of this scenario (Figure 2.33) are likely 
to have been more limited by comparison with the 
previous tax indexation simulation. For the first half of 
the 1980s, fiscal indexation would have represented a 
moderately "tighter" fiscal stance than the actual one. 
Hence, the public and international balances are likely 
to have improved, the debt/GNP ratio declined, with 
lower growth, and the labour market disimproved (i.e., 
lower employment, higher emigration, increased 
unemployment rate). 
What this simulation illustrates is that a hypothetical 
policy of public expenditure indexation from 1979 to 
1991, when combined with the actual policy regime of 
high taxation, would have been technically quite feas-
ible and would have been likely to have brought about 
a dramatic improvement in the fiscal and international 
balances and the debt/GNP ratio. The likely costs in 
terms of lower per capita growth, lower employment, 
and a combination of higher emigration and unem-
RECESSION AND RECOVERY: IRELAND IN THE 1980s 
Figure 2.32 
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ployment are also illustrated. The decision as to whether 
these costs would have been outweighed by the benefits 
is more a matter of political than economic consider-
ation. 
The simulation has many limitations, however, not 
least of which is the assumption of interest rates 
unchanged from their historical levels. In practice, a 
clearly signalled policy regime of high taxes and frozen 
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public expenditures from 1980 to the end of the decade 
would undoubtedly have led to a fall in the margin of 
Irish interest rates over world rates, and could have 
provided a strong stimulation to the economy as the 
OECD came out of recession after 1983. Was this a great 
missed opportunity, or were the policies actually fol-
lowed inevitable? We shall never know. 
Figure 2.33 
Public Expenditure Indexation Scenario 
(The term "Benchmark" refers to the historical outturn) 
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Complete Fiscal Indexation Scenario 
The combination of tax and expenditure indexation 
is shown in Figure 2.34 As in the tax simulation, the 
improvements in growth and in the labour market would 
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never have been a feasible prospect due to the massive 
deterioration in the public and international balances 
and the accumulation of extra debt (over and above the 
historical debt accumulation). 
Figure 2.34 
Complete Fiscal Indexation Scenario 
(The term "Benchmark" refers to the historical outturn) 
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In summary, what these three fiscal indexation 
simulations illustrate is that neither tax indexation nor 
the combination of both tax and expenditure indexation 
were feasible options in the 1980s if the public and 
international accounts were not to deteriorate beyond 
the historical outturn, thus calling into question Ire-
land's credit worthiness. We do not examine here the 
reasons why the Irish economy entered the 1980s in such 
a precarious state of disequilibrium since this is the 
subject matter of a separate study ("On the Causes of 
Ireland's Unemployment", by Frank Barry and John 
Bradley, to appear, Economic and Social Review, 1991). 
We can interpret these simulations from a slightly 
different perspective. What they illustrate is the high 
price that was probably paid during the 1980s, in tenn 
of lower growth and labour market deterioration, as a 
result of the necessity to raise taxation and cut 
expenditure during the 1980s. This arose from the 
requirement to sustain a much expanded state sector out 
to 1987, and to cut it back in size over the period 
1987-1990. 
Finally, if we put the above world and fiscal simu-
lations together, they illustrate the folly of the excessive 
fiscal stimulations of the 1970s and the particular danger 
Ireland faced when the world economy deteriorated in 
the early 1980s, just as the bills for past fiscal extrava-
gances fell due. 
2.5 IRELAND'S RECOVERY: 1987-1990 
The sharp recovery of Irish growth in the post 1987 
period illustrated earlier was dramatic, took most 
commentators by surprise (see, however, the previous 
two issues of this Review!), and has been the subject of 
much international commentary. We have outlined 
above the main characteristics of this recovery: a sub-
stantial improvement in growth, rapid improvement in 
the public and international balances, the completion of 
the convergence of price and wage inflation to German 
levels, and a more modest improvement in employment 
and unemployment. 
The reasons for this recovery have already been 
examined in the domestic and international literature 
(D. McAleese, "Ireland's Economic Recovery", Irish 
Banking Review, Summer, 1990; F. Giavazzi and M. 
Pagano, Can Severe Contractions be Expansionary, 
Discussion Paper, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London, 1990). Both approaches are based 
on the notion of an "expansionary fiscal contraction" 
(EFC), where the implementation of a credible adjust-
ment programme of expenditure cuts is the central 
feature in a restoration of private sector confidence, both 
processes taking place against a benign external econ-
omic climate. Interpreted literally, public expenditure 
cuts actually boost aggregate growth in an EFC, all other 
things being equal. 
Although the notion of an expansionary fiscal con-
traction is novel and full of interesting insights, it is 
ultimately unsatisfactory for many reasons. First, the 
element of restored private sector "confidence" is 
introduced as a deus ex machina to replace the asserted 
inadequate predictions of a conventional Keynesian 
analysis of Ireland's fiscal adjustment. No quantifica-
tion of the magnitude of the "confidence" effect is made, 
although an implicit appeal is made to the notion of 
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"Ricardian Equivalence" (i.e., the idea that a credible 
programme of public expenditure cuts is rationally 
interpreted by the private sector as a harbinger of future 
tax cuts, thus boosting present consumption and 
investment). The most recent empirical research casts 
considerable doubt on this notion (see K. Whelan, 
"Ricardian Equivalence and the Irish Consumption 
Function: The Evidence Re-Examined", in The Econ-
omic and Social Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1991). 
Secondly, no attempt at formal quantification is 
made of the relative roles of world and domestic factors 
in Ireland's recovery, other than noting that the external 
economic climate was favourable during the 1986-90 
period. Basically, the largely descriptive approach, 
while suggestive, does not allow one to isolate one effect 
from another. If an EFC needs an accompanying 
improvement in the world economy in order to work, 
then the concept amounts to nothing more than the 
platitude that the net effect of fiscal contractions and 
world expansion can be beneficial to a country like 
Ireland. 
Thirdly, the impression is conveyed that the con-
ventional or orthodox Keynesian or neo-Keynesian 
explanation of Ireland's recovery is inadequate and 
misleading (see McAleese, op. cit., page 20). Without 
any doubt, conventional state-of-the art neo-Keynesian 
models handle expectations inadequately, but it is 
probably a gross overstatement to assert that only 
expectations matter and that such models have nothing 
to teach us. 
For all its limitations, it is of interest to use the model 
to explore the crucial period of Ireland's recovery, 
1986-90, and attempt to distinguish between external 
and domestic influences. To do so, we need to make 
some stylised assumptions with a view to isolating the 
key factors driving the economy during the recovery 
period. We tentatively identify these as the pick-up in 
world growth after 1986, the rapid reduction in the rate 
of unemployment in the UK, and the sharp reduction in 
the Irish saving ratio, and the stance of fiscal policy. The 
stylised assumptions we make initially are as follows: 
(a) a hypothetical world growth which continued at its 
(low) 1986 level of about 2 per cent, thus eliminating 
the second resurgence of growth that took place in 
the latter half of the decade (Figure 2.35); 
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(b) a UK unemployment rate that stayed high, at its 1986 
value of 11.4 percent of the labour force, and failed 
to decline as it did during the "Lawson" boom 
(Figure 2.36); 
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( c) an Irish savings ratio that remained at its high 1987 
value of 17 .6 per cent of personal disposable income 
and failed to fall as it did over the recovery period 
(Figure 2.37). 
If the consumption function in the ESRI model were 
perf01ming adequately, this latter assumption would not 
be required. The advocates of the notion of an "expa-
nsionary fiscal contraction" seem to be claiming that the 
fall in the Irish savings ratio (equivalently, the boost to 
growth in consumption) is explained entirely by the 
effect the fiscal cuts of 1987-89 had on consumer 
confidence. An alternative explanation is that following 
the world recovery from the October 1987 stock market 
crash, a higher level of Irish consumption was driven 
by confidence in the health of the world economy and 
wealth effects, similar to those used sucessfully to 
explain the phenomenal drop in the UK savings ratio 
after the "Lawson boom". If ever there was an area 
requiring urgent further research, this is it. 
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Using the above stylised assumptions, and keeping 
all other assumptions in line with their historical values, 
we use the model to simulate over the "recovery" period. 
The effects on a range of variables are shown in Figure 
2.38 (a-f). 
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The overall deterioration of the simulated outturn 
relative to the historical outturn is apparent: lower GNP 
and consumption growth, even lower on a per capita 
basis; a deterioration of almost 3 percentage points of 
GNP in the exchequer surplus; a modest 1 point rise in 
the balance of payments surplus; a rise of almost 17 
points in the debt/GNP ratio; lower wage and price 
inflation; a loss of 25,000 jobs; reduced emigration and 
a 3 point rise in unemployment. 
We now repeat the simulation, adding a fourth 
change: 
(d) Public expenditure and taxation policies are indexed 
from their 1986 levels, thus eliminating the actual 
real cuts in expenditure that took place 
The results are shown in Figure 2.39 (a-f) and can 
be compared to the previous simulation. Of chief interest 
is the more severe deterioration in the public and 
external balances, and the 27 point increase in the 
debt/GNP ratio. Thus the historical improvement in the 
public finances can be almost completely accounted for 
by the world and fiscal shocks. With the exception of 
migration, the labour market effects are modest. 
What these simulations show is that a conventional 
neo-Keynesian model can adequately account for many 
of the stylised facts of Ireland's economic recovery 
during the 1986-90 period. 
For example, interpreting the results of Figure 2.38 
from a different perspective, they illustrate that the 
strong resumption of world growth, the fall in UK 
unemployment, and the drop in the Irish savings ratio 
are likely to have provided a significant boost to the 
economy over and above how it would have performed 
in the complete absence of these positive "shocks": 
(a) per capita GNP and consumption was probably 
raised by a cumulative 6 per cent; 
(b) there may have been a modest improvement of the 
balance of payments of 1 per cent of GNP; 
(c) the debt/GNP ratio was probably reduced by almost 
20 per cent of GNP; 
(d) employment is likely to have been boosted by some 
25,000, with a fall of some 3 points in the unem-
ployment rate. 
There could also have been some adverse effects: 
(e) a likely deterioration in the EBR by 2.5 percentage 
points of GNP, due to the boost to private con-
sumption and; 
(f) probably somewhat higher wage and price inflation. 
But of course, these shocks to the world economy 
took place at a time when fiscal policy was strongly 
contractionary. So, superimposing fiscal indexation on 
the above scenario resulted in a somewhat reduced boost 
to growth; a marked improvement in both the EBR and 
balance of payments; a much greater reduction in the 
debt/GNP ratio; more attenuated inflation effects; very 
little net change in employment; sharply reduced emi-
gration; and a more modest reduction of under 2 
percentage points in the rate of unemployment. Indeed, 
the results of the aggregate "world" and "indexation" 
simulation has a remarkable resemblance to those 
characteristics of Ireland's recovery claimed by the 
advocates of "expansionary fiscal contractions". 
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Irish Recovery Scenario: World, Savings Ratio and Indexation Factors 
(The term "Benchmark" refers to the historical outturn) 
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From the experiences of the 1980s, we can draw 
some salutary lessons: 
(a) The Irish economy is extremely vulnerable to 
influences from the world trading environment and 
on balance we tend to inherit slightly better than the 
world growth rate, other things being equal: 
(b) competitiveness is important, and close attention 
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must be paid to any factors which might cause a 
deterioration in international competitiveness, either 
directly, or indirectly through cost push from the 
sheltered sector; 
(c) fiscal expansions can be a negative sum game in the 
medium term and in very particular circumstances. 
Any short-term gains tend to be eroded quickly as 
the labour market tightens and tax rates are forced 
up to choke off the accumulation of debt. The 
crowding out mechanisms then operate through a 
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loss of competitiveness, through the tax wedges and 
the Phillips curve; 
( d) wage determination mechanisms are crucial to the 
growth of the economy. Nevertheless, the benefits 
of previous pay pacts seems to operate through their 
association with industrial peace rather than through 
fundamental changes to bargaining mechanisms. As 
experience with long-term pay pacts builds up, there 
may indeed prove to be a fundamental regime shift; 
(e) the benefits to the economy from the foreign-owned 
high-technology sector are manifest. However, any 
long-run gain in competitiveness also has a signifi-
cant effect on the traditional and food manufacturing 
sectors. Here the net gain to the economy (i.e., 
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contributions to GNP and employment) could be 
potentially much greater than for the high-techno-
logy sector because the indirect links to the market 
services and agriculture sectors are also greater; 
(f) The recovery of the period 1987-1990 was driven 
largely by the growth in the world economy and by 
stronger private consumption and investment. These 
effects more than offset the negative effects of the 
public expenditure cut-backs which were needed to 
restore balance to the public finances. These cut-
backs may also have induced a confidence effect, 
although its separate importance is impossible to 
quantify. 
CHAPTER3 
BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since we last published our Medium-Term Review 
two years ago there has been a major change in the face 
of Europe with the political and economic revolution in 
Eastern Europe. The speed and nature of the changes 
have taken everybody by surprise. It has changed the 
economic agenda for the EC and has greatly altered the 
economic environment in which the Irish economy will 
have to operate. While 1992 and the changes which it 
is bringing remain very important, new developments 
within the EC including Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the crisis in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and the pressures arising from the GAIT have 
all affected the prospects for the Irish economy. 
On the domestic front the changes have been of a 
much more limited nature. The public finances have 
shown some further improvement and the policy of 
tracking the DM within the EMS has become firmly 
established. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the external 
environment in which the Irish economy will operate 
over the next five years and to outline a stylised domestic 
policy environment within which we develop our central 
forecast. 
3.2 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
Since the end of the Second World War the inter-
national economy has become steadily more interde-
pendent. Even the United States has recognised that it 
can not determine its economic policy unilaterally. For 
small countries, such as Ireland, the degree of economic 
independence is now seen to be strictly limited. Thus 
the single biggest factor determining Ireland's econ-
omic prospects in the medium term will be the devel-
opment of the world economy. 
The single biggest shock to the developed economies 
has come from German unification. The pace at which 
it has had to proceed has left all forecasting bodies 
trailing behind events. Thus, while there are a range of 
different world economic forecasts available from 
major institutions, they tend to be rather out of date by 
the time of their publication. As a result, in this Review 
we have had to modify some of these forecasts to 
produce a coherent and up to date world scenario on 
which to base our forecasts for the Irish economy. We 
have relied heavily on the forecasts published in the 
National Institute Economic Review (NIESR); the 
OECD Economic Outlook; a working paper on the 
European economy prepared by the Netherlands Cen-
tral Planbureau; the IMF World Economic Outlook; 
and the London Business School Economic Outlook. 
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In this Section we consider first the prospects for 
Ge1many and how developments in that economy will 
affect the rest of the EC. We then tum to the prospects 
for the two other economies which have particular 
importance for Ireland: the UK and the USA. Finally, 
we consider developments in the EC which will have 
major significance for Ireland over the rest of the 
decade: reform of the CAP, Economic and Monetary 
Union, and 1992. 
3.2.1 German Unification 
The process of the unification of the German econ-
omy has effected a major change in the outlook for the 
EC economy in the immediate future. The problems and 
questions posed by this process should also be seen as 
a foretaste of the problems likely to arise in the possible 
extension of the EC to include countries in Eastern 
Europe towards the end of the decade. This latter process 
is likely to have a long-term effect on the environment 
in which the Irish economy operates. 
The initial reaction outside Germany to the process 
of German unification has been a fear that political 
priorities have taken precedence over economic wis-
dom. However, this view of the unification process 
ignores the economic dilemma which faced the Bonn 
government at the beginning of 1990. With the elim-
ination of the border between East and West Germany 
in 1989, the barriers to movement of the labour force 
were removed. This created the potential for a massive 
and very disruptive movement of population; workers 
in the East, while free to move to the West, had a very 
much lower standard of living than their compatriots in 
what had been the Federal Republic. This huge gap had 
to be closed sufficiently to reduce the potential attraction 
of migration. 
The Bonn government faced a choice on the rate of 
exchange at which to convert wage rates and savings in 
the old GDR into DMs. A low rate of exchange (e.g., 
4: 1) would have left industry in the East more com-
petitive but it would also have left living standards far 
below those in the old Federal Republic. This could have 
precipitated the migration which Bonn sought to avoid. 
On the other hand, too high a rate of exchange, while 
ostensibly narrowing the gap in living standards, would 
leave all of industry in the East profoundly uncompe-
titive precipitating massive unemployment. It was this 
latter high risk strategy which was eventually adopted. 
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Rates of pay in the East are now significantly closer 
to those in the West than would have been the case using 
a more market oriented approach. The advantage of this 
solution is that it greatly reduced the flow of migrants 
in 1990 while they still had employment in the East. 
Already in 1989 immigration into the Federal Republic 
from East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe 
amounted to approximately 750,000, 1.2% of the 
population of the Federal Republic. However, the major 
long-term problem posed by the solution adopted is that, 
by raising real wage rates in the East, it made much of 
the inefficient industrial plant in the East totally 
uneconomic. With the provision of Federal rates of 
unemployment payments and the attractions of high 
rates of pay in the West, a massive rigidity has been built 
into the labour market in the East. Wage rates can not 
adjust sufficiently to make employment in the East 
profitable in the immediate future. 
The result of this policy is that the unemployment 
rate in the united Germany will probably rise well above 
11 % of the labour force this summer. According to a 
recent report by Germany's five leading economic 
institutes, over 15% of the population of the united 
Germany could be unemployed or on short-time 
working by the end of the year. This is a level similar 
to that in Ireland. Whether eligibility for unemployment 
benefits will prevent a migration by the unemployed 
from the East remains to be seen. However, it is clear 
that Germany now has a major unemployment problem 
to add to the other problems arising from the undevel-
oped infrastructure in the East. 
In the past thirty years, with a very successful 
economy and a relatively low level of unemployment, 
there were few internal pressures in the Federal 
Republic of Gennany to change what proved to be a 
succesful economic formula. However, the changed 
economic circumstances arising from unification give 
cause for more uncertainty about future economic 
policy. Over the past year precedence has been given to 
the problems of unification rather than to the more 
traditional stance of adjusting policy to minimise 
inflation. While monetary policy has tightened con-
siderably, fiscal policy has been lax, allowing the 
emergence of a government deficit of over 5% of GNP. 
The corollary of this stance has been a rapid growth in 
GNP in the West, combined with some rise in inflation 
and a considerable rise in interest rates. 
We have assumed that the budget deficit in Germany 
is reduced gradually over the next five years. However, 
domestic demand will continue to grow quite rapidly 
resulting in the balance of payments for the united 
Germany moving into deficit. This means that Germany 
will continue to provide an attractive market for Irish 
firms. The way unification has taken place, with a rapid 
extension of coverage by West Geiman firms in the 
distribution sector into the East, means that for those 
Irish firms already supplying retailers or wholesalers in 
Germany, the growth in the market will provide new 
opportunities. The upward revision in the growth pro-
jections for Germany must be good news for Irish films. 
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Where the uncertainty arises is over how the German 
administration will handle the potential inflationary 
effects of the rapid growth in domestic demand com-
bined with falling output in the former GDR. The initial 
tax increases announced for this year, when combined 
with the fact that firms in the West have reached capacity 
is giving rise to a increase in the rate of inflation. Current 
wage settlements are running at between 6% and 7%. 
To slow the growth rate and reduce inflationary pres-
sures the Bundesbank has already raised interest rates. 
The need to finance the government deficit and the 
necessary investment in the East will maintain upward 
pressure on interest rates for the foreseeable future. Any 
relaxation by the Bundesbank could accentuate the 
present inflationary pressures. 
In this Review we have assumed that an increase in 
tax rates will result in the German inflation rate (con-
sumer prices) peaking next year at 4% with a gradual 
fall thereafter to 3% by 1995 (Figure 3.1). A return to a 
more normal pattern of2.5 % inflation might be expected 
in the second half of the decade. 
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To maintain downward pressure on inflation nom-
inal interest rates in Germany will show only a small 
fall from their present level (Figure 3.1). Even in the 
second half of the decade real interest rates in Germany 
should remain above their average level for the 1960-90 
period. This has serious implications for other members 
of the EMS, including Ireland. High real interest rates 
are likely to be transmitted to all other EC members 
helping to switch resources to finance the restructuring 
of East Germany. It will tend to offset the demand effects 
of the higher growth in Germany. For debtor countries, 
such as Ireland, the deleterious effects of the high 
interest rates will probably be more than enough to offset 
the benefits from a higher German growth rate. 
In spite of the high interest rates in Germany, it seems 
likely that the DM will be weaker on world markets than 
in the 1980s. The prospect of 15% unemployment in 
Germany, together with the switch to deficits on the 
balance of payments and government accounts, could 
lead to a depreciation of the DM compared to the US$ 
of nearly 2% a year until 1996. 
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There remains the possibility that the German gov-
ernment may fail to deal with the cunent problems of 
their economy, allowing the DM to weaken within the 
EMS. While this seems unlikely today, if it were to 
happen, it could result in French franc interest rates 
falling below German rates. Irish rates might follow 
their lead resulting in a reversal of the forecast differ-
ential between Irish and German rates. While such an 
outturn might sound attractive, it could be accompanied 
by many other changes in the EC environment making 
it a very unfavourable environment for Ireland. 
When the iron curtain vanished at the end of 1989 it 
seemed possible that there could be a major flow of 
resources, not just to East Germany, but also to the other 
countries of Eastern Europe undergoing change. How-
ever, it is now clear that the process of reform in those 
countries is very complex and it will be a number of 
years before they begin to attract a major flow of funds 
for investment. At present they are not competing with 
Ireland for investment. 
However, in the longer term investment inflows into 
these countries from the developed economies will both 
be necessary and attractive. Coming on top of the needs 
of the former GDR, this will put upward pressure on 
funds. Thus real interest rates throughout the world can 
be expected to remain fairly high over the rest of the 
decade. 
So far we have assumed a reasonably benign scen-
ario for the economic development of Eastern Europe. 
However, there remains the danger that the process of 
adjustment may not be smooth. It is clear that the Soviet 
Union is suffering from massive economic problems. 
These problems, and those of the other countries in 
Eastern Europe, are likely to be aggravated by the 
political pressures inherent in resurgent nationalism. 
While the EC may try and insulate itself from these 
problems, the possibility of massive migration, fol-
lowing on famine or other disasters, could force the EC 
to devote substantial resources to economic stabilisation 
in Eastern Europe. 
3.2.2 The United Kingdom 
While structural changes in the Irish economy have 
made it much less dependent on the UK than in the past, 
developments in the UK can still have a big impact, both 
on the demand for industrial exports and on the Irish 
labour market. The UK represents the largest market for 
our goods so that the rate of growth of that market and 
the competitiveness of Irish producers in it is still of 
major importance, especially for the traditional sector 
of Irish manufacturing. The high-technology and 
food-processing sectors are less affected by develop-
ments in the UK. 
In addition to its role as a market for our goods, the 
UK economy is of importance as a market for Irish 
labour. The UK has traditionally been the most 
important destination for Irish emigrants. As a result, 
emigration from Ireland is very sensitive to the differ-
ence between the unemployment rate in Ireland and the 
UK (Honohan, P., 1984: "The Evolution of the Rate of 
Unemployment in Ireland 1962-1983", in Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, The Economic and Social 
Research Institute, May). If UK unemployment rises, as 
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is the case this year, emigration tends to fall as job 
opportunities in Britain become scarcer. This raises 
unemployment in Ireland. 
Cunent forecasts suggest that the UK economy will 
recover slowly from its recession. It has lost competi-
tiveness in recent years and its rate of inflation of wages 
and prices is still running well above the European norm. 
While there has been an improvement in its balance of 
payments, it still remains in deficit in spite of the low 
level of activity. Because the UK economy is locked 
into the EMS at a rate of exchange which leaves it 
relatively uncompetitive, the medium-term growth 
prospects will remain weak. Certainly, the recovery will 
be much weakerthan that of the second half of the 1980s. 
While Irish firms will remain competitive in that market, 
they will face only a slow growth in demand. 
The rise in UK unemployment over the last year has 
been very rapid. It is likely to continue rising until after 
the recovery in the economy has begun. Thus we see the 
UK unemployment rate increasing to over 10% of the 
labour force by 1992, back to the level experienced in 
1987, though still lower than that of the early 1980s 
(Figure 3.2). This rise in unemployment is necessary to 
reduce inflationary expectations within the UK. If the 
UK adjusts rapidly to the changed exchange rate regime 
then it will cease rising. However, on current trends, the 
NIESR Review does not expect UK unemployment to 
begin falling until 1993 and, even then, to remain above 
the end 1990 level for the rest of the decade. 
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The cmTent policy on inflation in the UK seems to 
be a rather weaker copy of the policy of the early 1980s. 
A tough exchange rate regime is imposed with high 
interest rates. This halts growth and raises unemploy-
ment. This, in turn, cuts the rate of inflation. When the 
rate of inflation is down to the EC norm the UK may 
then attempt to correct its competitiveness problem by 
a final once off devaluation within the EMS. This would 
be a rather similar policy to that adopted successfully 
by Ireland in 1986. In this Review we have assumed that 
the UK devalues by around 3% in 1994. This change 
would be quite small and could be accommodated 
within the current EMS bounds for Sterling. The 
expectation of such a change will leave nominal interest 
rates in the UK above German and Irish levels up to at 
least 1994. 
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3.2.3 The United States of America 
When we prepared our lastReview in 1989 the major 
cause of economic uncertainty was the state of the US 
economy. Over the last two years the outlook for the US 
budget deficit has, in fact, worsened. To some extent 
the disimprovement is merely a recognition of an 
underlying problem with the US financial system and 
to some extent it reflects a more realistic set of projec-
tions by the US administration. 
However, while the US budgetary situation con-
tinues to be a cause for global concern, the current 
account of the US balance of payments has significantly 
improved. This means that the US has less need to attract 
capital inflows from abroad, putting less pressure on 
world savings. As with the UK, the improvement in the 
balance of payments owes something to the economic 
recession in the US. However, the position of the US 
differs significantly from the UK in that, at cmTent 
exchange rates, the US industrial sector is reasonably 
competitive on world markets. The balance of payments 
should continue to improve leaving scope for a recovery 
in the US economy into the medium term. 
The fall in economic activity within the US, together 
with the improvement in the balance of payments, has 
put less pressure on funds allowing domestic interest 
rates to fall. As stated above, for the future we expect 
the problems in the German economy to lead to some 
strengthening of the US dollar vis-a-vis the DM in the 
next five years. However, if the US currency were to 
strengthen by more than we have assumed one could 
see a return to the competitiveness problems which 
faced the US in the mid to late 1980s. 
3.2.4 The Common Agricultural Policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy ( CAP) is currently 
in crisis because the volume of production within the 
EC, together with imports, has risen well above EC 
consumption and the costs of selling the surplus on 
world markets have exhausted the EC budget. The 
long-term solution to this problem remains a matter for 
lively debate within the EC. In the central forecast in 
this Review we have assumed that the CAP continues 
very much as before, but with only a very small increase 
in nominal prices in the foreseeable future. In spite of 
the effective price freeze, this approach would, in the 
short term, require additional funding for the CAP. 
The article by Fitz Gerald and O'Connor in this 
Review considers the likely effects on the Irish economy 
of one set of proposals for ref01m of the CAP contained 
in a leaked EC Commission document. This article 
suggests that, if these proposals were implemented, 
holding the debt/GNP ratio unchanged (i.e. at the level 
forecast in our central projection described in the next 
Chapter), they would reduce the volume of GNP by 
between 1 % and 1.5% in the medium te1m. They would 
also knock up to 1 percentage point a year off the rate 
of inflation over a period of five years. If the draft reform 
package were implemented this would mean that the 
growth rate in the medium te1m would be at least 0.25 
percentage points below the level in the central forecast 
described in Chapter 4, and the rate of inflation would 
be reduced by twice that amount. 
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However, as discussed in that article there are a range 
of possible solutions to the crisis in the CAP. The final 
resolution of this problem will involve lively political 
debate, not just within the EC, but also involving all the 
participants in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). It will also be affected by developments 
in Eastern Europe as the EC has an active interest in the 
economic development of that region. 
3.2.5 Other EC Developments 
In the last Review we published a detailed study of 
the likely effects of 1992 on the Irish economy. Part of 
the growth in investment in the industrial sector in 1989 
and 1990 must be attributed to the anticipation by 
foreign firms of the effects of 1992, which undoubtedly 
imparted a new impetus to developments within the EC. 
The central forecast in Chapter 4 takes into account the 
major changes in the EC likely to arise from the 
completion of the EC market. 
However, there are a number of key areas where the 
impact remains uncertain. In our previous assessment 
we estimated that the opening up of public procurement 
would be very important for Ireland. While the EC plans 
still call for such a development, it is unclear how 
effective they will be. In our central forecast in Chapter 
4, we have assumed that it is not fully effective in the 
period to 1996. If it were successful there would be some 
additional growth in the high technology sector in 
Ireland in the mid-1990s over and above our benchmark 
projection. 
There remain some aspects of the completion of the 
internal market which have still to be resolved, in 
particular the details of tax harmonisation. Some 
potential problems have been removed due to changes 
in the proposals on VAT administration. However, it is 
not clear how practical the current proposals are. In this 
Review we have assumed that Ireland can sustain a 
standard VAT rate 1.5 percentage points above the UK 
level. It is also assumed that Irish excise rates for key 
products (beer, spirits, and petrol) are haimonised to UK 
levels by 1993. 
The plans for the EC Community Support Frame-
work (CSF), initiated as part of the 1992 process, are 
currently being implemented. They have provided for a 
major increase in public investment as well as an 
expansion of schemes in the education and manpower 
area. The benefits of these changes on the demand side 
of the economy are already being seen. Public invest-
ment is growing and the transfers from the EC have 
helped increase the balance of payments surplus. 
However, the objective of the CSF is increase the 
productive potential of the Irish economy, not to provide 
an income transfer. This supply side impact of the CSF 
is not likely to be seen until the middle of the decade at 
the earliest. 
In a separate study to be published over the summer, 
we have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the 
likely impact of the CSF on the Irish economy. (Bradley, 
J., J. Fitz Gerald, and I. Kearney, 1991: The Role of the 
Structural Funds: Analysis of Consequences for Ireland 
in the Context of 1992, The Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Policy Research Series, forthcom-
ing.) This study concentrates on the supply side impact 
of the CSF and provides a quantification of its impact 
BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 
on the economy in the period to the end of the century. 
We have incorporated the planned CSF financed 
increase in government investment in 1992 and 1993 
into our benchmark forecast and have assumed that after 
1993 the size of support for the Irish economy from the 
CSF will remain fixed in real terms at the 1993 level. 
To achieve such a continuation of support or even 
increase it may be difficult in the face of the growing 
problems in Eastern Europe. 
Since our last Review there has been a new devel-
opment in the growing impetus to economic and mon-
etary union (EMU). If successful the process of EMU 
will further change the operating environment for the 
Irish economy. Monetary union on its own will result 
in a convergence oflrish to German interest rates. While 
this process has already begun, in the absence of full 
union, domestic interest rates are likely to remain 
slightly above German rates for the foreseeable future. 
When consummated, monetary union will reduce 
interest rates to German levels. One of the costs of 
monetary union will be the loss of control over domestic 
monetary policy. However, for Ireland and other small 
countries this independence has proved largely illusory 
in the past. 
In this Review we have assumed that EMU does not 
occur till the end of the decade. As a result, Irish interest 
rates, while converging towards German levels, remain 
a minimum of 0.5 percentage points above German 
rates. Given the assumed profile for German rates this 
will allow some reduction in domestic rates in the period 
to 1993. However, for the reasons outlined above, they 
will remain well above the levels which might have been 
anticipated in the absence of German unification. 
3.2.6 The International Context for Ireland 
The external environment for the Irish economy is 
somewhat less favourable than we anticipated in our last 
Review. As shown in Figure 3.3 the expected recovery 
in industrial output in the UK will be particularly weak. 
While somewhat stronger in the US, due to its improved 
competitive position, it will remain weaker than the 
recovery of the mid-1980s. In Germany, assuming that 
current policies are succesful, growth is forecast to 
remain reasonably strong for the next few years. 
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In the case of inflation (Figure 3.4) we see the 
German performance deteriorating temporarily as a 
result of the pressures of unification. In the UK, on the 
other hand, the rate of inflation is likely to fall quite 
rapidly. If it does not do so, the UK recession will be 
longer than anticipated. The US rate of inflation is 
forecast to show some improvement in 1992 and to 
remain relatively low in the medium term. The price of 
energy is assumed to grow by around 2% a year in real 
terms over the forecast period. Starting from its current 
position the Irish economy is quite competitive on its 
major markets. 
Per Cent 
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The outlook for interest rates was discussed above 
and is summarised in Figure 3.5. Finally, the prospects 
for the UK labour market, which will have a major 
bearing on the level of emigration, were summarised 
above in Figure 3.2. 
There remain a number of areas of great uncertainty 
in the world forecast outlined above. It is quite possible 
that the problems of integrating Eastern Europe may 
prove more intractable and, hence, more expensive than 
envisaged. This could put further upward pressure on 
interest rates. In the case of the UK economy, failure to 
respond to the new operating environment of the EMS 
could prolong the current recession into 1992 or 1993. 
In the case of the US, while the recovery from recession 
faces better prospects than in the UK, the continuing 
failure to master the problem of the government deficit 
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could pose serious dangers in the medium term. As 
always, any serious problems for the US could translate 
into problems for other developed economies. 
3.3 DOMESTIC ASSUMPTIONS 
In this Section we set out our assumptions con-
cerning domestic fiscal and monetary policy and likely 
demographic trends over the rest of the decade. In the 
case of domestic policy the assumptions are not intended 
to be in any way prescriptive. Instead we use a stylised 
set of assumptions based on policy indexation. This is 
intended to characterise what would happen if there 
were no change in tax or expenditure policies in the 
medium term. The assumptions have been modified to 
take account of the pay commitments under the Pro-
gramme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) and 
of developments inherent in the completion of the EC 
internal market. 
3.3.1 Fiscal Policy 
Underlying our assumptions concerning fiscal 
policy in the medium term is the accepted principle of 
indexing all nominal instruments and leaving all real 
instruments unchanged. This underlying approach has 
been substantially modified to take account of some of 
the longer-term commitments on fiscal policy. 
On public service pay we have provided for the likely 
increases which will arise as part of the PESP in 1992 
and 1993. In addition to the basic increases, we have 
assumed that all special increases likely to arise as a 
carry-over from the Programme for National Recovery 
(PNR) and as part of the PESP will be paid. These special 
increases are very substantial; their total cost over the 
period 1991-93 will be close to the cost of meeting the 
basic increase provided under the agreement. The effect 
of the combined increases will be to raise public service 
pay rates by between 8% and 9% a year over the period 
1991-93. The policy implications of these very large 
special increases are dealt with later. For the period after 
1993 we have assumed that public service pay rates 
show the same growth as pay rates in the private sector. 
Employment in the public sector is assumed to grow 
at around 1 % a year over the forecast period. However, 
a more rapid rise in earnings in the public sector will 
mean that the share of public consumption in GNP will 
remain largely unchanged. 
The EC Community Support Framework provides 
for further significant increases in the volume of public 
investment in 1992 and 1993. Part of the funding for 
these schemes will be provided by the EC and will 
involve increased transfers from abroad in the balance 
of payments. 
The underlying stance on taxation is the assumption 
that rates and bands will be indexed each year to prices. 
However, there are two special factors which must be 
taken into account: tax harmonisation and commitments 
on reducing tax rates in the medium term. 
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While the problems posed for Ireland by the need to 
harmonise indirect taxes have been reduced by the tax 
increases announced in the recent UK budget, they 
remain substantial. We have assumed that the standard 
Irish VAT rate will be reduced to 19% by 1993 and that 
the rates of excise tax on alcohol and petrol will be 
brought close to UK levels by the same date. In addition, 
while it has received less attention, there will have to be 
a major change in the Deposit Interest Retention Tax 
(DIRT). While we have assumed that some of the costs 
involved in these changes will be made good by 
increases in both direct and indirect taxes they will still 
represent a substantial loss of revenue for the exchequer. 
(We have not provided for any compensation which the 
EC might provide to ease the problems of harmonisa-
tion.) 
As a result of the loss of revenue from tax har-
monisation and the generally tight budgetary situation, 
we have assumed that there will be no scope for major 
cuts in income tax rates up to 1993. From 1994 onwards 
we have assumed a small fall in rates of direct taxation 
(including social insurance contributions) each year for 
the rest of the decade. This fall is additional to the 
provision for full indexation and would, in 1994, cost 
around £30 million. 
While the government has committed itself to 
reaching a debt/GNP ratio of 100% by 1993, as dis-
cussed later, this is unlikely to be achieved without a 
significant policy change on expenditure or taxation 
(excluding receipts from privatisation). The need for 
such a policy change is discussed later and the bench-
mark projection takes account of the rather stylised 
policy stance outlined above. 
3.3.2 Monetary Policy 
The advent of EMU will remove even the illusion of 
an independent Irish monetary policy. Until EMU is 
finally implemented it is assumed that the Irish Central 
Bank maintains a constant rate of exchange between the 
Irish pound and the DM for the rest of the decade. From 
1993 onwards it is assumed that the margins for 
movement within the EMS are tightened so that the gap 
between Irish and German interest rates narrows further. 
The assumptions concerning German and EC monetary 
policy were discussed above. 
3.3.3 Demographic Trends 
Underlying developments in the labour market are 
changes in the population of working age. These 
changes are, in turn, a function of the natural increase 
(new entrants less retirals) and of migration, which is 
affected by economic circumstances and is discussed in 
the next Chapter. The rate of natural increase in the 
working age population is known with a reasonable 
degree of certainty for the next fifteen years based on 
the numbers born each year since the mid-1970s. 
The birth rate peaked in 1980 so that we can predict 
a rapid fall in new labour force entrants early in the next 
century. Figure 3.6 shows that the numbers of potential 
new labour force entrants less retirements will average 
between 20,000 and 25,000 until nearly the end of the 
decade. (The forecasts in this figure are taken from J.J. 
Sexton, D.F. Hannan, B.M. Walsh and D. McMahon, 
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1991, The Economic and Social Implications of Emi-
gration, The National Economic and Social Council, 
Report No. 90.) The numbers will then fall rapidly to 
around 8,000 a year by around 2005 as the post-1980 
cohort of births reach the age of entry into the labour 
force. This means that without emigration, even with no 
increase in labour force participation by married 
women, employment must grow by 1.5% to 2% a year 
even to provide jobs for the natural increase in the 
population. In addition, as we have assumed in this 
Review, there is likely to be some increase in partici-
pation in the labour force by married women. 
Finally, the rate of growth in the active labour force 
in the 1970s and 1980s has been affected by increased 
participation in education. However, with the bulk of 
children now completing secondary education it is not 
clear to what extent this factor will moderate labour 
force growth in the future. We have assumed that any 
such change is small. 
CHAPTER4 
THE CENTRAL FORECAST 
In this chapter we present our central forecast for the 
economy for the years 1991-96. The previous chapter 
gave details of the assumptions we have made con-
cerning the world economy and the domestic policy 
environment. While in this chapter we present a single 
central forecast, it must be recognised that there is a wide 
margin of uncertainty concerning the external 
assumptions and how the Irish economy will react to 
changing circumstances. As a result, at the end of this 
chapter we present summary results for a number of 
additional simulations where we have examined the 
sensitivity of our central forecast to variations in our 
assumptions. 
We take as a starting point the forecast for 1991 
presented in the Spring issue of the Quarterly Economic 
Commentary. As a result, we do not provide any detailed 
commentary on the forecast for this year but concentrate 
instead on the prospects for the economy in the medium 
term. 
In preparing this Review we have had the benefit of 
a new version of the ESRI Medium Te1m Model which 
allows us to examine in greater detail prospects for 
output and employment in the industrial and services 
sectors. However, as with previous versions of the 
Review, the model's results have been modified in the 
light of our judgement concerning changing patterns of 
behaviour in the Irish economy. 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the 
forecast. Because developments on the supply side are 
crucial in determining the growth potential of the 
economy in the medium term, we turn next to this aspect 
of the forecast. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 consider the 
prospects for wages and prices and for incomes. The 
expenditure side of the national accounts is considered 
in some detail in Section 4.5. We then discuss the 
balance of payments ( 4.6), the labour market ( 4. 7) and 
the public finances (4.8). Section 4.9 examines the 
prospects for the monetary sector of the economy, 
Section 4.10 examines the sensitivity of the central 
forecast to changes in certain key assumptions and 
Section 11 presents our conclusions. Detailed tables 
covering all aspects of the forecast are given in 
Appendix 1. 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
Table 4.1 gives details of the central forecast for 
certain key aggregates. This shows the Irish economy 
recovering in 1992 from a slow-down in 1991. It 
indicates that the economy will grow at around 3.75% 
a year in the period to 1996. This is slightly faster than 
the growth in the underlying productive capacity of the 
economy reflecting the recovery from lower growth this 
year. This rate of growth is somewhat below the forecast 
in the last Review due primarily to the deterioration in 
the prospects for world interest rates and the worse than 
expected performance of the UK and US economies. 
The rise in German interest rates due to unification will, 
on its own, reduce the average growth rate over the 
period by around 0.5% a year. 
The industrial sector remains very competitive on its 
key export markets and the prospects for wage inflation 
in the market sector remain satisfactory. However, the 
downward revision in the forecast medium-term growth 
rate has a consequence for employment. It is now 
expected that total employment will grow by just under 
1 % a year over the next five years leading to an increase 
in employment of 51,000 by 1996. 
This rate of growth in employment will be greater 
than that attained in the past five years. For many 
countries it would be regarded as quite satisfactory, but 
it will still not be sufficient to absorb the rapid 
TABLE 4.1:Central Forecast - Major Aggregates 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GNP% Change 1.4 5.0 6.1 2.0 3.7 4.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 
Balance of Payments, % of GNP 2.3 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.9 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement, % of GNP* 3.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.9 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.4 
Debt/GNP Ratio 130.4 119.4 111.8 108.4 105.6 101.8 99.5 96.4 92.6 
Total Employment, Thousands, April 1091 1090 1120 1123 1136 115 l 1158 1167 1174 
Unemployment Rate % 16.7 15.7 14.0 15.8 15.9 15.7 16.0 16.0 16.0 
Consumer Prices % 2.5 3.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 
* Includes receipts from privatisation 
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increase in the labour force over the period. The scope 
for emigration has been greatly reduced by the 
deterioration in the UK labour market which is likely to 
remain unfavourable for Irish emigrants until at least 
1993. As a result, emigration this year will be very low 
and the inc1;ease in the labour force will show up as an 
increase in unemployment. We forecast that the 
unemployment rate will continue to rise slowly up to 
1996. 
The annual rate of inflation, currently running at 
2.7%, may fall furthernext year. However, this is likely 
to be only a temporary reduction as the expected rate of 
inflation in our trading partners is running at a higher 
rate. In the medium term the Irish inflation rate should 
approach the forecast German rate of 3%. The rate of 
increase in wage rates in the market sector is expected 
to average just over 5% over the period, allowing the 
industrial sector to maintain its competitive edge. 
The balance of payments is forecast to remain in 
surplus throughout the next five years. This surplus will 
underpin the economic recovery and will facilitate the 
convergence of Irish towards Geiman interest rates. 
The rise in the forecast long-run real rate of interest 
has an adverse impact on the prospects for the public 
finances. While it makes debt reduction more urgent it 
also makes it more difficult to achieve, both directly, by 
raising interest payments, and indirectly by reducing the 
rate of growth. In addition to the higher interest rates, 
there are a number of other factors affecting the public 
finances which give cause for concern. 
The rate of increase in public service pay is very 
high. The imperative of tax hannonisation still requires 
further action. The opening position in 1992 for the 
exchequer borrowing requirement has been adversely 
affected by unduly lax budgets in 1990 and 1991. As a 
result, on unchanged policies, the exchequer borrowing 
requirement, which is held down in 1991 by the receipts 
from privatisation, will rise in 1992. While the 
debt/GNP ratio should fall steadily over the next five 
years, it will still be above 90% in 1996. 
4.2 THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Following four years of rapid growth when the 
economy bounced back from the deep recession of the 
1980s, the rate of growth this year has fallen back to 2% 
(Figure 4.1). This slow-down is a result of the recession 
in the US and UK economies and does not reflect a fall 
in the output potential of the Irish economy. Some slow 
clown after the recovery years was inevitable as capacity 
utilisation rose in industry. For the next five years the 
output potential of the Irish economy should allow a 
growth rate of a little over 3.5% a year without 
encountering any capacity constraints. This growth in 
output will result in an increase in employment of just 
under 1 % a year for the next five years. 
We now analyse the prospects for output growth in 
each of the main sectors of the economy. 
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4.2.1 The Industrial sector 
In our last Review, published in 1989, we suggested 
that the environment in the 1990s would be more 
favourable for domestic firms operating in traditional 
branches of industry than was the environment in the 
1980s. However, we were unable to quantify this 
advantage as we had to treat the industrial sector as a 
single aggregate. 
Since 1989 we have developed our model so that we 
can examine trends within the industrial sector. In this 
Review we consider the prospects for a five way 
break-down of the industrial sector: high technology 
manufacturing, food processing, traditional manufac-
turing, building, and utilities. 
The high technology sector includes engineering and 
computers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals; the tradi-
tional manufacturing sector contains those sub-sectors 
not included under food processing or high technology. 
It includes a wide range of sectors including wood and 
furniture, building products, clothing and textiles, paper 
and publishing. 
Food Processing 
The food processing sector is treated separately 
because it is intimately related to developments in 
agriculture. It depends on agriculture to supply the vast 
bulk of its raw materials and the market conditions 
which it faces are greatly influenced by developments 
in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The sector 
is also largely Irish owned with over 75% of the output 
of the sector being produced by Irish owned firms in 
1987. 
The major problem the food processing sector faces 
in the next five years is the crisis in the CAP. As 
discussed elsewhere in this Review, the current approach 
to reforming the CAP involves increasing use of quotas 
to restrict output. The food processing sector is thus 
constrained in the volume of inputs that it can obtain. It 
also suffers from serious seasonality problems. Finally, 
in a regime where intervention and heavily subsidised 
sales to third world countries provide the major market, 
there is little incentive to increase value added. As a 
result, unless the recent changes in structure in the 
industry can help it break into new EC markets, it is 
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likely to show only a small increase in output each year. 
For the next five years this increase should average 
around 1 % (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 
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It is widely recognised that there is spare capacity in 
the food industry. As a result, given no major change in 
throughput, rationalisation can be expected, resulting in 
a loss of up to 5,000 jobs over the next five years. The 
only prospect for preventing this decline is for the 
industry to penetrate more profitable EC markets and 
increase its value added. 
High Technology 
The high technology sector is predominantly foreign 
owned; in 1987 over 80% of the sector's output was 
accounted for by foreign firms. Exports also accounted 
for 80% of its total output. Given the high profitability 
of this sector this means that a large part of the domestic 
value added leaks out in profit repatriations. The sector 
has grown much more rapidly than the world economy 
over the 1980s and a separate study has indicated that 
it is less directly affected by Irish cost competitiveness 
than is the traditional sector. The major factor behind 
Ireland's increasing penetration of this market in the 
1980s was initially Ireland's favourable corporate tax 
regime. More recently, the availability of a skilled 
labour force has also played a role. 
Experience in the past has shown that the future 
growth of the US firms in this sector depends on the 
competitiveness of the US economy on the EC market. 
If our assumptions concerning movements in exchange 
rates prove correct, their competitiveness should be 
maintained. 
Growth was extremely rapid in the 1980s for the high 
technology sector in spite of the unfavourable circum-
stances in the wider Irish economy. It now accounts for 
almost 45% of the output of manufacturing and around 
35% of employment. However, as the sector has grown 
in importance the rate of growth inevitably shows signs 
of slowing. While the average growth in output between 
1987 and 199 l was over l 0%, the central forecast shows 
output growth averaging only 6% over the next five 
years (Figure 4.3). This slow-down partly reflects the 
maturing of the sector and partly the somewhat slower 
growth in the outside world. 
Figure 4.3 
Manufacturing 
High Technology 
35 
-5 L---'----------'----------'----------'----------'----------'----------'----------'----------'--------__J 
86 88 90 92 94 96 
- - - - Employment -output 
While the rate of growth in the high technology 
sector will decelerate, the absolute growth in employ-
ment of 17,000 in the sector in the next five years will 
be close to the growth of 15,000 experienced since 1986. 
The prospects for this sector could be improved by a 
number of factors. 
If there were vigourous enforcement of the 1992 
provisions on freeing public procurement there could 
be additional growth in the telecommunications 
equipment and health care industries. However, until 
the success of such measures are proven, foreign com-
panies in the relevant high technology areas may remain 
reluctant to expand in Ireland. 
Perhaps more important is the potential growth in 
the output of the aeronautical engineering industry, 
servicing aircraft. As this industry is fairly labour 
intensive and largely Irish owned, growth in the next 
five years could make a disproportionate contribution 
to the economy relative to the rest of the sector. 
Traditional Manufacturing 
The traditional sector has changed significantly over 
the past twenty years with many firms closing down in 
the 1980s. By 1987, 46% of the sector's output was 
accounted for by foreign firms. However, profitability 
in the sector is lower than in the high technology sector 
so that it generates a smaller volume of profits. As a 
result, profit repatriations are less important. It is also 
much more dependent on the home market: only 40% 
of output was exported in 1987. The sector was also 
more dependent on the UK for its export sales than was 
the high technology sector. It is the most sensitive of the 
three sector's to Ireland's competitiveness on the 
European market. 
The traditional sector of manufacturing underwent 
major trauma in the first half of the 1980s when output 
fell by 1.2% a year. As a result, total employment fell 
by 23,000 between 1980 and 1985. While world 
recession and the severe turn-down in the Irish economy 
were important factors in this upheaval, the sector also 
suffered a major loss of competitiveness over the same 
period. 
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Since 1986 this loss of competitiveness has been 
reversed. The slow-down in the domestic rate of infla-
tion, combined with the movement in the exchange rate, 
has resulted in a major improvement in competitiveness 
on both the UK and EC markets. Figure 4.4 shows the 
relative growth in labour costs in manufacturing in 
Ireland compared to the UK and Ge1many, all in a 
common currency. 
The improvement has not been confined to labour 
costs. Trends in the cost of capital, which are important 
to this sector, have moved favourably over the period, 
due to the decline in interest rates. The relative cost of 
other domestic services, used by industry, has also 
improved. When we published our last Review we 
signalled this improvement but expressed the fear that 
it might not be maintained. Experience has proved these 
doubts groundless. 
Index, 1986= 1.0 
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For the next five years we show this sector main-
taining its current competitive position. As a result the 
sector should grow at around 5% a year, broadly in line 
with the experience since 1987 (Figure 4.5). However, 
the growth in employment is likely to remain slow, 1.4% 
a year or 8,000 over the five years, reflecting the 
continuing growth in productivity. This is in line with 
the experience of the sector since 1987. However, there 
remains the possibility that the sector will capitalise 
more effectively on its competitive position and show 
more rapid growth than forecast. As against that, the 
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sector is more dependent on the UK market than the rest 
of manufacturing and it could suffer from any post-
ponement of recovery in that economy. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the combined effect of 
developments in these three sectors will give rise to a 
growth in the volume of value added in manufacturing 
rising from 4.2% in 1992 to average around 4.5% a year 
over the next five years. The growth in the volume of 
gross output over the same period will be slightly slower 
at 4.3% a year. 
Building 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, the growth in the 
building industry is largely determined by domestic 
demand. If the industry runs into capacity constraints it 
raises its price, and profitability, to equate demand with 
its output capacity. In our last Review we expressed the 
fear that the rapid growth in the economy, together with 
the EC CSF funded investments, could have resulted in 
such excess inflation in the sector. However, a rephasing 
of the CSF and the rise in interest rates in the EMS 
avoided that danger resulting, in fact, in a minor 
recession in the industry in 1990-91. 
A further increase in CSF funded investment 
combined with the start of construction on the gas 
inter-connector with the UK should provide an initial 
boost to investment in the sector in 1992. In addition, 
we envisage a pick up in investment, in particular in the 
industrial and housing sectors, giving rise to a sub-
stantial growth in demand for the sector's output in 
1992. Over the next five years gross output in the sector 
could show an average growth rate of 4.3% (Figure 4.6) 
a year while the growth in value added could be between 
2.5% and 3% per annum. The difference between these 
two measures arises from a more rapid growth in the 
use of material inputs in the sector. Employment growth 
in the sector could average 2.25% a year. 
Figure 4.6 
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The precise timing of investment is always the most 
difficult component of GNP to predict so that the path 
of output growth in this sector in the medium term 
remains uncertain. However, our central forecast 
suggests a significant recovery next year continuing into 
1993. Thereafter there could be some slow-clown as the 
stimulatory effects of the EC CSF encl and as work on 
the gas inter-connector is completed. The pattern of 
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employment growth reflects the time path for output 
with all the growth occurring in 1992 and 1993 and 
employment remaining static thereafter. 
Utilities 
The utilities sector accounts for under 7% of value 
added in total industry. The growth in the volume of 
output in that sector over the next five years will average 
around 4.5%. The growth in the volume of value added 
may be slightly higher. 
The likely growth in output of the aggregate indus-
trial sector over the period to 1996 will follow closely 
the time path of its biggest sub-sector, manufacturing, 
rising at around 4.5 % a year on average. This represents 
a slow-down compared to the 7.4% a year experienced 
between 1987 and 1991. This slow-down can be 
attributed to the disimprovement in the growth prospects 
for our major trading partners, the high real rates of 
interest and the exceptional circumstances of the 
recovery years 1987-89. Growth in 1992 may be 
somewhat below the average due to the gradual recovery 
from the slow-down in 1991. The growth in employment 
in the sector will be slightly slower at 1.7% a year than 
the 2% a year experienced between 1987 and 1991. 
This forecast for the industrial sector represents the 
mid-point on a wide range of possible forecasts. There 
are as many reasons to expect the forecast to prove 
unduly optimistic as there are to expect it to prove 
pessimistic. On the down side there is the possibility 
that world growth could prove substantially slower in 
the next five years than we have forecast. As against 
that, there is the possibility that the traditional manu-
facturing could respond more vigourously to its 
favourable competitive position and the food sector 
could break new ground in profitable EC markets 
increasing its value added. These issues are taken up 
again in Section 11. 
4.2.2 The Market Services Sector 
The market services sector is the largest single sector 
of the economy. However, it contains within it a great 
diversity of different kinds of enterprise. These range 
from highly capital intensive traded enterprises, such as 
air transport, to non-traded, low physical capital per-
sonal services. With the help of the CSO we have been 
able to split up market services into three sub-sectors: 
distribution, transport and communications and other 
professional and financial services. This breakdown 
facilitates an understanding of the processes likely to 
drive market services over the next five years. 
The distribution sector has undergone substantial 
structural change over the last twenty five years with 
the growth of supermarkets, the rise to prominence in 
the grocery trade of a small number of multiples, and 
the reduction in importance of the independent whole-
sale function. The completion of the EC market by 1993 
will have important implications for the way this sector 
operates. (J. Fitz Gerald, 1989: "1992: The Distribution 
Sector", in The Economics of 1992, The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Policy Research Series, Paper 
No. 10.) However, while these changes will result in 
some increase in efficiency of operation there are likely 
to be other forces giving rise to increased demand for 
the services of this sector. As living standards rise, 
higher standards of service are sought by consumers 
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which involve higher margins. In the UK in the 1980s 
there was an increasing trend to compete on service 
rather than on price. 
Distribution 
The result of these offsetting changes will be a fairly 
slow growth in the output of this sector, roughly in line 
with the growth in consumption (Figure 4.7). This 
would be a somewhat better performance than in the 
1980s when output in the sector actually fell, in spite of 
a small rise in consumption. 
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Employment in the sector in the 1980s actually 
increased. However, these figures mask a substantial 
shift over the period from full-time to part-time workers. 
With an improved output performance in the next five 
years employment is forecast to grow by 1 % a year. If 
the shift to part-time working continues the measured 
growth in employment could be slightly higher. 
Transport and Communications 
The transport and communications sector grew by 
5% a year from 1983 to the end of the decade (Figure 
4.8). This growth was driven by the rapid increase in 
exports, in particular tourism exports, and by increases 
in capacity in the telecommunications sector. In the 
latter case, the low investment in the 1970s had con-
strained output so that the sector was operating below 
its optimum level. (Bradley, J., J. Fitz Gerald, and I. 
Kearney, 1990: "A Model of the Irish Marketed Services 
Sector", The Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Report for DG XVI of the EC Commission.) The fall in 
air fares, consequent on increased competition, helped 
increase the demand for the services of this sector. 
For the next five years the prospects for the tourism 
industry remain bright and the telecommunications 
industry should have the capacity to meet demand for 
its services. As a result we forecast that the output of 
this sector will grow by about 4% a year in the period 
to 1996. 
Employment in this sector fell by 3,000 between 
1980 and 1990 in spite of the rapid growth in output. 
This reflected extensive rationalisation in the telecom-
munications sector and a considerable growth in pro-
ductivity. This sector is highly capital intensive and 
there has been significant substitution of capital for 
labour in communications. This trend is likely to con-
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tinue over the next five years so that we forecast a further 
fall in employment in the sector of 2,000 between 1991 
and 1996. 
Professional and Financial 
The professional and financial sector is the least 
homogeneous of the services sectors which makes 
modelling and forecasting less certain. The financial 
services sub-sector has grown in importance over the 
last twenty years. Between 1970 and 1990 employment 
in financial services more than doubled. However, 
financial services still accounts for less than a quarter 
of the employment in the sector. The sector, which 
includes hotels and catering, has benefited from the 
growth in tourism in recent years. For the rest of this 
sector the growth in domestic demand is the major 
cl.riving force. 
Experience elsewhere has been that rising living 
standards result in an above average growth in the 
demand for certain services, especially the services of 
this sector. In spite of the recession, over the period 
1980-89 the sector grew by 3% a year (Figure 4.9). For 
the next five years we forecast a rise in the volume of 
output of on average 4.7% a year. This growth will be 
fuelled by the growth in domestic demand and by a 
continuing, though less rapid, growth in the volume of 
tourism exports. 
The rapid employment growth in this sector in the 
1980s contrasted with the dismal performance else-
where in the economy. Over the period 1980-90 
employment grew by47,000, an averageof2.7% a year. 
For the next five years we are forecasting an almost 
identical rate of growth. Given the higher rate of growth 
forecast for the output of this sector, this implies an 
increase in the rate of productivity growth as more of 
the growth of the sector comes from the less labour 
intensive services. 
Taken together, the market services sector will grow 
by about 4.2% a year over the next five years. This is a 
slightly higher growth rate than that forecast for GNP 
over the same period and it mirrors the experience in 
the 1980s. 
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4.2.3 Agriculture 
In a separate article in this Review we examine the 
possible effects on the Irish economy of a major reform 
in the CAP. However, in the absence of firm decisions 
on how such a reform should proceed we have incor-
porated a stylised projection for the agriculture sector, 
taking account of recent trends in the CAP. 
We have assumed that real prices for agricultural 
output fall by between 1.5% and 2% a year over the next 
five years. This reflects the need to squeeze profitability 
continuously to prevent surpluses rising uncontrollably. 
In addition, we have assumed that quotas are either cut 
or their coverage extended to hold the volume of gross 
output in the sector unchanged at the 1991 level. On this 
basis, value added in agriculture, forestry and fishing is 
forecast to grow by around 0.3% a year (Figure 4.10). 
Figure 4.10 
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This is in marked contrast to the performance over 
the period 1980-90 when value added grew by 2.8% a 
year. However, given the crisis in the CAP we feel that 
even without a major reform, it would be unrealistic to 
expect significant output growth to be permitted in the 
face of mounting surpluses. This tum-around in the 
prospects for the volume of output of the sector has 
serious consequences for the food processing sector, as 
discussed above. 
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TABLE 4.2: Output: GDP at Factor Cost 
Constant Price % Changes 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Agriculture 4.8 -1.3 7.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Industry 9.2 11.7 5.0 3.9 4.2 4.6 4.2 4.5 4.6 
Manufacturing 12.2 12.7 4.7 4.2 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.0 
Utilities 4.0 5.4 5.3 5.0 6.0 6.1 4.6 4.5 4.4 
Building -5.2 9.8 7.0 1.0 4.4 4.5 0.9 1.7 1.9 
Market Services 5.5 3.9 6.5 1.7 4.0 4.9 3.6 4.0 4.2 
Distribution 1.8 3.9 6.5 1.7 3.3 4.2 2.1 2.8 3.0 
Transport & Communications 7.1 3.9 6.5 1.7 3.7 4.4 3.8 4.1 4.3 
Professional & Financial 4.5 3.9 6.5 1.7 4.5 5.5 4.3 4.7 4.8 
Non-Market Services -4.3 -2.5 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Health & Education -3.7 -2.2 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Public Administration -5.5 -2.9 0.5 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Adjustment for Fin. Services 5.1 6.1 1.7 3.8 5.4 6.2 4.9 5.3 5.5 
GDP at Factor Cost 5.2 5.5 5.3 2.3 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.5 3.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 2.5 I. I 4.5 2.0 2.6 4.7 2.3 2.7 3.0 
Subsidies -5.2 -3.3 2.7 1.0 1.2 1.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
GDP at Market Prices 5.5 5.3 5.3 2.3 3.3 4.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 
Net Factor Income 23.0 11.4 1.0 3.2 0.6 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.7 
GNP at Market Prices . 3.3 4.4 6.0 2.2 3.7 4.2 3.3 3.6 3.6 
* The growth rate for 1991 at previous year's prices is 2.0%, as in the Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Over the 1980s employment in the sector fell by 
around 4,500 a year. While employment in agriculture 
has proved very insensitive to profitability in the past 
we have assumed a slightly more rapid fall over the next 
five years of around 5,000 a year. By 1995 agriculture 
should account for just under 12 % of total employment. 
This contrasts with the situation in 1980 when agri-
cultural employment was over 18% of the total, illus-
trating its declining importance in the Irish economy. 
4.2.4 The Public Sector 
The growth in the output of the public sector is, by 
convention, almost totally determined by the rise in 
employment. Over the period 1981-86 output growth 
averaged 1.5% a year. From 1987 to 1989 there was a 
major fall in the output of the sector. As a result, the 
volume of output in 1989 was almost identical to the 
volume in 1981. In 1990 and 1991 there has been a small 
turn-around with employment increasing by around 
0.4% a year. Part of this increase in output and 
employment is due to increased CSF funding for 
training. 
For the next five years, growth in the public sector 
is assumed to remain low at just over 1 % a year. With 
declining pupil numbers in education, together with 
increases in efficiency in other sectors, this should leave 
scope for some limited increase in the quality of public 
services. However, as discussed later, the scope for even 
such improvements may be affected by other develop-
ments on the public finances. 
4.2.5 Total Output 
The detailed forecasts for the individual sectors are 
summarised in Table 4.2. Taken together they result in 
a forecast for the growth in GDP at factor cost and 
market prices of an average of 3.5% a year for the next 
five years. Unlike the last Review we do not see any 
re.ason for the growth rate to vary greatly from one year 
to another over the period to 1996. Unlike the experience 
after the 1980s recession, the recovery from the 1991 
slow-down is likely to be reasonably steady but slow. 
In 1992 the growth rate of GDP should be around 3.25% 
rising to 3.8% in 1993. The fact that the 1991 slow-down 
in Ireland has been reasonably mild, and that the 
recovery in the UK in particular will be weak, gives rise 
to this more gradual recovery path. 
The forecast trend growth for the next five years of 
3.5% represents a reduction from the 4% of our previous 
Review, reflecting the much more adverse outlook for 
real interest rates, discussed in the last chapter, and the 
poor performance of the UK economy. While this 
reduction in the medium-te1m growth rate is very 
disappointing in the face of the high level of unem-
ployment, it still represents a much more favourable 
outlook than the experience of the early 1980s would 
have suggested. 
4.3 PRICES AND WAGES 
Prices 
The major determinants of the Irish rate of inflation 
in the long run are the rate of inflation in our major 
trading partners and the rate of exchange of the Irish 
pound. With the establishment of what is effectively a 
fixed rate of exchange within the EMS, the Irish rate of 
inflation should follow reasonably closely the rate of 
inflation of other EMS countries. As discused in the 
previous chapter, we forecast a German rate of inflation 
of around 3% for the next few years. This is around 0.5% 
above the rate forecast in the last Review and the revision 
arises from the inflationary effects of German unifica-
tion. 
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While the external rate of inflation is the long-run 
determinant of the rate of inflation in Ireland, special 
factors, such as changes in taxes, can lead to some 
divergence in the short run. In the case of output prices 
in the industrial sector we see the effects of more rapid 
inflation in the UK having some carry-over effect on 
Irish output prices, excluding the food processing sector. 
As shown in Figure 4.11 and Table 4.3 we envisage a 
rise in manufacturing output prices in 1992 of 3.3% 
falling to a little over 2% by 1994 as UK inflation falls 
towards the EMS norm. 
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For consumer prices the continuing downward 
pressure on food prices will act as a moderating influ-
ence. In addition, while we have assumed that some of 
the costs of tax harmonisation are recouped from raising 
other indirect taxes, it will lead to a net loss of revenue 
to the exchequer and a reduction in consumer prices 
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below the long-run trend. Finally, if the PESP is 
effective in the private sector, as its precursor was in the 
1987-90 period, the rate of increase in wages will be 
somewhat below the trend in some of our trading 
partners. This will reduce the inflationary pressures 
within the services sector. 
The forecast growth in both the volume of GNP and 
of consumption makes it unlikely that there will be any 
build up in domestic inflationary pressures due to 
capacity constraints. Taken together these different 
factors should lead to a reduction in the Irish rate of 
inflation in 1992 and 1993 to around 2.5% a year from 
this year's forecast of 2.7%. From 1994 onwards it is 
likely that the rate of inflation in consumer prices will 
rise again towards the EMS norm of around 3%. While 
prices in the building sector showed a more rapid rise 
than consumer prices in the recovery years of 1988-90, 
as profit margins were rebuilt, we expect a more normal 
trend in the next five years . 
As outlined in the article by Fitz Gerald and O'C-
onnor on agricultural refo1m, any wide-ranging changes 
in the CAP could lead to a major drop in agricultural 
prices. This would tend to reduce the rate of inflation 
throughout the EC. However, because of the greater 
dependence of the Irish economy on agriculture the 
effects on the Irish inflation rate could be greater than 
for other EC countries. Thus there remains the possi-
bility that CAP reform could reduce the rate of inflation 
in the next five years by between 0.5% and 1.0% a year 
below our central forecast. Much would depend on the 
way any refmm package is implemented. While rates 
of inflation of below 2 % in Ireland may seem unlikely, 
CAP reform could produce such a result, albeit for a 
temporary period. 
TABLE 4.3: Price Deflators and Wage Rates (percentage changes) 
1988 /989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Consumption: 
Personal 2.5 3.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 
Government - Total 4.9 6.2 8.3 9.1 6.8 6.9 4.6 4.8 5.2 
Investment : 
Building 5.0 5.9 4.1 5.1 3.7 3.2 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Machinery & Equipment 7.0 6.8 1.0 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 
Exports: 5.7 7.3 -6.2 -0.9 3.5 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Agriculture 6.8 4.6 -6.0 -2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Industry 5.9 8.6 -7.4 -1.2 4.0 3.4 2.4 2.4 2.8 
Services 2.2 3.9 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 
Imports 6.3 6.7 -3.8 1.8 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Energy -14.3 17.5 5.9 -1.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 
Non-Energy 7.3 5.7 -4.0 1.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Gross Output - Agriculture 8.2 5.0 -11.8 -4.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Gross Output - Manufacturing -0.8 2.7 -3.6 1.6 3.3 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.5 
Foreign in £IR 
German Output 1.3 3.8 2.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
UK Output 11.6 3.9 -1.1 10.1 4.2 3.4 1.6 1.6 2.4 
Average Annual Earnings 
Industry 4.7 3.8 4.1 5.5 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.8 
Market Services 3.8 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.9 
Non Market - Public Admin. 0.0 10.3 8.3 9.1 8.0 8.0 5.1 5.3 5.8 
Non Agricultural 3.7 6.4 4.1 5.5 5.4 5.9 5.0 5.1 5.7 
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Table 4.3 shows the forecast growth in import and 
export prices over the next five years. While the export 
price will be bolstered in 1992 and 1993 by the rapid 
rise in UK prices, it is likely to rise by only 2.5% a year 
in the medium term because of the weighting of agri-
cultural produce in the total. On the other hand, import 
prices will be boosted by the assumed real increase in 
the price of energy giving rise to an average growth rate 
of around 3.25% a year. Although less dramatic than the 
loss in 1990 -91 there is thus likely to be a significant 
loss to Ireland arising from these adverse movements in 
the terms of trade. 
Wages 
Since 1985 average annual earnings in industry have 
grown by 4.5% a year (Figure 4.12). This represents a 
major change in behaviour compared to the previous 
fifteen years. The reduction in the rate of wage inflation 
was a major contributory factor to the recovery in the 
economy in the late 1980s and to the return to 
employment growth in industry. As indicated in the last 
chapter, there are a number of economic reasons why 
the rate of wage inflation has fallen. The Programme for 
National Recovery (PNR) and the PESP have reflected 
this change in behaviour. 
The reduction in the rate of price inflation has 
obviously been important. The falling rate of increase 
in wages has, in turn, contributed to this lower rate of 
price inflation. In addition, as the government's debt 
problem was turned round and expenditure was cut, the 
burden of taxation stopped rising. Employees have 
reacted to both the reduction in inflation and the stabi-
lising of tax deductions by moderating wage demands. 
Percentage Change 
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For the next five years we forecast a slightly more 
rapid growth in wage rates of an average of 5.2% a year. 
This will allow workers to share in the benefits of the 
increase in productivity. The forecast for unemploy-
ment, discussed later, will also exert downward pressure 
on the rate of wage inflation in the next three years. 
In terms of competitiveness the rate of wage inflation 
will compare favourably with that in Germany and the 
UK this year and in 1992 (Figure 4.4). Thereafter, the 
slow-down in domestically generated inflation in those 
two countries could result in wage inflation falling 
below our forecast for the Irish economy. However, on 
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the central forecast, there is unlikely to be any significant 
deterioration in Ireland's competitive position before 
the middle of the decade. 
Based on past experience we expect the rate of wage 
inflation in the industrial sector to be passed on to the 
market services sector so that average annual earnings 
in the two sector will rise at the same rate. 
Our forecast for the public (non-market) sector is 
rather different. For 1991-93 we have assumed that 
wage rates rise in line with the terms agreed in the PESP. 
In particular, the agreement allows for the continued 
processing of claims for special increases in the public 
sector. As a result, we forecast that average annual 
earnings in the public sector will grow much more 
rapidly than in the rest of the economy. In 1992 and 
1993 this will result in average earnings rising by around 
three percentage points a year more than in the private 
sector. Thereafter we have assumed that average earn-
ings in the public sector will rise at the same rate as in 
other sectors of the economy. 
The implications of this trend in public service pay 
for the public finances are discussed later. However, this 
pattern of growing differentials between average earn-
ings in the non-market and the market sectors of the 
economy gives serious cause for concern. Figure 4.13 
shows the ratio of average earnings in public adminis-
tration to average earnings in industry. Over the period 
1980 to 1985 there was relatively little change in this 
ratio. However, since that date, the rate of growth in 
average earnings in public administration has been 
much more rapid than in industry. To some extent the 
figures for the 1987-90 period have been biased upwards 
by the cost of redundancies and early retirements. Even 
allowing for this, the change in differential has been very 
marked. 
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The need to finance this diverging trend puts upward 
pressure on tax rates and, indirectly, raises wage rates 
in the market sector. However, there remains the danger 
that the higher rates of increase in the non-market sector 
could be passed on directly to the market sector. This 
could be very serious for employment growth and for 
the medium-term prospects of the Irish economy. As a 
result, it is urgent that measures be taken now to ensure 
that the diverging trend does not continue beyond 1993. 
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TABLE 4.4: Personal Income (percentage changes) 
1988 1989 1990 
Agricultural Incomes 17.0 4.5 -5.5 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 4.7 6.6 7.3 
Transfer Income 2.9 0.8 4.4 
Other Personal Income -6.0 8.7 14.2 
of which: 
Non-Ag. Profits etc. 11.1 14.2 10.4 
National Debt Interest 3.6 0.9 6.7 
Net Factor Income 29.9 19.6 -5.3 
Other Private Income -1.4 8.7 22.4 . 
Undistributed Profits (-) 12.1 8.6 42.6 
Personal Income 3.9 5.5 6.4 
Taxes on Personal Income 11.6 -3.7 7.0 
Personal Disposable Income 1.8 8.4 6.2 
Personal Consumption 5.0 9.3 5.8 
Personal Savings -13.6 3.1 9.2 
Tax Ratio (% Pers. Income) 23.5 21.4 21.6 
Savings Ratio (% Disposable 14.9 14.1 14.5 
Income) 
4.4INCOMES 
The forecast for the agricultural sector is gloomy so 
that farm incomes show little change in nominal terms 
over the forecast period. However, given the continued 
decline in employment in the agricultural sector there 
should be little change in real income per head. 
As shown in Table 4.4, in contrast to the recovery 
phase of the Irish economy when profits grew much 
more rapidly than wages and salaries, they will grow at 
similar rates in the next five years. This reflects the 
changing pattern of growth with less dependence on the 
high technology sector. The traditional manufacturing 
sector, which is much more labour intensive than the 
high technology sector, will account for a higher share 
of the growth than it did in the recent past. This sector 
will, in fact, show an increase in profitability in the 
forecast period. Overall the competitiveness of the 
economy, measured by profitability, will be broadly 
unchanged. 
Transfers, which are assumed to be indexed to 
consumer prices, will rise quite slowly over the next five 
years. There will be some additional growth over and 
above the rate of inflation to fund the higher level of 
unemployment. The rate of increase in national debt 
interest will also grow quite slowly reflecting the 
relatively small exchequer borrowing requirement. 
The revenue from personal taxation is affected by 
two assumptions. In 1993 there is a halving of the DIRT 
tax because of the ending of exchange control and the 
resulting need for harmonisation with other EC 
members. From 1994 onwards there is assumed to be a 
small reduction in the average rate of tax each year ( taxes 
divided by income). Taken together these will lead to a 
small reduction in the ratio of personal taxes to personal 
income. 
The resulting rise in personal disposable income will 
be nearly 6% a year. When the rate of inflation is allowed 
for, this will give rise to an average growth in real 
personal disposable income of 3% a year for the next 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
-8.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 
6.3 7.4 8.0 6.3 6.5 7.0 
6.5 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.8 
7.0 7.2 8.3 3.1 5.2 5.8 
3.5 7.2 8.7 4.3 5.9 6.8 
2.4 -1.5 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.5 
2.2 4.1 6.2 5.0 5.5 6.5 
2.3 6.4 7.9 2.9 4.9 5.5 
-7.2 4.4 6.9 2.4 4.2 4.9 
5.2 6.1 6.7 5.0 5.5 5.8 
5.9 6.0 5.0 5.8 5.4 6.0 
5.0 6.2 7.2 4.8 5.5 5.8 
5.0 4.9 7.4 5.1 5.7 6.0 
4.7 13.5 5.8 3.5 4.1 4.4 
21.7 21.7 21.4 21.5 21.5 21.5 
14.5 15.5 15.3 15.1 14.9 14.7 
five years. The reduction in DIRT in 1993 will result in 
a particularly big increase in real disposable income that 
year. 
4.5 EXPENDITURE ON GNP 
Consumption 
One of the areas of greatest uncertainty in the past 
concerning the prospects for the Irish economy has been 
the behaviour of consumers. Over the last twenty years 
a number of different approaches have been taken to 
modelling the pattern of personal savings. However, as 
yet, no satisfactory explanation has been found for the 
observed behaviour of consumers. When we published 
our last Review, drawing on recent Danish and UK 
experience, we felt there was a possibility of a rapid fall 
in the savings ratio in 1990. However, on the data 
available, this does not seem to have occurred. 
In the case of the UK in the 1980s the run-down in 
savings was accompanied by extensive financial 
deregulation, something which has not occurred to the 
same extent in Ireland. In addition, the rise in German 
interest rates in 1989, prompted by the Bundesbank, 
punctured the inflationary spiral in house prices and 
deflated consumer expectations. The action by the 
Bundesbank in raising interest rates was probably well 
timed from the point of view of the short-run behaviour 
of the Irish economy, though of course the consequences 
of higher interest rates in the medium-term are 
extremely adverse. 
Given the uncertainty about consumer behaviour, for 
the next five years we have projected a broadly 
unchanged savings ratio. We do not envisage circum-
stances like those in early 1989, which gave rise to fears 
of too rapid a fall in the ratio. There may even be a small 
rise in the ratio in 1992 with interest rates remaining 
high. Thereafter we show the savings ratio falling slowly 
back to this year's level. The change in DIRT tax could 
result in a further temporary rise in 1993. However, here 
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TABLE 4.5: Expenditure on GNP (constant 1985 prices, percentage changes) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Personal Consumption 2.4 5.2 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7 2.1 2.5 2.8 
Public Consumption -4.2 -3.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Fixed Investment 2.6 12.0 5.4 3.6 7.3 5.2 1.9 4.0 4.0 
Building -0.7 9.7 6.9 0.8 7.8 5.7 1.2 3.4 3.6 
Machinery 5.6 14.1 4.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 2.6 4.5 4.4 
Total Domestic Demand 0.4 6.0 4.9 1.3 2.0 4.4 2.0 2.7 2.9 
Total Exports 8.7 10.1 6.2 5.4 7.5 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 
Merchandise 8.9 11.0 6.0 5.6 7.9 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.2 
Services 6.8 2.2 7.6 4.1 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.5 
Total Demand 3.9 7.8 5.5 3.2 4.5 5.4 4.0 4.4 4.4 
Total Imports 3.9 10.9 5.6 4.4 6.3 7.3 5.1 5.5 5.5 
Gross Domestic Product 3.9 5.9 5.4 2.3 3.3 4.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 
Net Factor Income 23.0 11.4 1.0 3.2 0.6 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.7 
Gross National Product . 1.4 5.0 6.1 2.2 3.7 4.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 
* The growth rate for 1991 at previous year's prices is 2.0%, as in the Quarterly Economic Commenta,y 
we have assumed that consumers view income from 
deposits in the same way in which they view other forms 
of income and do not change their savings pattern. 
In the longer term it should be noted that the personal 
savings ratio in Ireland is quite high compared to our 
European neighbours. While some of this difference 
may be explicable in terms of demographic factors there 
could be some reduction in the rate in the longer term. 
Given the forecast for personal disposable income, 
we envisage a moderate growth in the volume of 
consumption over the next five years of nearly 3% a 
year (Figure 4.14 and Table 4.5). This is roughly in line 
with the experience since 1987. Because of the reduction 
in DIRT tax in 1993, together with a slight fall in the 
savings ratio, consumption growth in that year could 
peak at over 4.5%. However, as discussed above, 
consumers may spread out the effects of this tax change 
more evenly over time than we have forecast. 
Figure 4.14 
Consumption 
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The pattern of growth in public consumption is 
determined by our initial assumptions. The volume 
growth in this item is determined by the assumed growth 
in employment in the sector of 1 % a year. This rate of 
growth is substantially below the average growth in 
public consumption over the 1980s. 
While fiscal necessity may dictate a continuing fall 
in the share of public consumption over the next five 
years, it is not clear what will be the public preference 
in the longer term. It seems unlikely that the share of 
GNP devoted to demand for publicly provided goods -
health care and education - will fall indefinitely. By the 
end of the decade a growth rate for this aggregate more 
in line with national income could be anticipated. 
Investment 
Of all the components of expenditure the most 
difficult to forecast in the short tenn is investment. This 
is not just due to problems with indicators of current 
activity but reflects the fact that investment is extremely 
cyclical. In forecasting in the medium-term more 
importance attaches to the investment over the whole 
period rather than to its precise timing. In using a model 
based approach it is possible to determine the change in 
the capital stock over a period of years necessary to 
underpin the forecast change in output capacity. How-
ever, the model is less reliable in forecasting the years 
in which the investment will take place. 
While investment appears to have grown very 
rapidly in 1989 and 1990, when economic growth was 
particularly fast, the down-tum this year has seen a 
reversal in this trend. The recovery in the economy next 
year should see a return to growth in investment. Two 
special factors will help strengthen the 1992 recovery: 
CSF funded government investment and the building of 
the gas pipeline to the UK. However, the recovery 
should be fairly broadly based with significant growth 
in private housing, investment by the traditional and 
high technology sectors in manufacturing and in the 
market services sector. 
The fluctuations in investment in the years after 1992 
owe much to the special factors adding to growth in 
1992. In 1994 the growth in CSF funded investment is 
assumed to end and the gas pipeline should be com-
pleted. Over the five year period 1991-96 investment 
should grow on average by over 5.5%. Investment in 
the agricultural sector is likely to fall over the period 
due to the poor prospects for farmers' incomes. The 
prospects for investment in the food-processing sector 
are also poor as the sector undergoes rationalisation. The 
44 
growth in building investment will be slightly below 
5.5% due to the composition of the investment over the 
period. 
Exports 
In the short term, in 1992, our forecast for agricul-
tural exports is affected by our assumption that inter-
vention stocks remain unchanged after 1991. This 
means that there is a shift in agricultural produce from 
building up intervention stocks, as in 1990 and 1991, to 
direct exports. The result is a volume increase in 1992 
of 13% (Figure 4.15). Thereafter, the volume of agri-
cultural exports is constrained by the absence of growth 
in agricultural output. The small rise each year from 
1993 onwards of on average 1 % arises from some 
increase in the value added of the food-processing 
sector. 
Percentage Change 
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If at some stage in the future intervention stocks were 
completely liquidated this would provide a temporary 
additional increase in the volume of exports. However, 
the value of these exports could be quite low, much of 
the value of the original purchases having already been 
paid in the form of EC subsidies. 
As with agricultural exports, industrial exports are 
ultimately detennined by the supply capacity of the Irish 
industrial sector. As discussed earlier, that capacity is, 
in turn, dependent on the variables which appear in 
standard export demand functions, world demand and 
relative competitiveness. Figure 4.16 shows that the 
ratio of the value of industrial exports to the value of 
output of the manufacturing sector has risen steadily 
over the last ten years. At present they account for 62% 
of manufacturing output. While this ratio has risen 
rapidly in the past, the scope for a further increase in the 
proportion of output exported beyond 1996 is limited. 
Thus we can expect the volume increase in industrial 
exports to slow over the next five years. However, as 
shown in Figure 4.15, at 7 .3% a year the volume growth 
will remain rapid, even if it is below that experienced 
in the late 1980s. The result will be a further increase in 
the share of output exported. This makes the Irish 
industrial sector unusually independent of domestic 
demand and open to developments on world markets. 
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Figure 4.16 
Ratio of Industrial Exports to Output 
Tourism exports have shown extremely rapid 
growth in recent years. Any estimate for the period 
1986-91 based on previous trends seriously underesti-
mates the actual out-turn. Even allowing for some 
slow-down in 1991 the average volume increase since 
1987 is over 8% a year. This represents a major increase 
in market share. It is still unclear to what extent this 
change has been driven by changes in competitiveness, 
changes in marketing, or changes in tastes, especially 
on the European market. As a result, there is some 
uncertainty as to whether such a rate of growth can be 
sustained over the next five years . 
While the effects of the Gulf war and the recession 
in the US and the UK will affect growth this year and, 
to a lesser extent, next year, it can be expected that 
growth will continue in the next five years. However, 
in the light of the somewhat less buoyant forecast for 
the UK and the USA in the medium term, we have 
assumed that growth averages around 4.2% a year. 
The forecast for other services exports, including 
transportation, is for an average growth of 2.3% a year, 
somewhat slower than in the last few years. This reflects 
the somewhat less buoyant forecast for tourism and 
merchandise exports, both of which affect the demand 
for exports of other services. 
Imports 
In forecasting imports in the medium term we first 
forecast what will be the growth in domestic supply, 
taking account of the competitiveness of the economy. 
We then consider the likely level of final demand, 
including export demand. Imports are then determined 
as the difference between domestic demand and 
domestic supply. 
As shown in Table 4.5, we expect the volume of 
imports to grow more rapidly in 1992 and 1993 than it 
has in the last two years. This pick up reflects the 
recovery in the economy. In particular the rapid growth 
in investment, which tends to have quite a high import 
content, fuels the growth. However, as the special 
factors affecting investment fade out after 1993 and as 
domestic output growth continues, there is some 
reduction in the rate of growth of imports. None the less, 
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they still grow substantially more rapidly than does the 
volume of GNP, increasing the openness of the Irish 
economy. 
Net Factor Income 
In the period 1980-90 the average rate of growth in 
GDP was around 3% while the average growth in GNP 
was 2%. Driving a wedge between these two aggregates 
was the extremely rapid growth in what is called net 
factor income. (This item is, in fact, negative repre-
senting a net outflow). This rapid growth in net factor 
income was attributable to two of the three elements in 
net factor income: national debt interest and profit 
repatriations (Figure 4.17). 
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Over the 1980s the growth in national debt interest 
was a natural corollary of the rising debt. The growth in 
profit repatriations reflected the extent to which the very 
successful and profitable high technology sector was 
foreign owned. However, over the next five years 
foreign debt, while still rising in absolute terms, will fall 
as a percentage of GNP, leading to only a small increase 
in debt interest payments. In the case of profit repatri-
ations their growth over the period to 1996 will be more 
rapid than the growth in the value of GDP, exerting some 
negative effect on the value of GNP. However, the 
residual other factor income item, which is an inflow, 
will rise over the period to 1996 due to the build up in 
private foreign assets consequent on the balance of 
payments surplus. Together these changes will leave the 
overall growth in net factor income slightly below that 
for GDP. As a result GNP will grow slightly faster than 
GDP. 
GNP 
Over the next five years GNP should grow at around 
3.7% a year. As explained above the expected growth 
in GDP is just over 3.5% a year. The recovery next year 
will see the growth rate rising to approximately 3.75%. 
In 1993 it may reach a temporary peak, partly due to 
special factors driving investment. Thereafter the 
growth rate should settle down to around 3.5% a year. 
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4.6 THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
One of the most striking manifestations of the 
tum-around in the Irish economy in the 1980s was the 
change in the balance of payments. In 1981 the deficit 
on the balance of payments was nearly 15% of GNP. 
By 1990 it had been turned into a surplus of nearly 3% 
a year (Figure 4.18). A major factor in this reversal was 
the very deflationary fiscal policy followed throughout 
much of the 1980s (see chapter 2). This had the effect 
of deflating domestic demand and, therefore, the 
demand for imports. From 1986 onwards, as discussed 
earlier, the improvement in Ireland's competitiveness 
led to a rapid growth in industrial output and exports. 
While international transfers, predominantly from the 
EC, grew over the decade, their contribution to the 
recovery was small. 
Figure 4.18 
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Ireland has entered the 1990s with a significant 
balance of payments surplus. We envisage a continu-
ation of this surplus at around 2 % a year into the medium 
term. As discussed earlier, net factor income paid 
abroad, while continuing to grow, will rise much more 
slowly than in the 1980s. In spite of adverse movements 
in the terms of trade the competitiveness of the economy 
should see a continuing growth in the balance of trade. 
However, net international transfers from the EC will 
show little or no change from their present high level. 
No allowance has been made for a possible increase in 
transfers from the EC as compensation for the problems 
posed by tax haimonisation or from an increase in the 
size of the CSF after 1993. 
In the longer term some of the factors which could 
result in a return to the chronic balance of payments 
deficits experienced by Ireland prior to the mid 1980s 
would be: a fall in domestic supply due to a major loss 
of competitiveness; a pe1manent fall in the personal 
savings ratio to historically unprecedented levels; a 
return to an era of fiscal extravagance. Any increase in 
the rate of private sector investment above the forecast 
level due to enhanced prospects for profitability, while 
putting temporary pressure on the balance of payments, 
would increase capacity and actually increase the sur-
plus in the long term. 
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TABLE 4.6: Employment and the Labour Force, mid April (thousands) 
1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 164 166 163 
Industry 300 300 306 
Traditional Manufacturing 107 107 109 
Food Processing 37 37 36 
High Technology 71 73 76 
Manufacturing 215 216 222 
Utilities 14 14 14 
Building 71 70 70 
Market Services 410 424 427 
Distribution 166 172 171 
Transport & Communica- 66 64 66 
lions 
Professional & Financial 178 188 191 
Non-Market Services 206 201 194 
Health & Education 136 131 128 
Public Administration 70 70 66 
Total 1080 1091 1090 
Unemployment 232 218 203 
Labour Force 1312 1309 1293 
% of Labour Force 
Unemployment Rate 17.7 16.7 15.7 
Labour Force Participation 61.2 60.9 60.4 
Rate 
Net Emigration 27 32 46 
Provided a prudent fiscal policy is followed in the 
1990s this continuing surplus will underpin Ireland's 
recovery and will make possible continuing progress 
towards EMU. It will allow either the repayment of some 
of the government's debts or, alternatively, a build up 
in private sector foreign assets. Finally, it will keep 
downward pressure on domestic interest rates in the run 
up to the third stage of EMU. 
4.7 LABOUR MARKET 
The trend of employment in each sector of the 
economy has been discussed earlier and is summarised 
in Table 4.6. While quite satisfactory compared to the 
1980s, when employment fell significantly, the forecast 
rise of 0.9% a year for total employment over the next 
five years is still quite moderate (Figure 4.19). It is 
marginally slower than the average growth in employ-
ment experienced in the recovery years 1987-91. The 
contrast with the 1980s is greater at the sectoral level; 
whereas employment in industry fell by almost 50,000 
between 1980 and 1990 it should rise by almost 30,000 
over the next five years. However, it will still be below 
its 1980 level in 1996. By contrast the market services 
sector saw an increase in employment in the 1980s. This 
increase should continue for the next five years. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the net increase in the 
labour force (new entrants less retirals) will average 
between 20,000 and 25 ,000 a year over the rest of this 
decade. This increase is much greater than the forecast 
increase in employment. The result will be either an 
increase in unemployment or emigration. 
The recession currently underway in the UK has 
serious implications for the development of the Irish 
Jabour force. As shown in Figure 4.20, emigration 
picked up in the mid-1980s with the improvement in the 
UK labour market. However, with unemployment rising 
rapidly in the UK from the end of 1990 the UK labour 
.1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
165 162 157 152 147 142 138 
322 325 334 343 346 350 354 
112 115 116 118 119 121 123 
38 37 36 35 34 33 32 
82 85 88 93 97 100 102 
232 237 241 246 250 254 257 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
77 75 81 84 82 83 84 
441 443 450 460 467 474 481 
173 174 177 179 180 182 183 
67 65 64 64 64 63 63 
201 204 209 217 223 229 234 
192 193 195 197 199 201 203 
128 129 130 131 133 134 135 
64 64 65 65 66 67 67 
1120 1123 1136 1151 1158 1167 1174 
183 212 215 215 220 223 224 
1303 1335 1351 1366 1379 1389 1398 
14.0 15.8 15.9 15.7 16.0 16.0 16.0 
60.6 61.7 61.9 62.1 62.3 62.4 62.6 
31 5 9 12 17 23 28 
Figure 4.19 
Change in Total Employment 
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market has turned sour for Irish emigrants. While the 
UK economy may turn the corner at the end of this year 
we envisage a continuing rise in UK unemployment into 
1992. It will be 1993 or 1994 before it begins to fall and 
even by 1996 unemployment in the UK should be well 
above the levels experienced between 1988-90. 
The labour markets in other possible destinations for 
Irish emigrants are also unfavourable. The US and 
Australia are also in recession. In Germany the rate of 
unemployment in the old GDR is rising well above Irish 
levels and this provides a large pool of potential German 
speaking labour for industry in the West. In the 
medium-term it is difficult to predict how attractive the 
broader European labour market will prove for potential 
Irish emigrants. Past experience suggests that it will not 
prove a major draw, other than for those with high levels 
of skill and education. 
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Figure 4.20 
Numbers Emigrating 
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As a result, we believe emigration in the year to April 
1991 will fall to a very low level, around 5,000. It should 
remain under 10,000 in 1992. Thereafter, as the UK 
labour market improves, it will increase but even in 1996 
it will still be below the 1990 level. 
The effect of this reduction in emigration is to put 
much greater pressure on the domestic labour market. 
As shown in Figure 4.21, the numbers unemployed, 
having risen by nearly 30,000 in the year to April 1991, 
will show further small increases each year until 1996. 
By 1996 the numbers unemployed should peak at 
around 16% of the labour force. While below the 
recession years of the mid- l 980s, this is a very high level 
by historical standards. It must be viewed in the context 
of the rapid growth in the labour force and the unfa-
vourable labour market conditions outside Ireland. 
Figure 4.21 
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There remain many areas of uncertainty concerning 
future developments in the labour force. Forecasting 
emigration is extremely difficult. Obviously if the UK 
or broader EC labour market showed a more rapid 
recovery than we have forecast, emigration could 
increase quite quickly. This, in turn, could lead to a fairly 
rapid turn-around in unemployment in Ireland. 
On the other hand, the assumptions concerning 
labour force participation, shown in Table 4.6, are quite 
conservative. If participation by married women in the 
labour force were to rise more rapidly than assumed it 
would increase the labour force. Finally, we have 
assumed a constant educational participation rate 
(proportion of the population in education) over the 
forecast period. This rate rose significantly in the 1980s. 
With a very high proportion of children now completing 
second level education, it is not clear how much further 
this rate can rise. However, the extension of second level 
education to a six year cycle could lead to some increase. 
Such a further rise would reduce the labour force in the 
forecast period. 
4.8 THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
As discussed in the introduction to this Review, our 
last publication in 1989 forecast reasonably accurately 
the growth in GNP over the period 1989-90. Even with 
the lower than forecast growth in 1991 one might have 
expected our 1989 forecast for the public finances to 
have proved reasonably accurate. However, instead of 
an exchequer surplus in 1991 of over 1 % of GNP, as 
forecast in 1989, we are facing a borrowing requirement 
of a minimum of 2% of GNP, probably higher (Table 
4.7). In our forecast we have assumed that receipts from 
privatisation make up for the shortfall on the current side 
of the budget this year. This failure to move into surplus 
has been due to two factors: a relaxation of fiscal policy 
and the deterioration in the external environment. 
Fiscal policy was more lax over the period 1990-91 
than we had forecast. Both the 1990 and 1991 budgets 
made substantial cuts in taxation which were not funded 
by adequate cuts in expenditure. The problem with the 
1991 borrowing requirement is not so much the likeli-
hood of an excess over budget, but the fact that the initial 
opening position was much too high. 
The situation has also been aggravated by external 
factors: interest rates and public service pay. Prospects 
for interest rates both at home and abroad have disim-
proved significantly, largely because of the effects of 
German unification. We have already discussed the 
problems posed for the economy as a whole by the very 
rapid growth in public service pay. However, it has its 
most direct effect through the public finances. 
The net effect of this disimprovement in the public 
finances is to make the problems of tax harmonisation 
and control of the debt in the medium-term more 
difficult. Whereas we previously had anticipated no 
serious problem in reducing the debt/GNP ratio in the 
medium-te1m, it is now clear that this imperative will 
require greater effort and attention in the future. 
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TABLE 4. 7: The Public Finances, percentage changes 
1988 1989 1990 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 12.8 -3.4 10.8 
Company 29.3 0.3 55.7 
Personal 11.6 -3.7 7.0 
Taxes on Expenditure 9.8 10.3 2.5 
Net Trading & Investment -2.3 -21.7 18.5 
Income 
Transfers From Abroad -23.7 -0.6 -10.6 
Total Current Receipts 9.7 1.2 7.0 
Subsidies 18.8 -58.2 44.7 
National Debt Interest 3.6 0.9 6.7 
Other Transfer Payments 3.8 0.1 4.2 
Public Consumption 0.5 2.4 8.9 
Total Current Expenditure 3.7 -4.2 8.1 
Budget Deficit as % of GNP 1.7 1.3 0.7 
Total Capital Receipts 37.3 -25.0 13.7 
Total Capital Expenditure -19.6 -28.6 19.1 
Exchequer Borrowing as % of 3.3 2.3 2.0 
GNP 
Even with a recovery in economic growth in 1992 
and 1993 the moves to harmonise taxes will add to the 
borrowing requirement. Unless action is taken to 
increase taxes or cut expenditure to fund the necessary 
changes the borrowing requirement will rise towards 
3% of GNP (Figure 4.22). From 1994 onwards we have 
assumed that there are limited tax cuts and a small 
improvement in public services. On this basis the bor-
rowing requirement would start falling again. However, 
it would only fall below the 1991 level by 1996. 
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The debt/GNP ratio underwent a rapid fall from its 
peakyear, 1987to 1990(Figure4.23). While we forecast 
a continuing improvement in the ratio each year for the 
next five, the progress is likely to be slower than we had 
previously anticipated. It will leave the debt/GNP ratio 
still above 90% in 1996. The reduction in the ratio will 
be shared fairly equally between the ratio of domestic 
and foreign debt to GNP. Even in 1996 the debt/GNP 
ratio in Ireland will still be quite high by EC standards. 
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The upward revision in the forecast for real interest 
rates in the medium term increases the potential rewards 
from debt reduction while making its achievement more 
difficult. Investments, which might otherwise have been 
potentially profitable, have now been rendered unat-
tractive. The trade-off between debt reduction and 
investment has been altered in favour of more rapid debt 
reduction. 
While the debt/GNP ratio remains above 100% we 
remain very vulnerable to outside shocks such as a major 
reform of the CAP. As can be seen this year, any 
reduction in growth below the trend rate has serious 
effects on the public finances. Thus if the recovery from 
recession in the UK and the USA were postponed it 
would have serious consequences for the public finances 
next year. In addition, because of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the German economy, there remains a danger 
that real interest rates could rise above our forecast level. 
If this were to occur it would simultaneously reduce 
growth in the EC and Ireland and would increase the 
burden of the debt interest payments. 
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4.9 THE MONETARY SECTOR 
As discussed in chapter 3, the outlook for interest 
rates in the medium-term depends on progress towards 
EMU. In this Review we have assumed that the final 
stage of EMU is not reached before the end of the 
decade. Even if there is rapid progress and the Irish 
pound is fixed to the DM before that date, previous 
experience with the sterling regime indicates that 
interest rates in Ireland will remain above DM rates 
while there are separate currencies. The lower liquidity 
oflrish government debt will make it less attractive than 
debt issued by Germany. Thus there is a lower bound 
on the gap between Irish and German interest rates of 
between 0.25% and 0.5%. However, as we have 
experienced in the recent past, it is quite possible for 
that margin to be substantially larger. 
The fact that the margin has fallen to its current level 
of around 1 % for long-term rates is due to a number of 
different factors. The uncertainties concerning the 
German economy have weakened the position of the 
DM, both within the EMS and vis-a-vis the dollar and 
the yen. Thus there is little pressure for a DM appreci-
ation within the EMS. In addition, the relatively strong 
balance of payments position of the Irish economy gives 
cause for confidence in the sustainability of the Irish 
pound's present position within the EMS. This latter 
factor has been important in the last two years. 
Over the forecast period, as shown in Figure 4.24, 
the gap between Irish and German interest rates should 
narrow to a half a percentage point. The convergence of 
short-term rates may take somewhat longer. 
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The ending of exchange control has led to a major 
private capital outflow in the last two years as the private 
sector adjusts its portfolio of assets. Its holdings of 
foreign assets at the end of 1988 were considered much 
too low by the relevant financial institutions. The 
gradual abolition of all forms of exchange control in 
1992 and 1993 could generate additional outflows. 
The fact that the current account of the balance of 
payments has been in substantial surplus in recent years 
has facilitated this adjustment of portfolios. In addition, 
the balance of payments surplus has been a sign of the 
strength of the Irish economy and has encouraged 
foreign investors to increase their holdings of Irish 
financial assets, especially of Irish government debt. 
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This has allowed domestic holders of government debt 
to sell their Irish government securities and reinvest 
their funds abroad without taking a substantial capital 
loss. Without these two flows of funds into the country, 
through the current and capital accounts of the balance 
of payments, the portfolio adjustment by the Irish 
private sector might have led to even higher domestic 
interest rates than actually occurred. 
As it was, the need to attract a substantial inflow of 
foreign funds, to buy Irish government securities from 
the domestic institutions wishing to adjust their port-
folios, led to higher interest rates than might otherwise 
have been the case in 1989 and 1990. While Irish 
institutions were reasonably happy about the position 
of the Irish pound in the EMS, foreign institutions had 
to devote resources to familiarising themselves with the 
Irish economy before they could be happy investing. To 
pay for this acquisition of information they required a 
substantial interest differential compared to similar DM 
and even French franc assets. 
A further problem with the growth in foreign hold-
ings of Irish government securities is that it could pose 
difficulties in the future for the Central Bank in 
managing the exchange rate. Because such securities are 
potentially saleable without notice on the Irish stock 
exchange they can theoretically be converted without 
warning into a foreign exchange liability for the Central 
Bank. In practice such a liability can be avoided or 
delayed by allowing interest rates to rise sufficiently to 
deter sales. However, this adds an additional source of 
instability to interest rates. If the borrowing from abroad 
had been undertaken by the government in foreign 
currencies in the normal way, the Central Bank would 
know with certainty when the foreign exchange liability 
would mature. 
The portfolio adjustment by the Irish private sector 
took place rapidly over the last two years. In the future 
the capital outflow is likely to be somewhat smaller as 
the institutions' main concern is the maintenance of 
balance in the portfolio of new investments. In addition, 
foreign institutions have become more familiar with the 
Irish economy and see Irish pound assets as less risky 
investments than they did in the past. Thus the interest 
differential on medium and long dated government 
securities between Ireland and Germany ( or France) has 
narrowed. Downward pressure on this margin should be 
maintained by the Irish government borrowing, where 
necessary, in foreign currencies, rather than letting Irish 
pound rates rise to attract in foreign funds indirectly. 
Table 4.8 shows the forecast for the flow of funds 
over the next five years. The company sector, which 
actually had a surplus of funds over investment needs 
in 1987 and 1988, has an increasing need to borrow 
funds in the next five years. This reflects the rapid 
increase in the investment likely to be undertaken by the 
sector rather than a down-tum in profitability. However, 
by 1996 the size of the financing requirement of this 
sector, in the absence of increased profitability, may put 
some restriction on the volume of investment under-
taken. 
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TABLE 4.8: The Flow of Funds, £ million 
1988 1989 1990 
Company Sector 
Sources of Funds 2327 2248 2730 
Acquisition of Real Assets 1917 2293 3029 
Acquisition of Financial Assets 410 -44 -299 
Net Acquisitions Ratio 17.6 -2.0 -11.0 
Household Sector 
Sources of Funds 2567 2606 2799 
Acquisition of Real Assets 1155 1611 1623 
Acquisition of Financial Assets 1412 994 1176 
Net Acquisitions Ratio 55.0 38.2 42.0 
Company + Households 
Sources of Funds 4893 4854 5529 
Acquisition of Real Assets 3071 3904 4652 
Acquisition of Financial Assets 1822 950 877 
Net Acquisitions Ratio 37.2 19.6 15.9 
% Net Acquisitions 
Lent to Government -12.4 -3.7 
For the personal sector the assumption of a fairly 
constant savings ratio means that funds available for 
investment will rise steadily over the period. However, 
the two major areas for personal investment are agri-
culture and housing. In the case of the former the adverse 
prospects for agricultural incomes will lead to an actual 
fall in investment. While there will be significant growth 
in the volume of private housing investment it will be 
financed easily from the growth in savings. This will 
leave a growing residual for investment in financial 
assets. While lower than in the recession years of the 
1980s, the proportion invested in financial assets will 
be quite high compared to experience in earlier periods 
of economic growth. 
Taken together the company and household sectors 
will have a surplus of funds available over and above 
their needs for financing physical investment. We have 
assumed that around 17 % of new investment in financial 
assets by the household sector goes on government 
securities. The rest of the surplus funds are then assumed 
to be invested abroad. 
In the absence of a proper model of the portfolio 
behaviour of the private sector it is difficult to forecast 
trends in the capital account of the balance of payments. 
As indicated above there is some reason to believe that 
the recent large outflows may be part of a once off 
adjustment. However, the forecast for private invest-
ment abroad, derived residually as explained above, 
remains large over the next five years (Figure 4.25). 
While movement towards EMU may make rising shares 
of foreign assets in investment portfolios increasingly 
acceptable to conservative financial institutions, the 
extent of the investment implied by these figures is quite 
large. 
One possibility is that a higher share of new 
investment by the private sector might go into govern-
ment securities. This would reduce government foreign 
borrowing and private foreign investment by the same 
amount. The reduction in debt interest payments abroad 
would be offset by a reduction in earnings on private 
sector foreign assets. Thus changes in the allocation of 
funds compared to our central forecast would not 
directly affect the macro-economic forecast. It is only 
if such changes affected domestic interest rates that 
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there would be a real effect. However, with movement 
towards EMU the scope for changing domestic interest 
rates will be quite limited. 
The growing financing needs of the company sector 
will not be met from internal funds. This funding need, 
together with the absence of other domestic opportu-
nities for investment by the personal sector (including 
the financial institutions), will provide new 
opportunities for financial intermediaries. 
The banking system over the 1980s has been hit by 
a number of unfavourable shocks. The dominance of the 
government sector in the market for funds reduced their 
role as a financial intermediary. In addition, the banks' 
position in the market for funds was adversely affected 
by the imposition of the DIRT tax. 
Over the next five years the diminished importance 
of the government sector in the market for funds will 
increase the role of the banking system. It is at present 
better placed to channel surplus funds from the personal 
sector to the company sector than are insurance com-
panies or pension funds. The financing needs of the 
company sector will also be greater than in the 1980s 
due to the higher rate of growth and investment. 
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Finally, the abolition of all forms of exchange 
control and the completion of the EC single market at 
the end of 1992 will expose the banking sector in 
particular to greater competition. For larger firms there 
will be increasing possibilities of cutting financing costs 
by looking to the wider EC banking system. However, 
given the relatively small size of most Irish firms they 
will generally still be dependent on the domestic 
banking system. If they are to prosper it will be 
important that the efficiency gains in the wider EC 
banking system are passed on to Irish firms through 
increased competition at home. 
4.10 UNCERTAINTIES 
As with all previous Medium-Term Reviews, fore-
casting is made difficult by the fact that there are many 
areas of uncertainty in the external environment facing 
the Irish economy. Today there are two major external 
factors which give rise to uncertainty: the effects of 
German unification on interest rates; the timing and 
magnitude of the recovery in the US and UK economies. 
In this Section we explore how our central forecast 
would be altered by changes in the assumptions which 
we have made about interest rates and recovery in the 
UK and the US. 
Higher Interest Rates 
In the first simulation we examine how the Irish 
economy has been affected by the rise in German 
interest rates over the last two years. This gives a good 
idea of the effects of one aspect of Geiman unification 
on the medium-term prospects for the Irish economy. It 
also shows how the Irish economy would be affected by 
any further changes in real interest rates, over and above 
those allowed for in our central forecast. As shown in 
Figure 4.26, in the simulation, beginning in 1992, we 
reduced German (and Irish) interest rates by two per-
centage points below what they would otherwise have 
been. This change was made for the rest of the decade. 
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This interest rate reduction affects the Irish economy 
through two main channels. Given the size of the 
national debt it has major implications for the exche-
quer's finances. Secondly, it affects private sector 
behaviour, especially the volume of investment and , in 
the medium term, productive capacity. In the simulation 
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we have assumed that any effects on the exchequer 
finances are sterilised in the medium term by a cut in 
income taxes. The improvement in the borrowing 
requirement would be enough to finance a 20% reduc-
tion in all income tax bills over the period to 1996. 
The effects of this combined reduction in interest 
rates and the rise in income tax on GDP and GNP is 
shown in Figure 4.27. The initial effects on GDP are 
smaller than on GNP because it takes time for output 
capacity to rise. However, by 1996 GDP would be 2.8% 
higher and GNP would be 3.1 % above the central 
forecast level. The favourable effect on the govern-
ment's finances occurs much more rapidly. 
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The interest rate cut affects employment through 
three channels: it reduces the cost of capital and, 
therefore, the cost of production, leading to an increase 
in output; the cut in taxation increases domestic demand 
for goods and services; the reduction in tax rates leads 
to a reduction in wage rates, increasing Ireland's 
competitiveness. By 1996, as a result of the lower 
interest rates, almost 30,000 more people would be 
employed than under the central forecast. As shown in 
Figure 4.28, the reduction in the unemployment rate 
would initially be 0.9 percentage points, peaking at 1.4 
percentage points in 1995. 
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Our model takes no account of the possible wealth 
effects on consumers arising from lower interest rates. 
These have proved to be important in other countries. 
If they were taken into account it would increase the 
estimated effects on GNP of the interest rate shock 
above those shown here. 
The results of this simulation indicates that the Irish 
economy is highly sensitive to any rise in EC interest 
rates. The rise which has already occurred as a result of 
German unification has reduced the growth rate of the 
Irish economy in the medium-term by over 0.5% a year. 
While some of this effect is offset by the more rapid 
growth in German demand, the effects of Geiman 
unification, taken together, are clearly negative for 
Ireland in the medium-term. Most of the downward 
revision in our estimate of the medium-tenn growth 
potential of the economy since our last Review can be 
attributed to this change in the external environment. 
This simulation also highlights the dangers to the 
Irish economy of any further disturbance pushing 
interest rates above the level in our central forecast. Our 
high level of indebtedness leaves us very vulnerable to 
shocks to the international financial system. Because of 
our indebtedness the most important channel through 
which changes in interest rates affect the economy is 
through the government sector. Any further rise would 
necessitate urgent action to deal with the problem 
caused for the public finances. 
Postponed World Recovery 
Considerable doubt remains about the timing of the 
recovery in the UK and US economies. While we still 
expect a slow recovery next year, in this Section we 
explore the possible effects on the Irish economy of a 
postponement of the recovery. We assume that the 
growth of output in 1992 in both the US and the UK is 
approximately 2 percentage points below the level 
assumed in our central forecast. Compared to 1991 this 
would involve a small fall in output in the UK and no 
change in the US. From 1993 onwards these two 
economies are assumed to grow at the same rate as in 
the central forecast. (They do not recover the output lost 
in 1992.) 
Slower growth in the UK would adversely affect 
unemployment in that country. We assume that the UK 
unemployment rate in 1992 is 1 percentage point above 
the level in the central forecast in 1992 ( over three 
million unemployed). From 1993 onwards we assume 
that it is 1.5 percentage points above the ( declining) level 
in the central forecast. 
The effect of the prolonged recession would be to 
reduce the Irish growth rate by 0.5% in 1992 (Figure 
4.29). There would be some small additional effects in 
subsequent years. The initial effect on employment 
would be a loss of over 4,000 jobs (Figure 4.30). By 
1996 employment would be only 2,300 below the 
benchmark level as the effects of the recession on 
demand wore off. 
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However, the effects on unemployment would be 
rather different. In 1992 the numbers unemployed 
would be up by almost 5,000 on the central forecast. As 
the state of the UK labour market continued to dis-
courage emigration in the years after 1992, the labour 
force in Ireland would build up. By 1996, 
unemployment would be almost 12,000 above the 
central forecast level. 
This simulation highlights the importance of the UK 
labour market to the development of the Irish labour 
market. The effects of a deterioration in the UK econ-
omy on Irish unemployment comes through two chan-
nels: it reduces the demand for Irish goods and, 
therefore, employment in Irish firms; it reduces the level 
of emigration over a number of years. The second of 
these (the emigration effect) is now more important in 
the medium te1m for unemployment than is the direct, 
demand, effect. 
4.11 CONCLUSIONS 
The recovery in the Irish economy in the late 1980s 
was due to a number of different factors. First, as shown 
in chapter 2, the world economy underwent a period of 
very rapid growth which passed through to the Irish 
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economy. Second, as discussed above, the competitive 
position of the Irish economy improved over the second 
half of the 1980s. 
In the next five years Ireland faces a less attractive 
world environment than in the last five. However, the 
deterioration should not be exaggerated. As shown 
above, doubts about the precise timing of the recovery 
in the UK and US economies will not greatly alter our 
view about the medium-term prospects for Ireland. 
Ireland will face a continuing growth in world demand 
and a continuing flow of foreign investment. The high 
level of real interest rates has undoubtedly reduced the 
potential growth rate of the Irish economy by around 
0.5%. However, we have built this into our central 
forecast. 
As discussed earlier, the competitiveness gains made 
in the late 1980s have been preserved. We have seen 
some of the benefits from this improvement in the 
growth in employment in 1990. In our central forecast 
we forecast that these gains will be eroded only slowly 
throughout the next five years so that the Irish economy 
should continue to perfo1m somewhat better than the 
average for the EC. 
Taken together, these different factors mean that, 
even allowing for the slow-down this year, the Irish 
economy has the potential to grow at around 3.5% a year 
in the next five years. As shown in Figure 4.31 this is 
broadly in line with the experience in the 1986-90 
period, though slightly lower than the rate of growth 
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s 
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Table 4.9 shows the forecast average contribution to 
growth from key sectors of the economy over the next 
five years. For comparison, figures are also shown for 
the 1980s. This table shows that, net of profit repatri-
ations, the manufacturing sector contributed 1.8 per-
centage points to growth in the second half of the 1980s. 
In the 1991-95 period it will contribute 1 percentage 
point. This reduction reflects the somewhat less 
favourable world environment. 
The contribution from agriculture has fallen steadily 
over time and is likely to be negligible in the next five 
years. The turn-around in the foreign debt interest 
payments was a major factor in the recovery in the 
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economy. Whereas in the 1981-5 period it knocked over 
0.5% off the growth rate each year, in the 1991-95 period 
it will have no deleterious effect on growth. 
TABLE 4.9: Contribution to Growth 
percentage points, annual average 
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 
Manufacturing 1.8 1.0 
Building -0.3 0.1 
Agriculture 0.4 0.2 
Market Services 0.6 1.3 1.4 
Non-Market Services 0.3 -0.1 0.1 
Foreign Debt Interest -0.6 -0.3 
Other -0.7 0.6 0.7 
The single biggest contributor to growth in the 
medium-term will be the market services sector. While 
this sector is affected by the growth in tourism exports, 
its output must be seen as being largely induced by the 
growth in other sectors in the economy. 
In Section 10 we considered two areas of uncertainty 
about the future - interest rates and the nature of the 
recovery in the UK and the USA. There are many other 
factors which could also throw our central projection 
off course. For example, developments on the UK 
labour market have major implications for the level of 
Irish unemployment. A more rapid recovery in that 
labour market could see a a fall in Irish unemployment 
rather than the forecast rise. 
Unless a fairly tough stance is adopted on fiscal 
policy in the next few years, the problem of the debt 
could return to dominate the national agenda. Related 
to this is the problem of pay determination generally in 
the economy. We have seen how moderation in private 
sector pay in the last few years has paid off in terms of 
employment growth in 1990 and this year in the insu-
lation of the existing levels of employment from the 
recession in the UK. If the current pattern of moderation 
in the private sector were to break down, in particular 
because of the rapid rise in public service pay, it would 
be very serious for employment growth in the future. 
This issue is taken up in the next chapter. 
In summary, while there is likely to be a reasonable 
growth in GNP in the next five years, it will be somewhat 
slower than in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the 
prospects for unemployment are not satisfactory. Faced 
with the unfavourable state of the UK labour market it 
is important to consider what domestic action can be 
taken to deal with the problem. 
Past experience shows that fiscal expansions can not 
promote lasting growth in employment. The most that 
can be hoped is that fiscal policy will be directed to a 
sustained reduction in the debt leaving the economy less 
vulnerable to shocks, such as that of German unification. 
For the future, policy changes must be directed to 
improving the efficiency of the supply side of the 
economy so that the industrial sector can compete 
effectively in European markets. The need for such 
action underlies the logic of the EC Community Support 
Framework (CSF). In the next chapter we consider what 
domestic action can be taken on the supply side to raise 
the long-term growth potential of the economy. 
CHAPTERS 
IRELAND IN THE YEAR 2000 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The central forecast in the previous section takes us 
from the time horizon of the latest Quarterly Economic 
Commentary (i.e., end 1991) out to the middle of the 
decade. In this concluding section we extend our horizon 
out to the end of the decade, pose a series of questions 
about how the economy is likely to evolve through the 
1990s, and attempt to evaluate the role that public policy 
can play in bringing about a better outturn than a 
somewhat disappointing "steady as she goes" scenario 
would suggest. 
Can one reasonably ask of economic analysis that it 
look beyond a five year time horizon? To do so, one 
must make a distinction between a "forecast" and a 
"scenario". When we carry out a forecast for a given 
period into the future, we take the most likely 
assumptions about the world economy and the stance of 
domestic policy, and then derive the most probable 
outturn for the economy on the basis of these assump-
tions. We may indeed present variants on this forecast 
(as in the previous chapter), but there is a strong sense 
in which we believe that the central forecast is the most 
likely outturn, given the present information which we 
have at hand. By this definition, we do not attempt to 
forecast the long-term prospects for the end of the 
decade. 
In this Chapter we examine a "scenario", which is 
simply a possible or feasible outturn based on a given 
set of assumptions. To every different set of assumptions 
there is a corresponding different outturn and it is not 
possible to choose any given set of assumptions over 
any other. The crucial act of faith needed in carrying out 
analysis of long-term scenarios is that the ESRI 
Medium-Term Model will remain an adequate repre-
sentation of the Irish economy over the rest of this 
decade. If that act of faith is made, then we can talk about 
a range of possible prospects for the economy. 
The outline of our scenario is presented in Section 
5.2 and is one where the world is assumed to continue 
to grow smoothly from mid-decade out to 2000 at a rate 
similar to its forecast perfmmance in the early part of 
the decade, 1993-96. The artificial nature of this 
assumption should be apparent, since this type of 
behaviour has never held since the late 1950s. Who 
knows what global calamities lie just round the corner? 
Nevertheless, it represents a reasonable starting point 
for considering long-term issues. 
SS 
Our assumption about domestic policy is similarly 
related to that made in the latter part of our central 
forecast, i.e., essentially the indexation of public 
expenditure programmes and only a very gentle cut in 
tax rates. In other words we assume a completely passive 
role for government, implying a forbearance that has 
seldom been exercised in the past and may not, indeed, 
be appropriate for the future. 
Taking these assumptions, we then use the model to 
derive the consequences of this scenario and present the 
resulting performance of the economy. We shall show 
that this outturn has good and bad aspects, the bad 
aspects tending to focus attention on the poor per-
formance of employment and unemployment. We 
examine these problems further in Section 5.3 in an 
attempt to explore possible better outturns for Ireland 
by the end of the decade. 
The long-term analysis presented in this section, 
together with the more detailed medium-term forecast 
presented in Section 4, serve to isolate two fundamental 
issues for the future development of the economy: 
(a) low levels of job creation, enduring high unem-
ployment, high emigration outflows, and their 
relationship to the crucial issue of costs (in particular 
wage determination) in the private and public sec-
tors, and 
(b) the optimal or desirable role of the public sector in 
improving the performance of the economy, con-
strained as it is by the inherited burden of debt from 
the previous decade and the failure of previous fiscal 
expansions. 
In Section 5.4 we examine these issues and attempt 
to draw out the range of choices facing Irish policy 
makers and private sector agents. In effect we pose the 
questions: "What kind of economy do we wish to have 
by the end of the decade?"; "What kind of public and 
private actions will work towards an economy where the 
distributional consequences of high unemployment are 
removed, migration takes place purely on a voluntary 
basis, and jobs are available to all who actively seek 
them?". As one might expect, the possible answers to 
such weighty questions are never simple. 
5.2 A SCENARIO FOR 2000 
Let us imagine a scenario where, in the second half 
of the decade, the world economy evolves in a smooth 
and untroubled way. Growth in the OECD proceeds at 
a steady 2.5 per cent per annum (with Germany growing 
at just under 4 per cent). The key rate of long-term 
consumer price inflation in Germany is 2.5 per cent. 
Exchange rates within the EMS are fixed, and there is 
56 
no variation between the DM and the $US, with some 
slight appreciation of the Yen against both. With very 
minor variations, world nominal interest rates have 
converged to 7 .5 per cent in the latter half of the decade 
(i.e., 5 per cent in real terms). Finally, the UK labour 
market has almost fully recovered from the recession of 
1991-1995, and the UK rate of unemployment has 
stabilized at about 8.5 per cent of the labour force. 
These stylised assumptions are illustrated in Figure 
5.1. With the exception of the high real interest rates, 
this could be characterised as a modestly optimistic 
scenario for the world economy, the modesty of the 
growth being more than offset by the optimistic 
assumption of the absence of any cyclical downturns 
such as characterised the years 1990-91. 
These world and policy assumptions are fed into the 
model, which then generates the likely domestic econ-
omy consequences for the entire decade of the 1990s. 
We show in Figure 5.2 the summary effects on a range 
of Irish macro aggregates: growth, international and 
public sector balances, the debt/GNP ratio, inflation, 
employment and unemployment. 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
What this figure shows is that Ireland inherits a 
growth rate of GNP more in line with that of Germany 
than the lower OECD average (graph (a)). This is very 
much in keeping with performance in past decades, 
except for the period in the mid-1980s when the econ-
omy was being deflated. 
The surplus on the balance of payments is sustained 
at about 2 per cent of GNP (graph (b)), driven by the 
export orientation of the industrial sector, the good level 
of competitiveness inherited from the latter part of the 
1980s, and the assumed stance of fiscal neutrality. 
The exchequer deficit of about 2 per cent of GNP on 
average in the first half of the decade is gradually 
transformed into a modest surplus of 1 per cent by the 
year 2000, driven by the indexation of policy instru-
ments to prices, and resulting in a continual fall in the 
share of the public sector in the total economy. 
As a direct consequence, the nation's public debt 
burden is gradually reduced as a per cent of GNP (it 
continues to rise in absolute terms out to 1997), falling 
from 112 per cent of GNP in 1990, to 93 per cent in 
1996, and reaches 70 per cent by the year 2000 (graph 
(c)). This is a level more in keeping with present EC and 
OECD averages. 
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Figure 5.2 
Scenario-2000 : Domestic Macroeconomic Implications 
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Irish consumer price inflation, at about 3 per cent per 
annum, is very much in line with German inflation 
(graph (d)). However, wage inflation, which remained 
at about 5 per cent per annum out to 1996, shows a 
tendency to rise gradually, to reach over 7 .5 per cent by 
the year 2000. This is significantly above the German 
rate, and would require a more rapid rise in labour 
productivity in order to sustain the Irish cost competi-
tiveness position. This has serious consequences for 
employment growth, which we now examine. 
Perhaps the most disturbing graph is that showing 
the performance of total employment and emigration 
2000 
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(graph (e)). Here we see that the initial modest increase 
in employment creation in the years 1992-93 (where on 
average 14,000 net extra jobs were created per annum) 
tends to fade out, so from 1994 to the end of the decade 
the figure for net employment creation falls below 
10,000 per annum. Emigration, which fell to a low of 
5,000 in 1991 (as aresultof the UK recession), gradually 
and inexorably rises to just under 40,000 per annum by 
the year 2000. In effect, this is the labour market scenario 
that the National Economic and Social Council found 
to be "entirely unacceptable" in its recent important 
study A Strategy for the Nineties: Economic Stability 
and Structural Change. 
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The main force driving Irish emigration is the high 
Irish rate of unemployment compared to the gradually 
improving UK labour market (graph (f)). The eventual 
modest fall in Irish unemployment, from a high plateau 
of 16 per cent over the years 1991-1996, to a value of 
14 per cent by the year 2000, comes about mainly as a 
result of the resumption of high emigration rather than 
adequate net job creation. If one continued the simula-
tion further into the next decade, the unemployment rate 
would continue to fall, and would stabilise at about 
12-13 per cent of the labour force, or about 3-4 per cent 
higher than the 8.5 per cent UK rate. 
To put it crudely, the fact that Irish workers effec-
tively have the choice of working either in Ireland or in 
the UK means that the level of Irish real wages is 
partially determined by Irish labour market conditions, 
but also by conditions in the UK labour market. This 
hinders wage rates from being bid down sufficiently by 
labour market slackness (i.e., higher unemployment) to 
price Irish workers back into jobs. 
5.3 EXPLORING THE SCENARIO 
Given the modest assumptions about the world 
economy, the perfo1mance of the Irish economy in our 
scenario, if not spectacular, is quite adequate on most 
counts: a growth rate at the upper end of world growth; 
balance of payments surpluses; modest exchequer 
deficits with eventual surpluses; a falling debt/GNP 
ratio; and no serious inflationary trends. 
The one area of serious under performance is in the 
labour market. The rate of job creation is totally inad-
equate to prevent the unemployment rate rising in the 
absence of renewed high emigration. In our scenario a 
total of over 230,000 people emigrate between 1992 and 
2000, slightly more than emigrated in the period 
1983-1990. How and where does this under perform-
ance arise? 
An examination of the different producing sectors 
of the economy and of the mechanisms of labour supply 
throws some light on the situation. In Figure 5 .3 we show 
the annual change in employment by broad sector: 
industry, market services, agriculture and the public 
sector (i.e., public administration, health and educa-
tion). 
Figure 5.3 
Net Employment Creation by Sector 
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Agriculture 
With a brief modification in 1989-90, mainly due to 
reclassification of categories, employment in agricul-
ture is projected to fall by between about 3,000 and 4,000 
per annum. This would leave the agricultural work force 
at about 10 per cent of total employment by the year 
2000. Agricultural labour shedding has little to do with 
economic processes in the non-agricultural part of the 
economy and the rate of job loss seems to be only mildly 
sensitive to general conditions in the rest of the labour 
market. Nothing in the experience of other EC states or 
in the prospects for agricultural policy generally within 
the EC holds out much prospect for a better outturn. 
The Public Sector 
After the years of job cuts in the public sector during 
1988-1990, our policy scenario assumption contained a 
resumed growth of public sector employment of 1 per 
cent per annum (i.e., about 2,000 jobs). This leaves the 
public sector share of total employment at 17.4 per cent 
in the year 2000, roughly the same share (17 .1 per cent) 
it had in 1990 after the job cuts, and down from its 
historical peak of 19 per cent in 1987. 
This growth in public sector employment is con-
sistent with a declining debt/GNP ratio, from its present 
level of 112 per cent at end 1990 to about 70 per cent 
by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the costs of even this 
modest public sector job creation are seriously inflated 
by the projected rapid rise in earnings in this sector 
relative to the private sector for the period 1992-93, as 
discussed in Section 4 above and illustrated earlier in 
Figure 4.13. 
Industry 
Turning to the exposed industrial sector, the period 
1992-93 sees the decade's strongest employment 
growth, averaging 9,000 per annum. This is followed 
by a gradual fall off in net industrial employment 
creation, to end the decade at a very mediocre net 
increase of merely 1,000 per annum. The annual change 
in employment in the main four sub-sectors of industry 
(i.e., high-technology, food, traditional, and building) 
is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 
Net Employment Creation in Industry 
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The poorest performance is shown by the food 
processing sector of manufacturing, where labour 
shedding of about 1,000 per annum over the entire 
decade is projected. The reasons for this dismal pro-
jection were examined previously in Chapter 4, and 
relate to the constraints placed on the sector from 
existing excess capacity and the anticipated reform of 
the CAP. To project the poor performance of the first 
half of the decade out to the second half is perhaps to 
make a slightly provocative assumption about the 
inability of this sector to switch to a high value-added, 
employment generating mode of operation that would 
be so desirable. 
In the high-technology sector the modest net job 
creation of the first half of the decade (under 4,000 net 
per annum) wanes in the latter part of the decade, and 
in the year 2000 there is an actual net loss of 1,300 jobs. 
Three reasons can be advanced for this disappointing 
behaviour: 
(a) Our assumption of a modest rate of growth in the 
world economy, and its direct consequences for the 
level of foreign direct investment in Ireland; 
(b) We have seen that wage inflation shows a tendency 
to remain higher than price inflation and to accelerate 
towards the end of the decade under the pressure of 
a declining rate of unemployment. This causes some 
systematic substitution of other inputs for labour, in 
this sector and elsewhere in industry; 
( c) Our previous studies of the behaviour of this sector 
over the 1970s and 1980s have shown that technical 
progress is labour shedding. This means that as time 
passes it takes less labour to produce the same output, 
or, in other words, labour productivity rises. 
So, the poor employment creation performance of 
the high-technology sector comes about as a result of 
these three factors: low world growth, relatively high 
cost inflation, and technology-driven high productivity. 
A considerably higher level of multinational direct 
foreign investment would be needed to improve this 
situation, stemming from higher world growth and/or 
increased Irish competitiveness. 
The net employment creation in the traditional sector 
remains steady at about 2,000 per annum over the whole 
decade. Here, the rate of labour shedding technical 
progress is less than for the high-technology sector, and 
the gradual loss of competitiveness over the decade is 
somewhat compensated for by the stimulus to domestic 
demand from higher incomes. This latter effect is, of 
course, completely absent from the high technology 
sector. 
Finally, employment creation in building and con-
struction initially shows the cyclical behaviour typical 
of this sector. The recovery in 1992/93 is mainly driven 
by the injection of EC Structural Funds (the CSF), and 
by the recovery elsewhere in the economy. However, 
the longer term net job creation is more modest, as the 
assumption of no further real increase in the CSF 
dominates public capital expenditure in the second part 
of the decade. 
Market Services 
Turning to the final source of sectoral employment, 
the annual net changes in employment in marketed 
services are shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 
Net Employment Creation Market Services 
AnnualChange(Thousands) 
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The poor employment performance of the Transport 
and Communication sector is apparent, and the reasons 
for this have been examined previously in Section 4. For 
the rest of the decade, this is likely to remain a tech-
nology driven sector, with any hiring in newer, growing, 
sectors of telecommunications merely compensating for 
labour shedding in other more traditional, labour 
intensive, areas such as the postal service. 
Net employment creation in distribution runs at an 
average of about 2,000 per annum over the decade. The 
continual rationalisation of EC distribution networks 
will serve to attenuate employment growth in this sector, 
particularly in the early phases of the completion of the 
EC Single Market. 
The most active net employment creation of all 
sectors takes place in the category of Professional and 
Other market services, averaging about 6,000 per 
annum. In effect, this is a type of residual sector with 
respect to employment and shows strong growth in most 
OECD countries as a result of industrial restructuring, 
financial sector innovation and advances in data pro-
cessing technology. In addition, it has a possibility of 
generating export earnings, although these are mainly 
represented in our scenario in terms of tourism exports. 
To summarise, in Figure 5.6 we show labour's share 
of added value in industry and market services over the 
extended period 1980 to 2000. The sharp decline in 
labour's share in industry (from a high of 72 per cent in 
1980 to below 54 per cent in 1989) came about as a 
result of two factors. The high-technology sector 
became more dominant in aggregate manufacturing 
during the 1980s (Figure 5. 7), and this sector has a much 
lower wage bill as a share of added value than the 
traditional sector or in building (Figure 5.8). 
What our scenario for the 1990s shows is that 
labour's share of added value (equivalently, the profit 
share) tends to stabilize, and in the case of marketed 
services to rise slightly (equivalently, the profit share 
falls). This occurs under the pressure ofa system of wage 
bargaining that is assumed to pass on a sizeable pro-
portion of the benefits of growth to labour rather than 
to profits. Another implication is that real wages may 
rise significantly over the decade of the 1990s (Figure 
5.9), in a way that is very much in keeping with average 
behaviour between 1960 and the early 1980s (Figure 
5.10). 
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Figure 5.6 
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This poses a policy dilemma in very stark terms: 
would a better national outturn result if real wages did 
not rise and the benefits of the resulting higher 
competitiveness could be channelled into greater 
employment creation? We return to this issue in our 
concluding section below. 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
Figure 5.9 
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Figure 5.10 
Nominal and Real Wage Inflation 
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Labour Supply 
Turning now to the projected characteristics of 
labour supply, the key features of the scenario are shown 
in Figure 5.11. In graph (a) we show the change in the 
working age population (i.e., aged 15-64) and the 
change in the labour force. Also shown in this graph is 
the "potential" population of working age, where we 
have "added back" the loss of working-age population 
due to migration. 
For the 1980s, the rise in working age population 
was systematically larger than the rise in the labour 
force, due mainly to a steady increase in the proportion 
of those of working age who continued to participate in 
full-time education and training (graph (b)). For the 
decade of the 1990s, both measures move broadly in 
line, after a slight increase in the labour force partici-
pation rate in the early part of the decade (graph (c)). 
Our assumptions about future behaviour of educa-
tion and labour force participation (graphs (b) and (c)) 
are somewhat speculative and other possibilities could 
arise in the medium-term. For example, policy changes 
in the area of third-level education could permit an 
increase in participation, a factor that would temporarily 
remove people from the labour force. Ireland's present 
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Figure 5.11 
Scenario-2000 : Labour Supply Behaviour 
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rates, while higher than the UK, are still lower than many 
other EC countries. With respect to overall labour force 
participation, here two offsetting forces are operating: 
a steady rise in the participation of married women, and 
a slow decline in overall participation due to earlier 
retirement. 
The inter-relationship between population change 
and migration can be seen in graph (d), where the 
projected population increases of the period up to the 
mid-1990s are reversed thereafter as high levels of 
out-migration build up. With the projected temporary 
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slow-down in emigration (due to the UK recession), 
population remains roughly static at the start of the 
1990s, and with the projected resumption of emigration 
the population declines steadily thereafterout to the year 
2000. 
Finally, two indicators of conditions in the supply 
side of the labour market are shown in graphs ( e) and 
(t). In graph (e) we show a type of dependency ratio, 
i.e., the ratio of non-participants in the labour market 
(the young, old and those in full-time education) to those 
in gainful employment. This ratio rose steadily in the 
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1980s to a peak of 1.5 in mid-decade. For the 1990s it 
declines steadily, mainly for demographic reasons 
connected with the falling birth rate of the 1980s. In this 
respect, Ireland is very different from other EC countries 
with a more mature population age structure. 
In graph (f) we show a measure of the "replacement 
ratio", i.e., the fraction of average earnings made up by 
unemployment transfers, commonly thought to be a 
factor influencing work incentives. This ratio peaked in 
the early 1980s, declined steadily thereafter, and is 
projected as constant during the 1990s as a result of our 
assumption of fiscal indexation. 
Evaluation 
In summary, our scenario simulation shows 
problems arising on both the demand and supply sides 
of the Irish labour market, and points to the inter-relation 
of both sides in explaining the projected continuing high 
rate of unemployment and resumed emigration. Feas-
ible policy prescriptions designed to improve on this 
gloomy scenario must also address both sides of the 
labour market while respecting the constraints on the 
public finances which the Nationa!Economic and Social 
Council have stressed in their recent Strategy document. 
Our long-term scenario is one that has been con-
sidered by the NESC, and decisively rejected. In the 
words of the Council: 
"Not only would this be a failure to achieve the 
central aim of rapid employment growth, but it would 
imply a comprehensive failure to overcome the gross 
inequalities in Irish society which ( . .) are linked to 
unemployment", (page 413 of A Strategy for the 
Nineties). 
What then can be done to produce a more acceptable 
scenario, i.e., basically one with higher employment 
growth, lower emigration, and a falling rate of unem-
ployment, without compromising on the other desirable 
macroeconomic aspects. To look towards higher world 
growth would at best be wishful thinking, in the sense 
that the world economy is equally likely to grow faster 
as slower in our scenario assumption. Indeed, our global 
economy assumptions might even be considered on the 
optimistic side, and growth might be both slower and 
more erratic. In fact, a rate of world growth of 5-6 per 
cent (rather than 2.5-4 per cent) would be needed in 
order to make inroads into the Irish employment prob-
lem. 
The NESC also found broad agreement among all 
the Social Partners that ''fiscal policy (should) not be 
used to stimulate the short-term growth of the economy, 
and that moneta,y and exchange rate policy be set to 
maintain the value of the Irish pound within the EMS" 
(Strategy, page 414). 
Having excluded the two options of higher world 
growth and general fiscal stimulation, what then is left? 
Within a binding constraint on the exchequer finances, 
the NESC proposed a series of "structural" reforms of 
public sector activities. In our concluding section we 
attempt to evaluate how desirable changes in private 
behavioural attitudes, together with this enlightened 
public policy stance, might work towards producing a 
better labour market outturn. 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
5.4 FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY 
We have seen from the analysis of the scenario to 
the year 2000 that the central under-performance of the 
economy lies in prospective developments in the labour 
market. On the basis of unchanged policies, and with a 
moderately benign world economic performance, for 
the entire decade of the 1990s there is a serious risk of 
low levels of job creation, enduring high unemployment 
and heavy emigration outflows, particularly when the 
UK economy recovers from its present recession. 
The root causes of these problems originate both 
within the labour market and in other areas of the wider 
economy. What, if anything, would work towards 
improving this situation and what constraints are there 
on such action? 
The scope for domestic policy action at present 
remains limited by the problem of the public finances. 
Indeed, the last two budgets of 1990 and 1991 involved 
some relaxation of the stringent approach to the public 
finances of the years 1987-89. As a result, we forecast 
that the borrowing requirement ( excluding privatisation 
revenues) may actually rise in 1991 and 1992. However, 
simple prudence dictates the need to moderate the 
excessively high debt/GNP ratio, and this must be borne 
in mind when examining the scope for policy initiatives 
for the rest of the decade and the appropriate long-term 
strategy for the public finances. 
While there are severe constraints on fiscal policy 
there is an opportunity for new initiatives to promote 
the efficiency and broader competitiveness of the pro-
ductive sector. What should be the strategy adopted to 
promote this development of the productive sector? We 
examine it under three headings: costs, pay and 
employment; the public finances; and medium-term 
development policy. 
5.4.1 Unemployment and Pay 
Economists have much to say about the possible 
causes of high and enduring unemployment, but less 
about practical and feasible solutions. Indeed, their 
advice is often unpalatable and negative, as they point 
to the likelihood that, with an unwillingness to change 
well established patterns of behaviour, in the short run 
there is little that public policy can do to alleviate the 
problem. At best one can hope that the income transfer 
and re-training systems will operate in such a manner 
as to mitigate the social injustices of involuntary 
unemployment, without destroying completely incen-
tives to work. 
Is there a solution to the problem of high unem-
ployment in the longer term? The answer depends very 
much on what is felt to be an acceptable time-scale for 
improving the situation and how radical a change in 
behaviour is acceptable to employees and employers 
alike. For example, is it likely that, given time, a policy 
which concentrated on boosting cost competitiveness 
(i.e., mainly moderating the rise in labour and other input 
costs) could eventually bring about a situation where 
the nation-wide beneficial boost to job creation was 
deemed to compensate for the restrictions on individual 
income growth? 
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The negative aspects of such a policy are only too 
easy to see. While it might result in many more lower-
paid jobs it might only marginally improve the overall 
average standard of living and the distribution of 
income. In addition, a strict voluntary incomes policy 
might still result in a loss oflrish skilled labour to higher 
paying jobs in the alternative UK labour market. 
In order to have any chance of succeeding, any 
incomes policy would require presently employed 
skilled workers to trade off the desire for higher 
domestic wages, or for a higher standard of living in the 
UK, against the less tangible benefits to them of sus-
taining a competitiveness-driven higher rate of 
employment creation here in Ireland. 
A Realistic Pay Policy 
One reason for the poor labour market projections 
in our scenario-2000 arises from our view of pay 
bargaining, as illustrated in the ESRI model of the 
economy (see article later in this Review). For example, 
past experience shows that each time unemployment 
falls, due to job creation or emigration, employees react 
by seeking higher real wages, choking off investment 
and future job creation (the "Phillips curve" effect). In 
addition, employees have generally received full com-
pensation for increases in productivity. 
Although this has been the pattern in the past, it need 
not remain so in the future. Legitimate questions to ask 
are: 
(a) "Can the structure of pay determination be changed 
from that which obtained in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, 
either to increase labour market flexibility (i.e., 
reduce this "Phillips curve" effect), or to compensate 
for it?" 
(b) "Does the historical behaviour of almost complete 
pass-through of productivity gains to wages lead to 
a worse employment/welfare position in the long-
run compared with an alternative process of 
competitiveness/ investment led growth?" 
(c) "Are there realistic policies that might assist 
movement in the above directions, in order to 
maximise job creation in Ireland?" 
It must be said that the above processes of produc-
tivity pass-through and market flexibility may already 
have been modified in the exposed internationally 
trading sector by the acceptance, by workers and 
employers alike, that fixed EMS exchange rates are here 
to stay. Hence, our scenario projection of unchanged 
behaviour patterns may be excessively pessimistic, 
although the jury is still out on the issue. 
If this shift in expectations is to be consolidated, 
equal realism must spread to the sheltered sector, 
including the public service. In this respect, the recent 
ESB strike was not an encouraging development. The 
"principle" of comparability should play a lesser role in 
pay determination than in earlier decades. Even where 
the presentation of public sector pay deals appears to 
curtail or exclude the danger of "leap-frogging" claims, 
the enshrinement of the comparability "principle" builds 
undue rigidity into the pay structure in the face of 
changing economic, social and technical circumstances. 
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As discussed earlier in chapter 4, the central forecast 
shows average earnings rising much more rapidly in the 
public sector than in industry over the next three years. 
This increase in differential does not appear to be 
warranted by a claim of slower growth of public sector 
incomes in the past. If it continues it is likely to pose 
serious problems for pay bargaining in the private sector 
and it could jeopardise the development of a more 
realistic pay policy in the future through "spill-over" 
effects. 
Responses to the recent recruitment initiatives in the 
public sector, and areas of market services, usually take 
the form of massive over-application by young people 
seeking their first jobs. The success of the banks and 
Aer Lingus in introducing new lower grades, together 
with the difficulty of holding on to skilled senior staff 
in areas of the public sector, suggests that the pay 
gradient, especially in the public sector, is too shallow. 
Restricting, or reducing recruitment grade pay, com-
bined with the prospects of a proper career structure, 
would move the system in the direction indicated by 
market forces. 
This suggests strongly the need for radical modifi-
cations to the structure of the present PESP, or its 
successor, where concessions by mainly public sector 
trades unions in the area of pay flexibility might permit 
a major shift in the pattern of employment creation in 
the public and private sectors alike. 
Combined with revenue-neutral tax reform, which 
could reduce upward pressure on wages via the "tax 
wedge", the possibility opens for a slower than predicted 
rise in real wages, which could push the economy in the 
direction of faster than predicted growth in productive 
investment, output and employment in industry and 
market services. 
5.4.2 The Public Finances 
While much public attention is currently focused on 
the likely overrun in the exchequer borrowing require-
ment, this is only one aspect of a wider problem of public 
sector indebtedness. If the 1990 and 1991 budgets had 
maintained a tougher stance on reducing public 
expenditure and resisted the pressures for tax cuts, any 
prospective cyclical overrun would be perceived as 
unimportant by financial markets. 
However, the EBR target in the 1991 budget was 
already too soft. Furthermore, in the light of the likely 
high public service special pay awards contained in the 
recent PESP and the need to harmonise taxes to prepare 
for 1992, budgetary control is still an important issue. 
Given the deterioration in the world economy and 
the higher level of interest rates that have occmTed over 
the last two years, the costs of high levels of debt have 
increased and the imperative to eliminate the borrowing 
requirement is reinforced. This change in the external 
environment has made it more important than before 
that the debt/GNP ratio target of 100% of GNP by 1993 
be attained. 
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Instead, fiscal policy has been relaxed, and in our 
central forecast we suggest that on unchanged policies 
the debt/GNP target of 100% will not be reached until 
1994 at the earliest. It is also disturbing that the higher 
level of public expenditure being financed by further 
debt accumulation is being used partly to fund higher 
wages in the public sector, an action that must militate 
against the stated aim of public policy to reduce the rate 
of unemployment in the long term. 
While the receipts of privatisation may facilitate the 
achievement of budgetary targets this year, they should 
not be treated as easing the path towards the 1993 
debt/GNP target. For example, if proceeds from the sale 
of Irish Life are used to reduce the borrowing require-
ment, it must be realised that this also reduces the asset 
position of the public sector. If a full balance sheet for 
the public sector were drawn up, it would be seen that 
such transactions would do nothing in the short term to 
ease the state's problem of high indebtedness. A valid 
argument for privatisation is that it will increase overall 
efficiency in the relevant public sector enterprises, not 
that privatisation is an opportune cash windfall with 
which to pay off public sector debts. 
One must not lose sight of the fact that the public 
debt issue is essentially of a medium-term character and 
must be tackled in the context of a medium-term 
strategy. The necessary question to pose is: "What 
should be the appropriate policy on public sector debt 
reduction in the next five years?" Approaches to this 
issue are conditioned by the enormous risks which 
attach to a high level of debt and the costs in terms of 
future output forgone to pay the interest on the debt. 
The problem of debt stability was tackled in the latter 
part of the 1980s and, on the basis of reasonable 
assumptions, does not now pose a threat equal in 
magnitude to that of the early 1980s. The severity of 
continued fiscal contraction is, to some extent, a matter 
of domestic choice. 
The fact that our debt is so high means that over 7 
per cent of GNP is preempted by interest payments. 
Furthermore, it leaves us extremely vulnerable to shocks 
to the world financial system and the degree of uncer-
tainty about the future is magnified by the sheer size of 
our debt. A lower level of debt would mean that future 
interest rate shocks would have a less disruptive impact 
on the essential business of government. The possible 
magnitude of such disruptive effects have already been 
illustrated in our analysis of the consequences of higher 
German interest rates. Any further sudden and sustained 
rise in interest rates, as occurred in the 1980s, could 
prove very disruptive, necessitating the postponement 
or abandonment of many planned public sector infras-
tructural and other investments. 
Just as private individuals should plan their finances 
in a prudent fashion, so too should governments seek to 
maintain a level of debt which leaves sufficient room 
for manoeuvre in the face of future unexpected shocks 
to the world economy. Experience in other countries in 
Northern Europe suggests that a debt/GNP ratio of 
between 50-75 per cent of GNP is appropriate and this 
is the level that Irish policy makers should aim for during 
this decade. This was recognised in the recent Pro-
gramme for Economic and Social Progress which 
expressed the view that the rate should be "75% of GNP 
or below by the year 2000". 
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While the need to manage risk (i.e., prudential 
considerations) provides the over-riding incentive to 
reduce the debt/GNP ratio, it does not indicate how 
rapidly this task should proceed. Without a doubt, the 
present high debt ratio is a major factor in keeping Irish 
living standards down, taxes high, and growth below 
what it could otherwise be. It also affects Ireland's 
international competitiveness and attractiveness for 
investment. 
The competitiveness effect of high indebtedness will 
become even more important with the development of 
the Single Market, as highlighted by the mounting 
pressures for EC-wide tax harmonisation. Countries 
with high debt ratios will find themselves with high 
taxes, not to pay for a high level of public services, but 
rather to pay for past consumption. If taxes are kept high 
to pay the interest bill, the burden will tend to price the 
productive sector out of its EC markets through its 
upward pressure on wages. 
Alternatively, if services have to be cut to pay the 
interest, living standards will fall with consequential 
labour market effects in an open economy like Ireland. 
This is a problem, not just for Ireland, but for other 
heavily indebted EC members such as Denmark and 
Belgium. 
Ideally, the medium-term aim should be to reduce 
the debt/GNP ratio to average EC levels in the range 
50-75 per cent of GNP to minimise the competitiveness 
loss. The optimum time path for reduction in the debt 
ratio depends both on the need to reduce our exposure 
to world shocks and on our willingness to postpone 
cmrent expenditure to reap the future benefits of 
improved competitiveness which will flow from a lower 
debt. The minimum requirements would seem to be as 
follows: 
(a) A rapid reduction of the debt/GNP ratio to under 100 
per cent, mainly on prudential grounds. 
(b) Continuous, if gradual, reduction thereafter, towards 
average EC levels of 50-75 per cent. 
Budgetary policy must be clearly and unambigu-
ously targeted at these goals, in order to reap all the 
benefits of policy credibility. The central thrust of policy 
must not be deflected by short-term issues. 
5.4.3 Development Strategy 
Simply holding down pay, both absolutely and as a 
proportion of net output, may be a necessary condition 
for faster employment growth, but it is unlikely to be 
sufficient in itself to stimulate an adequate increase in 
jobs. Our examination of the working of the economy 
also highlighted the fact that permanent increases in 
output can not be achieved by public sector stimulation 
of domestic demand. If ever such a policy had any shred 
of credibility, the history of the period 1975-86 should 
finally disabuse holders of such a view. 
Public expenditure and taxation policies must be 
directed towards increasing the efficiency, competi-
tiveness and productivity of the trading sectors of the 
economy. Such policies should aim at reducing the costs 
of production in Ireland, in order to attract higher levels 
of production, investment, employment and real wages 
in the long-run. Public policy must work in concert with 
the market economy, not against it. 
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However, policy must recognise certain inescapable 
facts of economic life if they are to succeed in encour-
aging the growth of employment: 
(a) the need for growth in output, not merely for a 
redistribution of an unchanged volume of output; 
(b) the need to observe a rigorous public finance 
constraint; 
(c) the openness of the Irish economy to outside 
influences both through trade and migration, leading 
to a relative lack of economic autonomy; 
(d) the fact that action to change the structure of the 
economy may take a considerable time to take effect. 
In spite of the pressures for an instant response to 
our current problems it is necessary to stress the need 
to take a longer time horizon. Many of the potentially 
worthwhile changes which could be made to the 
structure of the economy would take some years to show 
their full benefits. For example, investment in education 
and changes to industrial policy have very long term 
consequences, and produce limited short-term benefits. 
In an increasingly integrated EC economy the central 
objective of development policy must be the promotion 
of greater efficiency in the market sector of the econ-
omy, since it is only through the improvement in our 
competitive position that we can hope to promote a more 
rapid growth in output. 
We have already discussed how the development of 
a realistic pay policy could contribute to this objective. 
However, in the longer run pay costs are only one of the 
elements which go to make a competitive economy. 
Containment of other input costs, such as energy, 
telecommunications and transport, can all contribute to 
the economy's performance. In addition, it is possible 
to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
economy by raising the productivity of the different 
factors of production without changing their price or 
pay. For example, a more skilled and educated work-
force produce more and higher quality output. Higher 
productivity is ultimately the only way to achieve rising 
living standards. 
It is possible that our model-based scenario-2000 
has underestimated the likely impact of measures 
already taken in respect of, for example, tourism. The 
considerable investment being financed as part of the 
EC CSF may also effect a reduction in costs and an 
increase in productivity over and above the figures 
shown earlier in this Chapter. However, it is clear that 
more needs to be done. Within the constraints of the 
public finances, some sharper focussing of development 
strategy is needed. 
The National Economic and Social Council strategy 
embraces five main areas of policy: macroeconomic 
policy; tax/public expenditure reforms; incomes policy; 
development policy and manpower policy. Within these 
areas, they have identified many different opportunities 
for public policy action to improve market efficiency 
and labour productivity: 
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(a) a broadly based and wide-ranging tax refo,m, with 
reductions in average and marginal direct tax rates, 
financed largely by a widening of the tax base. This 
would ease pressures for wage increases by shifting the 
tax burden to other forms of income. This could in turn 
increase competitiveness and output; 
(b) changes in social welfare (specifically a move to a 
single, lower rate of employee's PRSI), taxation of 
short-term benefits, etc. , with the aim of removing 
well-known labour market disincentive effects and 
poverty traps; 
(c) implementation of a comprehensive policy with 
respect to housing, in order to increase mobility within 
the labour market, and introduction of a domestic 
property tax to redress the present built-in bias towards 
excessive investment in property rather than employ-
ment creation; 
(d) reforms in the management of public enterprises, 
with a view to reducing the cost of services inputs to the 
exposed internationally trading sector; 
(e) A renewed emphasis on education and training. 
The NESC sees manpower policy as having two 
strands: the first involves a reallocation of public 
expenditure to fund an enhanced manpower policy to 
tackle unemployment in the short-term; the second is 
aimed at increasing the productivity of industry and 
services to encourage the development of businesses 
employing high-paid high-skilled labour. 
The range of short-term measures which the NESC 
propose could cut unemployment. However, they face 
problems of resources and of management. The pro-
posal is to fund these measures by a redirection of 
expenditure from other areas. It must be questioned 
whether the willingness is there to redirect funds in this 
way. In the past there have been problems in imple-
menting training and other manpower schemes effec-
tively. If the NESC strategy is to succeed there will have 
to be very close monitoring of any new initiatives and 
a willingness to be flexible if individual measures are 
found to be ineffective. 
It is not our present purpose in this Review to add to, 
or evaluate, this very comprehensive set of proposals. 
If successful they can be expected to promote the 
development of the economy through a number of 
different channels. However, a pragmatic, systematic, 
and quantitative evaluation of the likely benefits to job 
creation of the NESC proposals is clearly needed. 
The impact of the EC Community Support Frame-
work has recently been analysed by the ESRI, using a 
combination of detailed microeconomic studies of 
individual sectors within the macroeconomic frame-
work of the ESRI model (The Role of the Structural 
Funds: Analysis of Consequences for Ireland in the 
Context of 1992, by John Bradley, John Fitz Gerald and 
Ide Kearney, to appear, ESRI Policy Series, Summer 
1991). Work is under way on a similar analysis of the 
more complex and qualitative NESC proposals. 
Realistically the fruits of development policies will 
take time to bear fruit. Children who benefit from 
developments in education today might not enter the 
labour market until the end of the decade. In the past, 
this has made education an unattractive area for 
investment in times of serious jobs crises. 
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Education should not be seen as being merely a 
preparation for instant entry into the labour market. It 
is no accident that the most successful countries in 
Northern Europe have long had well developed edu-
cational systems. In the case oflreland, full state funding 
of secondary education was only introduced in the late 
1960s and participation in second level education has 
risen over the subsequent twenty years. As a result, the 
work-force under the age of thirty-five is now better 
educated than was the previous generation. If the 
experience of other countries is anything to go by, one 
may expect the fruits of this higher level of education 
to produce a pay-back over a very long time period. 
Even if there is no apparent present shortage of 
skilled labour, the absence of certain skills may result 
in new firms choosing to by-pass Ireland. Undoubtedly 
the increased availability of skilled and highly educated 
labour in the 1980s has contributed to the growth in the 
computer industry in Ireland. New firms, such as 
INTEL, would not have chosen to locate in Ireland were 
it not for the availability of the skills which they need. 
In this case training and education has helped increase 
the demand for labour in specific high-technology 
industries and has brought other "down-stream" benefits 
to other sectors of the economy. 
At the opposite end of the range of education and 
skills, experience has shown that those entering the 
labour market with no skills and little education have 
very poor prospects of finding permanent employment. 
If effective intervention can be made to provide them 
with a better training for the labour market then they 
will be in a position to compete for employment. While 
this will not of itself create more employment, it may 
make them active participants in the labour market and 
contribute to a more realistic pay policy. However, it 
should be said that research has shown that the training 
and education system has, so far, not been very sue-
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cessful in assisting the truly disadvantaged. A more 
successful approach must be found, for the root cause 
of Ireland's problem of structural or long-term unem-
ployment lies in this area of disadvantage and depri-
vation. 
The long-term nature of such policies should not 
permit policy makers to become side-tracked by ad hoe, 
short-te1m, temporary palliatives, which, while politi-
cally attractive, are no substitute for a coherent devel-
opment strategy. What we need to do is to build on, and 
implement, some of the wide range of options put 
forward by the NESC and contained within the PESP. 
Because of the uncertainty in this area we must expect 
some of the initiatives to fail. As a result, it will be 
important to monitor the progress of all measures 
designed to promote the long tem1 development of the 
economy and to concentrate on those which show the 
best prospects of bringing about a more rapid growth in 
output by the tum of the century. 
Writing recently about the prospects for the US 
economy in The Age of Diminished Expectations, Paul 
Krugman states: "For the economy, the important things 
- the things that affect the standard of living of large 
numbers of people - are productivity, income distribu-
tion and unemployment. If these things are satisfactory, 
not much else can go wrong, while if they are not, 
nothing can go right. Yet very little of the business of 
economic policy is concerned with these big trends". 
Although in the first two items of Krugman's list, 
productivity and income distribution, Ireland is in some 
ways better off than the US, it is important to realise that 
we are achieving little success in addressing the third 
item, unemployment. While this is partially explained 
by a lack of policy autonomy, it is also due to the obvious 
painfulness of the measures we would have to take if 
we were really serious about changing things. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix contains a set of tables giving additional details of the central forecast discussed in Section 4. 
TABLE A.l: Output 
1990 Volume Price 1991 Cont. to Volume Price 1992 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth o/o % % £M Growth o/o 
Agriculture 2207 0.4 -6.8 2066 0.0 0.3 0.6 2085 0.0 
Industry 8375 3.9 0.9 8780 1.8 4.2 4.2 9525 1.9 
Manufacturing 6495 4.2 -0.3 6748 1.5 3.9 4.4 7323 1.5 
Utilities 554 5.0 I. I 588 0.2 6.0 -0.5 620 0.2 
Building 1326 1.0 7.9 1444 0.1 4.4 5.0 1582 0.2 
Market Services 9651 1.7 -1.8 9638 0.7 4.0 0.5 10078 1.6 
Distribution 2728 1.7 0.1 2780 0.2 3.3 2.3 2936 0.4 
Transport & Communications 1633 1.7 0.1 1663 0.1 3.7 1.4 1749 0.2 
Professional & Financial 5290 1.7 -3.5 5195 0.4 4.5 -0.7 5394 1.0 
Non-Market Services 3793 0.4 8.9 4148 0.1 1.2 7.8 4525 0.2 
Health & Education 2493 0.4 9.1 2730 0.0 1.0 8.0 2978 0.1 
Public Administration 1300 0.5 8.6 1418 0.0 1.4 7.5 1547 0.1 
Adjustment for Fin. Services 1100 3.8 2.5 1170 0.2 5.4 3.0 1270 0.3 
GDP at Factor Cost 22926 2.3 0.1 23463 2.4 3.3 3.0 24944 3.4 
Taxes on Expenditure 4450 2.0 I.I 4588 0.4 2.6 1.2 4767 0.5 
Subsidies 1830 1.0 -21.5 1450 0.1 1.2 -4.5 1400 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 25546 2.3 1.8 26601 2.7 3.3 3.0 28310 3.8 
Net Factor Income -2878 3.2 -0.9 -2942 -0.5 0.6 3.5 -3062 -0.1 
GNP at Market Prices 22668 2.2 2.1 23659 2.2 3.7 2.9 25248 3.7 
1992 Volume Price 1993 Cont. to Volume Price 1994 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth o/o % % £M Growth o/o 
Agriculture 2085 0.3 0.3 2096 0.0 0.3 0.7 2118 0.0 
Industry 9525 4.6 3.3 10294 2.2 4.2 1.7 10912 2.0 
Manufacturing 7323 4.5 3.5 7920 1.7 4.7 1.8 8441 1.7 
Utilities 620 6.1 0.3 660 0.2 4.6 0.2 692 0.2 
Building 1582 4.5 3.7 1714 0.2 0.9 2.8 1779 0.0 
Market Services 10078 4.9 3.0 10888 1.9 3.6 1.9 11489 1.4 
Distribution 2936 4.2 2.9 3145 0.5 2.1 2.8 3302 0.2 
Transport & Communications 1749 4.4 -0.2 1821 0.3 3.8 -0.5 1881 0.3 
Professional & Financial 5394 5.5 4.0 5922 1.2 4.3 2.1 6306 0.9 
Non-Market Services 4525 1.2 7.8 4936 0.2 1.2 4.9 5240 0.2 
Health & Education 2978 1.0 8.0 3248 0.1 1.0 5.1 3448 0.1 
Public Administration 1547 1.4 7.5 1688 0.1 1.4 4.7 1792 0.1 
Adjustment for Fin. Services 1270 6.2 3.6 1396 0.3 4.9 2.1 1495 0.3 
GDP at Factor Cost 24944 3.8 3.6 26819 3.9 3.2 2.1 28263 3.3 
Taxes on Expenditure 4767 4.7 0.7 5027 0.9 2.3 3.0 5299 0.4 
Subsidies 1400 1.8 0.1 1427 0.1 1.0 0.6 1450 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 28310 4.1 3.3 30419 4.7 3.2 2.3 32111 3.7 
Net Factor Income -3062 3.1 3.0 -3253 -0.5 2.6 2.3 -3415 -0.4 
GNP at Market Prices 25248 4.2 3.2 27166 4.2 3.3 2.3 28696 3.3 
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Agriculture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Utilities 
Building 
Market Services 
Distribution 
Transport & Communications 
Professional & Financial 
Non-Market Services 
Health & Education 
Public Administration 
Adjustment for Fin. Services 
GDP at Factor Cost 
Taxes on Expenditure 
Subsidies 
GDP at Market Prices 
Net Factor Income 
GNP al Market Prices 
Agricultural Incomes 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 
Transfer Income 
Other Personal Income 
Non-Ag. Profits etc. 
Financial Serv. adj. (-) 
National Debt Interest 
Net Factor Income 
Government Trad. Inc.(-) 
Other Private Income 
Undistributed Profits(-) 
Personal Income 
Taxes on Personal Income 
Personal Disposable Income 
Personal Consumption 
Personal Savings 
Tax Ratio (% Pers. Income) 
Savings Ratio (% Disposable 
Income) 
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1994 Volume Price 1995 Cont. to Volume 
£M % % £M Growth% % 
2118 0.3 0.7 2139 0.0 0.3 
10912 4.5 2.0 11626 2.1 4.6 
8441 4.9 1.9 9024 1.8 5.0 
692 4.5 0.4 726 0.2 4.4 
1779 1.7 3.8 1876 0.1 1.9 
11489 4.0 2.1 12202 1.6 4.2 
3302 2.8 3.3 3508 0.3 3.0 
1881 4.1 0.2 1963 0.3 4.3 
6306 4.7 2.0 6731 1.0 4.8 
5240 1.2 5.1 5570 0.2 1.2 
3448 1.0 5.3 3666 0.1 1.0 
1792 1.4 4.8 1905 0.1 1.4 
1495 5.3 2.3 1610 0.3 5.5 
28263 3.5 2.3 29928 3.6 3.6 
5299 2.7 3.1 5612 0.5 3.0 
1450 1.2 0.6 1477 0.1 1.3 
32111 3.5 2.5 34064 4.0 3.7 
-3415 3.1 2.3 -3601 -0.5 3.7 
28696 3.6 2.5 30462 3.6 3.6 
TABLE A.2: Personal Income and Personal Expenditure 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1605 1878 1962 1855 1706 1704 1699 
10488 10982 11709 12558 13343 14327 15479 
3605 3708 3737 3903 4158 4321 4484 
2585 2431 2642 3018 3230 3463 3752 
4834 5372 6135 6775 7015 7523 8176 
884 968 1058 1100 1170 1270 1396 
1944 2015 2032 2169 2220 2187 2256 
-1957 -2542 -3039 -2878 -2942 -3062 -3253 
481 470 368 436 490 450 465 
3456 3407 3702 4530 4633 4928 5318 
871 976 !060 1512 1403 1465 1566 
18282 18999 20050 21334 22437 23814 25414 
3999 4463 4300 4602 4875 5168 5428 
14284 14536 15750 16732 17562 18646 19986 
11784 12375 13523 14301 15016 15757 16928 
2500 2161 2227 2431 2546 2890 3057 
21.9 23.5 21.5 21.6 21.7 21.7 21.4 
17.5 14.9 14.1 14.5 14.5 15.5 15.3 
Price 1996 Cont. to 
% £M Growth % 
0.5 2158 0.0 
2.4 12459 2.2 
2.5 9716 1.9 
0.9 765 0.2 
3.5 1978 0.1 
2.4 13019 1.7 
3.9 3753 0.3 
0.9 2065 0.3 
2.1 7201 1.1 
5.6 5950 0.2 
5.8 3916 0.1 
5.3 2034 0.1 
2.7 1745 0.3 
2.7 31841 3.7 
3.1 5961 0.5 
0.7 1506 0.1 
2.8 36296 4.2 
2.6 -3835 -0.6 
2.8 32461 3.6 
1994 1995 1996 
1705 1712 1715 
16456 17528 18750 
4663 4841 5023 
3870 4071 4305 
8526 9029 9641 
1495 1610 1745 
2333 2413 2498 
-3415 -3601 -3835 
475 487 501 
5473 5742 6059 
1603 1671 1754 
26694 28152 29793 
5741 6049 6411 
20953 22104 23382 
17789 18811 19946 
3163 3293 3437 
21.5 21.5 21.5 
15.1 14.9 14.7 
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TABLE A.3: Expenditure on GNP 
1990 Volume Price 1991 Cont. to Volume Price 1992 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth o/o % % £M Growth o/o 
Personal Consumption 14301 2.2 2.7 15016 1.5 2.5 2.4 15757 1.6 
Public Consumption 4010 0.5 9.1 4396 0.1 1.0 6.8 4740 0.2 
Fixed Investment 4665 3.6 3.6 5005 0.8 7.3 3.4 5549 1.6 
Building 2275 0.8 5.1 2411 0.1 7.8 3.7 2697 0.8 
Machinery 2390 6.0 2.4 2594 0.7 6.8 2.9 2848 0.8 
Final Domestic Demand 22976 2.2 3.9 24417 2.3 3.2 3.3 26046 3.3 
Stock Building 560 340 -0.9 29 -1.2 
Agricultural 98 20 -0.4 1 -0.1 
Intervention 446 320 -0.4 1 -1.3 
Non-Agricultural 16 0 -0.1 27 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 23536 1.3 3.8 24757 1.4 2.0 3.3 26076 2.1 
Total Exports 15915 5.4 -0.9 16629 4.7 7.5 3.5 18496 6.7 
Merchandise 14192 5.6 -1.3 14785 4.4 7.9 3.7 16552 6.4 
Services 1723 4.1 2.7 1843 0.3 3.0 2.4 1943 0.2 
Total Demand 39451 3.2 1.7 41386 6.1 4.5 3.0 44572 8.8 
Total Imports 13905 4.4 1.8 14785 3.4 6.3 3.4 16261 4.9 
Gross Domestic Product 25546 2.3 1.8 26601 2.7 3.3 3.0 28310 3.8 
Net Factor Income -2878 3.2 -0.9 -2942 -0.5 0.6 3.5 -3062 -0. I 
Gross National Product 22668 2.2 2.1 23659 2.2 3.7 2.9 25248 3.7 
1992 Volume Price 1993 Cont. to Volume Price 1994 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth o/o % % £M Growth o/o 
Personal Consumption 15757 4.7 2.6 16928 3.0 2.1 3.0 17789 1.4 
Public Consumption 4740 1.0 6.9 5117 0.2 1.0 4.6 5408 0.2 
Fixed Investment 5549 5.2 3.1 6020 I. I 1.9 2.7 6303 0.4 
Building 2697 5.7 3.2 2942 0.6 1.2 2.7 3056 0.1 
Machinery 2848 4.8 3.0 3073 0.6 2.6 2.9 3243 0.3 
Final Domestic Demand 26046 4.2 3.4 28065 4.3 1.9 3.2 29500 1.9 
Stock Building 29 60 0.1 87 0.1 
Agricultural 1 I 0.0 I 0.0 
Intervention I 1 0.0 1 0.0 
Non-Agricultural 27 58 0.1 85 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 26076 4.4 3.4 28125 4.5 2.0 3.2 29587 2.0 
Total Exports 18496 6.6 3.0 20314 6.1 6.2 2.3 22059 5.8 
Merchandise 16552 6.9 3.1 18253 5.8 6.4 2.3 19872 5.6 
Services 1943 3.3 2.6 2061 0.3 3.1 3.0 2187 0.2 
Total Demand 44572 5.4 3.1 48439 10.6 4.0 2.5 51646 7.8 
Total Imports 16261 7.3 3.3 18020 5.8 5.1 3.2 19535 4.1 
Gross Domestic Product 28310 4.1 3.2 30419 4.7 3.2 2.3 32111 3.7 
Net Factor Income -3062 3.1 3.0 -3253 -0.5 2.6 2.3 -3415 -0.4 
Gross National Product 25248 4.3 3.2 27166 4.3 3.3 2.3 28696 3.3 
1994 Volume Price 1995 Cont. to Volume Price 1996 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth % % £M Growth 
% % 
Personal Consumption 17789 2.5 3.1 18811 1.6 2.8 3.1 19946 1.8 
Public Consumption 5408 1.0 4.8 5724 0.2 1.0 5.2 6083 0.1 
Fixed Investment 6303 4.0 2.9 6744 0.9 4.0 3.0 7223 0.9 
Building 3056 3.4 3.0 3253 0.3 3.6 3.0 3471 0.4 
Machinery 3243 4.5 2.9 3485 0.5 4.4 3.0 3745 0.5 
Final Domestic Demand 29500 2.6 3.3 31278 2.7 2.8 3.4 33252 2.8 
Stock Building 87 115 0.1 146 0.1 
Agricultural I I 0.0 I 0.0 
Intervention I I 0.0 I 0.0 
Non-Agricultural 85 113 0.1 144 0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 29587 2.7 3.3 31394 2.8 2.9 3.4 33398 2.9 
Total Exports 22059 6.1 2.3 23937 5.9 6.0 2.6 26045 6.0 
Merchandise 19872 6.3 2.3 21606 5.6 6.2 2.6 23555 5.7 
Services 2187 3.4 3.1 2332 0.3 3.5 3.1 2490 0.3 
Total Demand 51646 4.4 2.7 55331 8.7 4.4 2.9 59443 8.9 
Total Imports 19535 5.5 3.2 21267 4.6 5.5 3.2 23147 4.6 
Gross Domestic Product 321 I I 3.5 2.5 34064 4.1 3.7 2.8 36296 4.2 
Net Factor Income -3415 3.1 2.3 -3601 -0.5 3.7 2.6 -3835 -0.6 
Gross National Product 28696 3.6 2.5 30462 3.6 3.7 2.8 32461 3.7 
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Agricultural Incomes 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 
Non-Ag. Profits Net 
Non-Ag. Profits Gross 
Stock Appreciation adj. (-) 
Financial Services adj. (-) 
Domestic Income 
Depreciation 
GDP (Factor Cost) 
Taxes on Expenditure 
Domestic 
EC 
Subsidies (-) 
Domestic 
EC 
GDP (Market Prices) 
Net Factor Income 
Gross National Product 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 
Company 
Personal 
Taxes on Expenditure 
Gross 
EC Budget Contribution(-) 
Net Trading & Inv. Income 
Transfers From Abroad 
Total Current Receipts 
Subsidies 
National Debt Interest 
Other Transfer Payments 
Public Consumption 
Total Current Expenditure 
Public Auth. Savings (net) 
as% of GNP 
Total Capital Receipts 
Total Capital Expenditure 
Capital Deficit 
Total Borrowing 
as% of GNP 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
TABLE A.4: National Income and National Product 
1987 
1605 
10488 
4732 
4834 
102 
884 
15939 
1994 
17933 
3672 
3344 
329 
1564 
766 
799 
20041 
-1957 
18084 
1987 
4275 
277 
3998 
3344 
3574 
231 
481 
237 
8337 
766 
1944 
3421 
3577 
9707 
-1369 
-7.6 
489 
1305 
-815 
-2185 
-12.1 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1878 1962 1855 1706 1704 
10982 11709 12558 13343 14327 
5312 5973 7055 6885 7305 
5372 6135 6775 7015 7523 
60 162 -280 130 218 
968 1058 1100 1170 1270 
17204 18586 20368 20764 22065 
2129 2336 2558 2699 2878 
19333 20922 22926 23463 24944 
3965 4368 4450 4588 4767 
3672 4050 4151 4273 4439 
293 318 299 315 327 
1814 1372 1830 1450 1400 
910 380 550 430 575 
905 992 1280 1020 825 
21484 23918 25546 26601 28310 
-2542 -3039 -2878 -2942 -3062 
18942 20879 22668 23659 25248 
TABLE A.5: Public Authorities' Accounts 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
4821 4659 5161 5490 5805 
358 359 559 615 637 
4463 4300 4602 4875 5168 
3672 4050 4151 4273 4439 
3949 4340 4432 4590 4769 
277 290 281 317 330 
470 368 436 490 450 
181 180 161 360 320 
9144 9257 9909 10613 11014 
910 380 550 430 575 
2015 2032 2169 2220 2187 
3551 3555 3705 3998 4153 
3595 3683 4010 4396 4740 
10071 9650 10434 11044 11656 
-927 -393 -525 -431 -642 
-4.9 -1.9 -2.3 -1.8 -2.5 
672 504 573 924 806 
1049 749 893 1150 1083 
-378 -245 -320 -226 -277 
-1304 -639 -845 -657 -919 
-6.9 -3.1 -3.7 -2.8 -3.6 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
1699 1705 1712 1715 
15479 16456 17528 18750 
7967 8328 8831 9437 
8176 8526 9029 9641 
209 198 198 204 
1396 1495 1610 1745 
23749 24993 26460 28157 
3070 3269 3467 3684 
26819 28263 29928 31841 
5027 5299 5612 5961 
4688 4950 5254 5592 
339 349 359 369 
1427 1450 1477 1506 
594 609 627 648 
833 842 850 858 
30419 32111 34064 36296 
-3253 -3415 -3601 -3835 
27166 28696 30462 32461 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
6111 6483 6823 7230 
683 742 774 820 
5428 5741 6049 6411 
4688 4950 5254 5592 
5029 5301 5615 5963 
341 351 361 371 
465 475 487 501 
340 350 360 370 
11604 12259 12924 13693 
594 609 627 648 
2256 2333 2413 2498 
4309 4484 4657 4834 
5117 5408 5724 6083 
12276 12833 13420 14063 
-672 -574 -496 -371 
-2.5 -2.0 -1.6 -1.1 
921 942 966 993 
1146 1176 1217 1260 
-225 -234 -251 -267 
-898 -808 -747 -638 
-3.3 -2.8 -2.5 -2.0 
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Exports - Total 
Merchandise 
Services 
Imports - Total 
Balance of Trade 
as%ofGNP 
International Transfers 
EC Subsidies 
EC Taxes(-) 
Capital 
Government Payments (-) 
Government Receipts 
Private Transfers 
Net International Transfers 
Factor Income Flows 
National Debt Interest (-) 
Profits etc. Outflows (-) 
Other Factor income 
Current Account Balance 
as% of GNP 
Budegtary definitions 
Exchequer Borrowing 
as% of GNP 
Current Budget Deficit 
as% of GNP 
CHANGE IN: 
Govt. Securities Held by: 
Commercial Banks 
Central Bank 
Non-Bank Private Sector 
Total (Domestically held) 
Small Savings 
Other Borr. from C.Bank 
Total Domestic Debt 
Foreign Debt: 
Government Securities 
Foreign Currency Debt 
Total Foreign 
Total Debt 
Total £IR Debt 
Government Foreign Bor-
rowing: 
In Foreign currencies 
In Government Securities 
Total 
1987 
11785 
10447 
1338 
11530 
1317 
7.3 
799 
329 
-13 
52 
237 
236 
879 
-1957 
804 
1307 
154 
239 
1.3 
TABLE A.6: Balance of Payments 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
13533 15990 15915 16629 18496 
12073 14440 14192 14785 16552 
1460 1550 1723 1843 1943 
11981 13285 14030 14654 15581 
1968 2302 2010 1844 2235 
10.4 11.0 8.9 7.8 8.9 
905 992 1280 1020 825 
293 318 299 315 327 
62 72 195 320 344 
76 56 60 110 113 
181 180 161 360 320 
233 238 258 270 281 
101) 1108 1535 1545 1330 
-2542 -3039 -2878 -2942 -3062 
894 973 1024 1075 1039 
1908 2337 2150 2193 2442 
260 271 296 326 419 
437 371 667 447 502 
2.3 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.0 
1993 
20314 
18253 
2061 
16723 
2294 
8.4 
833 
339 
450 
ll6 
340 
290 
1459 
-3253 
1065 
2673 
485 
500 
1.8 
TABLE A.7: Public Authorities' Debt Financing 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
-1 786 -619 -479 -462 -460 -723 -706 
-9.9 -3.3 -2.3 -2.0 -1.9 -2.9 -2.6 
-1180 -317 -263 -152 -295 -507 -541 
-6.5 -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 -1.3 -2.0 -2.0 
-2563 -203 119 0 161 197 
-13 13 I 0 0 0 
1535 -195 152 178 212 197 
-1040 -385 272 178 373 394 
422 216 253 187 223 208 
-171 -270 164 0 -55 -67 
-789 -439 689 365 541 534 
865 1002 36 197 0 0 
-194 -331 -316 -266 472 461 
671 671 -280 -69 472 461 
-119 232 409 296 1013 995 
76 563 725 562 541 534 
405 -282 -50 -44 -200 378 363 
460 867 1320 5 0 0 0 
865 585 1270 -39 -200 378 363 
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1994 1995 1996 
22059 23937 26045 
19872 21606 23555 
2187 2332 2490 
17569 18535 19548 
2524 2670 2898 
8.8 8.8 8.9 
842 850 858 
349 359 369 
463 476 490 
119 123 127 
350 360 370 
299 307 316 
1485 1512 1539 
-3415 -3601 -3835 
1096 1125 1155 
2867 3087 3355 
548 610 674 
595 581 601 
2.1 1.9 1.9 
1994 1995 1996 
-621 -565 -463 
-2.2 -1.86 -1.43 
-448 -375 -256 
-1.6 -1.23 -0.79 
161 178 201 
0 0 0 
187 164 141 
347 342 342 
196 173 148 
-54 -62 -71 
490 453 419 
0 0 0 
407 371 288 
407 371 288 
897 824 706 
490 453 419 
319 294 219 
0 0 0 
319 294 219 
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1987 
Government Securities Held 
by: 
Commercial Banks 5381 
Central Bank 365 
Private Non-Bank 5830 
Total Domestic 11576 
Foreigners 1800 
Total 13376 
Other Borrowing from C.Bank -572 
Small Savings 2323 
Total Debt Held Domestically 13327 
Total £Ir Debt 15127 
Foreign Debt: 
Foreign Currency 9693 
Government Securities 1800 
Total Foreign Debt 11493 
Total National Debt 24820 
Debt Ratios (% of GNP) 
Total National Debt 137.2 
Total Domestic Debt 73.7 
TotalForeign Debt 63.6 
Total £Ir Debt 83.6 
Total Foreign Currency Debt 53.6 
TABLE A.8: National Debt 
Current Prices, £ Million 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
2819 2616 2735 2735 
352 365 365 365 
7365 7170 7322 7500 
10536 10151 10423 10601 
2665 3667 3703 3900 
13201 13818 14126 14501 
-743 -1013 -849 -849 
2745 2960 3213 3400 
12538 12098 12787 13152 
15203 15765 16490 17052 
9498 9168 8852 8587 
2665 3667 3703 3900 
12164 12835 12555 12487 
24701 24933 25342 25638 
130.4 119.4 111.8 108.4 
66.2 57.9 56.4 55.6 
64.2 61.5 55.4 52.8 
80.3 75.5 72.7 72.1 
50.1 43.9 39.1 36.3 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1991-96 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
2896 3093 3254 3432 3633 
365 365 365 365 365 
7712 7909 8096 8260 8401 
10973 11368 11715 12057 12399 
3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 
14873 15268 15615 15957 16299 
-904 -971 -1025 -1087 -1158 
3623 3830 4027 4200 4348 
13693 14227 14717 15169 15588 
17593 18127 18617 19069 19488 
9059 9520 9927 10298 10586 
3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 
12959 13420 13827 14198 14486 
26651 27647 28543 29367 30074 
105.6 101.8 99.5 96.4 92.6 
54.2 52.4 51.3 49.8 48.0 
51.3 49.4 48.2 46.6 44.6 
69.7 66.7 64.9 62.6 60.0 
35.9 35.0 34.6 33.8 32.6 
THE ESRI MEDIUM-TERM ECONOMIC MODEL1 
John Bradley and John Fitz Gerald 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Of the many reasons that could be advanced for 
constructing a computer model of the economy, the least 
convincing is the quest for a kind of crystal ball with 
which to forecast the future. Any notion that the ESRI 
model contains within itself the seeds of Ireland's future 
is totally misguided for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, given the supporting set of assumptions 
about the future world economy and domestic policy 
actions, almost any outtum can be generated by the 
model. Since the model is totally silent in the choice of 
these assumptions, a major underlying support of any 
forecast must seek its justification elsewhere. 
Secondly, just as generals always fight the present 
war based on experience from the last, so also do models 
incorporate the assumption that the economy of the 
future will function very much like the economy did in 
the recent past (meaning 15 to 20 years). 
What then is the justification for devoting scarce 
resources towards constructing and maintaining a 
large-scale computer model of the Irish economy, the 
latter often being the more expensive aspect? Where do 
the ideas for the model structure and properties orig-
inate? Does the model tell us anything worth knowing 
that any competent economic analyst could not work 
out from reading the international forecasting and 
analysis literature and manipulating data on a simple 
spreadsheet? 
Taking the last issue first, to some extent the pro-
duction of short-term forecasts ( with a 12-15 month time 
horizon) can be produced with a simpler judgemental -
based technology and is an activity that is comple-
mentary to the analysis of the medium-term (3-5 years), 
and not a substitute for it. Indeed, a formal macromodel 
may not be always appropriate for the task of short-term 
forecasting. 
Most of the economic forecasting reported regularly 
in the media is of the short-term variety. Attention is 
focussed on the demand-side of the economy, and on 
the incomes generated by expenditures on consumption, 
investment, trade, etc. The nature and capacity of 
production is regarded as fixed, the short-term issue 
being the rate of capacity utilisation. Attention to public 
policy tends to focus on the immediately preceding 
and/or anticipated budget. 
When one moves into the future, the situation 
becomes more complicated. Investment activities can 
change the productive capacity of the economy; some 
sectors may decline, others may grow; policy changes 
which have only minor short-term implications can have 
major long-term consequences. In short, everything 
begins to become interdependent, and the ultimate 
consequences of policy or other shocks becomes diffi-
cult to disentangle using judgemental or ad-hoe 
methods. 
If, in the medium-term, judgemental methods must 
be augmented by more formal approaches, where do the 
ideas for the formal models come from? How valid are 
they? Could a formal model be seriously in error? 
Ever since data on the economy became widely 
available (an important by-product of the development 
of Keynesian macroeconomics in the 1930s and 1940s), 
economists have attempted to test their theories by 
constructing formal quantitative models (i.e., models 
that tell you the magnitude as well as the direction of 
any given result). The early models displayed their 
Keynesian origins in their focus on the demand side of 
the economy with little attention paid to the supply side. 
However, as the world changed in ways that were 
not anticipated by Keynesian economists, ideas and 
theories of how the economy functioned also changed, 
albeit with a delay. For example, during the 1970s the 
world economy was hit by a series of massive supply-
side shocks (energy shortages, oil and other commodity 
price rises), which opened up serious weaknesses in the 
demand-side underpinnings of most operational econ-
omic models then being used. For a time modelling went 
out of fashion, since it provided a poor guideline on how 
to grapple with a supply-side recession (referred to 
popularly as stagflation; low growth combined with 
high inflation). 
The late 1970s and the 1980s saw the emergence of 
conflicting viewpoints and theories of how economies 
work, always the sign of a discipline vigourously alive. 
Three main schools emerged: 
(a) The New Classical School: These economists hold 
that, contrary to the old Keynesian assumptions, 
markets do clear very quickly and that people form 
their expectations rationally, i.e., using all available 
information. They provide little or no role for public 
policy in boosting output or reducing unemploy-
ment, even in the short term. 
1 The ESRI Medium-Term Model was developed in part within an EC-wide modelling exercise (HERMES) within DG XII (Science, Research 
and Development), and has also been funded by a research contract with DG XVI (Regional Funds). Over the years the project has benefited 
greatly from collaboration with colleagues in the Irish Department of Finance, the Central Bank oflreland, University College Cork, University 
College Dublin, Trinity College, and DG II (Economics and Finance). 
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(b) The Monetarist School: These economists believe 
that while the economy has a natural tendency to 
move towards equilibrium, this can take a long time 
since prices and wages only adjust very slowly. They 
believe that only inflation results from government 
boosts to demand, and that no attempt should be 
made to "fine-tune" the economy using discretionary 
policy actions. Rather, stable and robust policy rnles 
should be adhered to. 
(c) The New Keynesian School: This is the lineal 
descendant of the original Keynesian economics of 
price rigidity and non-clearing markets, updated 
with a more sophisticated modelling of expectations, 
wage-price rigidity and supply-side responses. It 
holds that although markets may clear in the very 
long-nm, there is at least some role for public 
counter-cyclical policy. 
It is from the latter New Keynesian school that the 
ESRI medium-term model draws its inspiration, 
building on the earlier Keynesian model developed in 
the Central Bank and the Department of Finance in the 
l 970s,2 and incorporating much new research on the 
production side of the economy. An application of an 
early four-sector version of the ESRI model to a study 
of the fiscal expansions of the 1970s found that no 
permanent benefit to the economy resulted.3 A subse-
quent updated version was used in the Medium-Term 
Reviews, covering the periods 1987-92 and 1989-94.4 
A full technical description of that first version is 
available in an ESRI publication.5 
The purpose of this short article is to provide a 
non-technical introduction to the present revised and 
extended version of the ESRI medium-te1m model. 
While a complete technical description is in preparation, 
and will be published later in the year, we felt that an 
informal presentation of the model would assist the 
reader in following the forecasting and analysis con-
tained earlier in the present Review. 
In Section 1.2 we give an overview of the key 
mechanisms in the model, and follow in Sections 1.3 -
1.7 with more detailed descriptions of the main sub-
sectors: manufacturing, services, and the public sector, 
and of the labour supply and the expenditure (or 
absorption) sides of the model. We conclude with an 
impression of how we think the model provides a guide 
to the future evolution of the economy and how it helps 
present starkly some central policy dilemmas. 
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
Economists have three different but ways of looking 
at the behaviour of the economy. They examine what is 
produced (for example, output from the industrial sec-
tor); what is spent (e.g., private consumption, invest-
ment, etc.); and the incomes earned by the factors of 
production (e.g., the industrial wage bill, profits, etc.). 
Each approach (output, expenditure and income), 
should lead to an identical measure of gross domestic 
product (GDP), being the conventional aggregate 
measure of activity in the entire economy. Short-term 
forecasts (such as published regularly in the ESRI's 
Quarterly Economic Commenta,y) focus on 
expenditure-income relations. With a medium-term 
orientation in mind, the ESRI model focuses initially on 
the output ( or production) relationships, and examines 
the downstream expenditure and income consequences. 
The key mechanisms within the model are shown in the 
box below. 
Core Mechanisms in the ESRI Model 
(1) The exposed sector is driven by world demand, 
elements of domestic demand, and cost 
competitiveness. 
(2) The sheltered market sector (services and 
building) is driven by domestic demand. 
(3) The public sector is policy-driven, with bor-
rowing and debt accumulation modelled. 
( 4) Wages are determined in a bargaining model, 
and influenced by prices, taxes, unemployment 
and productivity. 
(5) The labour market is open and influenced by 
conditions in the UK labour market. 
Production in the Model 
An initial distinction can be made between those sectors 
of the economy that are exposed to the world trading 
environment (the traded sector) and those sectors that 
are sheltered from direct exposure to trade (the non-
traded sector). Broadly speaking, the traded sectors 
consist of manufacturing, most of agriculture,6 and a 
small part of market services. The non-traded sectors 
comprise the rest (i.e., utilities, building services, most 
of market services and all public or non-market ser-
vices). The relative sizes of these sectors, in terms of 
added-value, are shown in Figure 1. 
2 J.Bradley, C. McCarthy and T. O'Connell, 1978: "The Central Bank's Macroeconomic Model: Structure, Estimation and Application", 
Cemral Bank of Ireland, Winter Bulletin; J. Fitz Gerald and 0 . Keegan, "The Behavioural Characteristics of the MODEL-80 Model of the 
Irish Economy", loumal of the Statistical and Socia/ Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. XXIV. 
3 J. Bradley, C. Fanning, C. Prendergast and M . Wynne, 1985: Medium-term Analysisfo Fiscal Policy in Ireland: A Macroeconometric Study 
of the Period 1967-1980, Dublin: Economic & Social Research Institute 
4 J. Bradley, J. Fitz Gerald and A. Storey, 1987:Medium-Term Review:1987-1992; J. Bradley and J. Fitz Gerald, 1989: Medium-Term 
Review: 1989-1994, Economic and Social Research Institute. 
5 J. Bradley, J. Fitzgerald, D. Hurley, L. O'Sullivan and A. Storey, 1989: HERMES-Ireland: A Model of the Irish Economy: Structure and 
Pe1for111a11ce, Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
6 Some details of the agriculture sector is given in the special article on the CAP in this Review. 
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Given the extreme openness of the Irish economy 
(the total of imports and exports was 133 percent of GNP 
in 1991), we give primacy to the traded sector as the 
main engine of sustainable growth. In the case of 
manufacturing, there are two key determinants of 
growth: the state of world7 demand and the level of Irish 
cost competitiveness relative to its trading partners.8 
Hence, the two external forces driving the Irish manu-
facturing sector's output are the rate of world growth 
(which is more-or-less-transmitted one-for-one to 
Ireland) and the level of world cost competitiveness, 
which Ireland must at least match in order to grow as 
fast as the world economy. Any gain in competitiveness 
results in an increase in market share and growth faster 
than the world economy. Any loss of competitiveness 
reverses this process. 
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Given the level of output in manufacturing, the 
manner in which it is produced is then dete1mined. 
Firstly, arising as a consequence of its exposure to world 
competitive forces, Irish manufacturing output prices 
are determined in the world market place and cannot 
easily be altered to respond to Irish cost conditions. The 
appropriate mix of labour, capital and material inputs 
depends on their relative prices. For example, if wage 
inflation outstrips rises in the cost of capital, there is 
some scope for substituting capital for labour in the 
medium-term production process. In addition to relative 
price terms, there is also a systematic trend in the use 
of some factor inputs due to "technical progress". For 
example, in manufacturing there is a tendency towards 
"labour saving technical progress", i.e., some 3 percent 
less labour is needed per annum to produce the same 
level of real output. 
Developing on the above outline, the ESRI model 
contains equations describing the determination of 
manufacturing output and factor inputs, in terms of 
external forces (world output and world competitive-
ness) and domestic forces (mainly Trish wage costs, with 
some role for domestic demand). Since output prices 
and the prices of material inputs and capital are largely 
determined externally, attention is focussed on the 
determination of wage rates, to which we now turn. 
75 
The algebra of the wage bargaining equation is 
outlined in the box. Industrial wage rates are modelled 
as the outcome of bargaining between trades unions and 
employers, with the frequent intervention of the gov-
ernment. In such models, wages are determined by at 
least four explanatory variables: output prices, the 
"wedge" driven by taxes between the wage denominated 
in the employer's (output) price and the take home 
consumption wage enjoyed by workers; the rate of 
unemployment; and labour productivity. 
The Simple Economics of Wage Bargaining 
Consider the formula for the share of the value of 
output going to fund the wage bill; 
L*\V 
Q*P =k 
where L is the number employed, Q the volume of 
output, P the price of output and W the wage rate. 
Suppose that the share, k, is not constant, but is 
influenced by the unemployment rate and a measure 
of taxation (the tax "wedge"). Rewriting the equation 
in log form yields 
Jog(~)= a 1 + a2 Log(wedge) + apR + a4 log(prod) 
where prod= Q!L represents Jabour productivity and 
UR is the rate of unemployment. A dynamic version 
of this equation is used to determine wage rates in 
aggregate industry in the ESRI model. All other sec-
toral wage rates are linked to the central industry 
wage bargain. 
Empirical evidence shows that the following is the 
effect of wages (treated in isolation from the rest of 
the model) of a specified change in each of the "ex-
planatory" variables: 
I % rise in price (P) I % rise in wages 
I % rise in wedge 0.40 rise in wages 
I % point rise in UR 1.6 % fall in wages 
I % rise in prod 0.60 % rise in wages 
In the longer term the above affects are magnified by 
a factor of 1.7, although it is not very meaningful to 
isolate the wage equation from the model in such 
circumstances. 
The price that the employer obtains for her product 
clearly influences the price at which she can profitably 
purchase factor inputs, like labour. The "wedge" effect 
arises as workers try to bargain in terms of a take-home 
wage denominated in consumer prices and not in terms 
of the gross pre-tax wage. The effect of unemployment 
on wages is called by economists the "Phillips curve"; 
it basically states that the tighter the labour market, the 
higher will be wage settlements, and vice versa. Finally, 
the productivity effect comes as workers try to partici-
pate in the benefits of real growth. The data from the 
past few decades showed that there tended to be a total 
pass-through of productivity gains on average (con-
trolling for all other factors). Any tendency for the 
7 We use the term "world" somewhat loosely in this article, where a more correct usage would consist of a trade-weighted measure of activity 
in a range of countries in Ireland's trading sphere. 
8 In some subsectors, we shall see that the state of domestic demand also plays a role, but one which is subsidiary to world demand. 
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pass-through to fall below unity will lower labour's 
share of the value of output (and correspondingly raise 
the profit share). 
Turning now to the non-traded sector, consider the 
behaviour of the large market services sector. Leaving 
aside tourism and other traded services (a relatively 
small fraction of the total), output in market services is 
driven by domestic demand. So, for example, private 
consumption will contain a certain element of services 
output (transport and communication, recreation, pro-
fessional services), and any change in consumption will 
impact on the demand for services output accordingly. 
Services output is assumed to be produced in a way 
that attempts to minimise costs of production. Hence the 
mix of capital and labour inputs is sensitive to the 
relative prices of the inputs, as in manufacturing. 
However, given its high degree of insulation from world 
competition, prices in the services sector tend to be 
determined as a mark-up on input costs. Hence, if these 
services are required as inputs into manufacturing, a loss 
in industrial competitiveness can result if Irish services 
prices rise excessively. 
It is the balance between the traded and the non-
traded sectors that makes the Irish economy (and, 
consequently its modelling) interesting and more 
complex than the highly stylized "small open economy" 
model that is developed in economics textbooks. Indeed, 
as we shall see below, the export-oriented development 
of the Irish manufacturing sector through multinational 
foreign direct investment makes the Irish economy quite 
unique among the EC peripheral members. 
3 THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The first version of the ESRI model contained an 
aggregate industrial sector, comprising manufacturing, 
utilities and building. Experience with that model 
pointed to the need to disaggregate the sector into five 
subsectors: a separate treatment of utilities and of 
building, and a three-way breakdown of manufacturing. 
Examination of manufacturing illustrated that there 
were three quite separate components in terms of how 
the subsectors functioned. First, a high-technology 
sector could be identified, which was largely foreign 
owned, almost 100 percent export oriented, capital and 
R&D intensive, and which had a high propensity to 
repatriate its profits out of Ireland. Second, the food 
processing sector had a unique dependence on domestic 
agricultural production (mainly of cattle and milk), and 
fell under the influence of the EC Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP), with its price and quota rules. Finally, the 
traditional manufacturing sector covering a diverse area 
of drink, textiles, clothing, wood, paper, publishing, etc., 
was mainly in domestic ownership, tended to be more 
labour intensive than the other sectors, and was less 
export oriented (but still traded over 50 percent of its 
output). 
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The three sectors differ in terms of their driving 
forces. The high-technology sector is driven by world 
demand (with no domestic demand influence) and 
competitiveness. Output in the food processing sector 
is constrained by Irish agricultural production within the 
CAP. In the traditional sector, both world and domestic 
demand play a role, together with international 
competitiveness. 
The factor inputs were modelled in a way that 
recognized that the capital stock could only be varied 
slowly over time, whereas the other inputs (labour, 
energy and other materials) could be varied more rapidly 
in response to changes in relative prices. A full technical 
description of the findings concerning the underlying 
technologies of the three sectors is available.9 Briefly, 
it was found that the possibilities of substituting the 
different factor inputs (labour, capital, materials) were 
more restricted than might apply in a larger, less open, 
economy such as the USA, Germany or the UK. In the 
case of the high-technology sector, the low possibilities 
of factor substitution within Ireland are in stark contrast 
to the greater possibilities of relocating the entire 
production process out of Ireland, if competitiveness is 
lost. 
4 THE MARKET SERVICES SECTOR 
The first version of the ESRI model contained an 
aggregate market services sector based on the very 
limited data available at the time from the CSO. The 
very heterogenous nature of the sector made the con-
struction of an aggregate model very difficult to justify, 
and the ad hoe model lacked any firm foundation in 
economic theory. 
The advent of 1992 made it imperative to understand 
the behaviour of the market services sector, since this 
sector was likely to bear some of the burdens of 
rationalisation within the single European market (e.g., 
rationalisation of distribution and opening up of finan-
cial markets). 
In the present version of the ESRI model we treat 
market services in a three-way split: distribution 
(wholesale and retail), transport and communications, 
and other (professional, financial, personal) services. In 
each case, the scale of output is determined in the model 
by a suitably weighted measure of final demand (e.g., 
the weights determining, say, distribution output reflect 
the distribution content of consumption, etc.). 
The special nature of the transport and communi-
cations sector is recognized in the model, where the 
capital stock varies very slowly over time and is subject 
to public sector'influences (e.g., the massive investment 
in telecommunications during the first half of the 
1980s). However, in the other two sectors the mix of 
capital and labour is sensitive to factor prices. In 
addition, "technical progress" was found to be labour 
saving in distribution but labour using in other services 
(i.e., over time output becomes less labour intensive in 
9 J. Bradley, J. Fitz Gerald and I. Kearney, 1990: "Modelling Manufacturing Sector Behaviour Using a Restricted Cost Function: Open 
Economy Extensions", Report submitted to DG XVI, Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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distribution but more labour intensive in other services). 
A full technical description of the market services sector 
is available. 10 
5 THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR 
The demand for labour is dete1mined in the pro-
duction block of the model, as a derived demand, and 
is influenced by the scale of output, prices (including 
the wage rate), and trend terms capturing technical 
progress. The supply of labour consists of a series of 
relationships determining population of working age, 
participation in full-time education, participation in the 
labour force, and migration. 
Starting with population, the population of working 
age (15-64 years) grows at a "natural" rate (that can shift 
over time due to underlying changes in fertility, etc), 
but is sensitive to migration flows into and out of the 
country. 
A certain proportion of those of working age will 
decide to participate in full-time education. Another 
proportion of those remaining will decide to participate 
in the labour force and seek work. This labour force 
participation ratio is determined by such factors as the 
probability of obtaining work (proxied by the employ-
ment rate, or one minus the unemployment rate); the 
returns to employment (proxied by the "replacement 
ratio, or the fraction of average annual earnings made 
up by income transfer payments); and slowly changing 
sociological factors (proxied by time). 
The final chain in the dete1mination of labour supply 
is migration. Net outwards migration is determined by 
the relative attractiveness of the nearest alternative 
labour market, the United Kingdom. If the probability 
of obtaining work in Ireland disimproves (equivalently, 
if the Irish rate of unemployment rises relative to the 
UK), there will be a tendency for outflows of migrants 
to start up or accelerate. In addition, if the returns to 
working in Ireland deteriorate relative to the UK 
(measured in terms of relative real after tax earnings), 
a further tendency to outmigration will be created. 
The migration mechanism is one of the more crucial 
relationships in the model and, it must be admitted, one 
of the less reliable in terms ofrobustness of the statistical 
estimates. To ignore the possibility of migration (i.e., to 
assume that the Irish labour market is "closed") would 
be to commit a serious error, leading to an overestimate 
of the forces operating between higher unemployment 
and wages in the Phillips curve (see above), driving 
down wages and pricing labour back into jobs. How-
ever, too high a model sensitivity of migration outflows 
to any deterioration in the Irish labour market leads to 
a serious underestimate of the equilibrating powers of 
higher unemployment on wages. On balance, we feel 
that the long-run migration relation is adequately cap-
tured in the model, but the timing of short-run responses 
may not be handled adequately by our approach. 
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6 THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Although we could attempt to explain public sector 
behaviour in terms of implicit or explicit objectives a 
society may set itself, most conventional economy-wide 
models take the key decisions of the public sector as 
determined by forces not included within the model. So, 
for example, public sector employment numbers, tax 
rates and rates of income support are taken as given and 
are not derived within the model as arising from the 
desire to achieve some other objective. Of course, one 
may manipulate such policy instruments in order to 
achieve different outturns, but the policy settings (public 
employment, tax rates, etc.) are not on "auto-pilot" and 
can be changed arbitrarily by the "policy maker", within 
the bounds of political and financial feasibility. 
The output measure of public sector activity is 
essentially determined by public employment inputs, 
and appears in the model on the expenditure side of the 
national accounts as public consumption. Financing 
public consumption represents ultimately a burden on 
the rest of the economy (a burden that can only be 
delayed by debt rather than tax financing). 
A wider measure of the size of the public sector in 
the economy consists of total public expenditure, 
obtained by adding public consumption, subsidies, 
current and capital transfers (such as unemployment 
benefits and IDA grants to industry), national debt 
interest payments, and public investment expenditures 
(such as housing, roads, etc). These additional 
expenditure items are also included in the ESRI model 
as the product of some notional "rate" applied to a 
notional "base" (e.g., expenditure of unemployment 
transfers is determined as the product of an average rate 
of transfer - a policy instrument - multiplied by the 
numbers unemployed (determined elsewhere in the 
model). The main tax revenues are similarly determined 
as the product of a tax "rate" by a "tax base" (e.g., VAT 
receipts are the product of an average VAT rate - a policy 
instrument - by the VAT base, being essentially the 
value of consumption). 
The exchequer surplus is the difference between tax 
and other revenue and current expenditure. While 
theoretically any expanded level of public expenditure 
could be financed by raising taxes and keeping the 
exchequer borrowing requirement roughly in balance, 
in fact resort was made both to tax financing and to 
borrowing during the 1970s and 1980s. Financing the 
burgeoning EBR required the state to borrow both 
domestically and abroad, and to accumulate a national 
debt. Domestic borrowing is set in the model as a 
proportion of domestic savings, and the residual deficit 
is financed by foreign borrowing. A useful measure of 
the debt-servicing capacity of a nation is the accumu-
lated national debt as a proportion of GNP (the 
"debt/GNP" ratio), a variable also dete1mined within the 
model. 
l OJ. Bradley,J. Fitz Gerald and I. Kearney, 1991: "The Irish Market Services Sector: An Econometric Investigation, to appear in The Economic 
and Social Review. 
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7 EXPENDITURE 
The expenditure side of the national accounts con-
sists of private and public consumption and investment, 
stock changes, exports and imports. Certain key 
elements of expenditure in the ESRI model should be 
emphasised. 
The quest for a stable and robust model of private 
consumption behaviour has taxed, and continues to tax, 
the brains of economic modellers both in Ireland and 
abroad (see Whelan, 1991 for a recent contribution to 
the intellectual debate). Our approach has been to use 
the very simplest model where consumers are assumed 
to be liquidity constrained. This implies that con-
sumption is determined by current personal disposable 
income, excluding any wealth effects. Pending 
improvement in this area, we interfere with the model's 
consumption forecasts if the more recent data indicates 
a change of behaviour (refer Chapters 2 and 4 above). 
Private investment is detennined on the supply side 
of the model, described above, as a derived factor 
demand into the production process. 11 So, investment is 
determined initially by sector, and the aggregate sectoral 
investment is split between its two main components: 
machinery and equipment, and building and construc-
tion. 
The public elements of consumption and investment 
are used as policy instruments in the model. 
Industrial exports are determined in a supply func-
tion in terms of sectoral manufacturing output, where 
the marginal propensities to export the output of each 
sector are estimated, and corrected by a time-trend, 
permitting the export share of output to rise over time. 
Finally, there is no conventional demand for imports 
equation in our model. Rather, we determine all the 
separate sectoral components of output, and all the 
elements of final demand. Imports are dete1mined as a 
"residual", i.e., as the difference between output and 
final demand. 
If Ireland faced a binding balance of payments 
constraint (like many third world countries), the ability 
to import would be constrained by the ability to finance 
the balance of payments deficit. In practice our approach 
simply imposes consistency between domestic supply 
(determined in the production block) and domestic 
demand (determined in the absorption block). 
8 THE MODEL AS GUIDE TO THE 
FUTURE 
Economic models are used in two different but 
related situations: forecasting and policy analysis. If one 
requires simply to forecast aggregate Irish GNP forward 
a few years, a simple approach based on extrapolating 
recent past GNP trends, adjusted by a study of likely 
future world trends, and applied with a dash of common 
sense will probably out-guess any large structural 
economic model! However, if a series of detailed 
sectoral forecasts, based on a range of different world 
scenarios and domestic policy stances, is required, the 
simple isolated time-series approach becomes less rel-
evant. 
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In such a situation, a large-scale structural model has 
its own set of problems. For example, the so-called 
"Lucas critique" (after the US economist of the New 
Classical school, Robert Lucas) holds that model-based 
policy analysis is invalid since the model's structural 
parameters (the numbers obtained from statistical 
analysis of past data) cannot be assumed to remain 
unchanged in the face of policy regime shifts. 
However, it is generally accepted that the force of 
the Lucas critique is greatest in the case of "reduced 
form" models, i.e., small-scale models whose equations 
represent a mixture of behavioural, policy reaction and 
ad hoe elements. Nevertheless, even for structural 
models, care must be taken to ensure that one does not 
stray into configurations of the economy which are very 
different to those which characterised the years used for 
model calibration. 
Another aspect of modelling concerns the formation 
of expectations. Most conventional models (including 
our own) use adaptive or extrapolative expectations 
mechanisms, which basically say that future perform-
ance of a particular variable is affected only by its past. 
A more recent development uses "rational" expec-
tations mechanisms, which assume that people form 
their view of the future by taking account of all available 
information, including available economic model 
forecasts. So, for example, when it became accepted in 
1986/87 that the Central Bank and the government were 
firmly committed to maintaining the Irish pound -
Deutschmark link, rational expectations would require 
the complete discounting of any past experience and 
quick adjustment to the new credible exchange rate 
regime. Incorporation of forward-looking expectations 
into a model is technically very complex and is on the 
future research agenda for the ESRI model. 
What then can we realistically demand from the 
ESRI medium-term model? Firstly, it can be used to 
develop medium-term forecasts, conditional on judge-
mental assumptions concerning the world economy and 
domestic policy. Such forecasts are never used in "pure" 
form, and are altered post hoe in the light of judgement 
and experience. Nevertheless, the model provides an 
essential accounting and economic framework within 
which to formulate and evaluate forecasts. While the 
absence of such a framework makes realistic medium-
term forecasting difficult, if not impossible, to carry out, 
its presence is still no absolute guarantee of the validity 
of the forecast. 
Secondly, a limited form of policy and scenario 
analysis can be carried out using the model. Examples 
of this analysis are included in the previous chapters of 
this Review. Ideally, such scenarios should not differ 
massively from the historical inputs. In practice one 
pushes the model to its limits and beyond, and must 
adjust ones evaluation of the validity of the results 
accordingly. If this is living dangerously, what then is 
the situation where no model is available and one must 
be guided by "irrelevancies in the past, hunches as to 
the present and clairvoyance as to the future"? 
11 Private housing investment is determined separately as a function of real disposable income, and the real cost of borrowing. 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CAP REFORM* 
by John Fitz Gerald and Deirdre O'Connor 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Attempts at reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) are almost as old as the CAP itself. 
Beginning with the Mansholt plan of 1968 there have 
been many crises and partial reforms in the intervening 
years. The most recent major change was the intro-
duction in February 1988 of the financial framework 
which effectively set a "ceiling" on CAP spending for 
the period 1988 to 1992. This was accompanied by the 
imposition of budgetary stabilisers for agricultural 
commodity programmes designed to prevent 
over-production and keep them within budgetary 
targets. 
While the immediate cause of the latest crisis is the 
escalation in CAP spending, which this year threatens 
to exceed the above-mentioned ceiling of ECU 32.Sbn. 
set in 1988, there are other deeper factors. The unifi-
cation of Germany and developments in Eastern Europe 
have been contributory factors in the emerging 
budgetary crisis. However, even without these changes 
the CAP faced major problems in the early 1990s. 
Not least of these is the pressure within the GATT 
round to move towards freer world trade in agriculture. 
However, the pressures for refmm should not be seen 
as merely political pressures from outside the EC, in 
particular from the US. The CAP itself is manifestly 
inefficient in terms of its objective of supporting farm 
incomes and in the size of the surpluses which it 
generates. There is increasing awareness of the skewed 
distribution of the benefits from the CAP, whereby, 
according to the EC Commission, 80% of support goes 
to the 20% of farmers who produce 80% of the output. 
This is the consequence of attempting to support farm 
incomes using a price policy. Attention has also been 
drawn to the build up of food stocks which are currently 
worth ECU 3.7bn. This results from the gap between 
growth in agricultural production and consumption in 
the EC. These grew by 2% and 0.5% respectively 
between 1973 and 1988. 
While it could be argued that the CAP may benefit 
food-importing Third World countries by depressing 
world prices for some commodities, there is little doubt 
that it causes major problems for those which are 
food-exporting. In addition, the need to assist Eastern 
European countries in developing their economies will 
put increasing pressure on the EC to agree to greatly 
improved access for Hungarian and Polish farm pro-
duce. In the longer term the broadening of the EC's 
membership seems highly likely. Thus the pressures for 
changes in the CAP in the 1990s are emanating from a 
number of different sources and they will clearly have 
to be faced up to in the coming five years. 
While the problems with the CAP are reasonably 
obvious, the path for future reform is by no means clear. 
The conflicting interests of farmers and non-farmers, of 
farmers in different member states of the EC, and of the 
EC and other trading groups means that the path for 
reform is a highly politicised issue. 
The EC faces a choice of moving towards freer trade 
in agriculture or, on the other hand, adopting a fortress 
Europe approach by attempting to reduce EC production 
to self-sufficiency levels by means of quota restrictions. 
These two polar cases would have very different 
implications for Irish agriculture. They would both 
involve very substantial costs for the farming com-
munity, costs which one might hope would be made 
good from the EC budget. 
The choice between these polar cases could also give 
rise to a conflict of interest between the fa1ming and 
food processing sectors. A regime whereby production 
is restricted by means of quotas is more attractive to 
farmers than it is to food processors. From the point of 
view of food processors, lower prices and a higher 
volume of output is preferable. There is no obvious or 
correct solution. A spectrum of possible alternative 
policies lies between these two polar cases. 
The ultimate impact of any reform package on 
Ireland cannot be evaluated completely without refer-
ence to a number of other factors. These include the 
response of other European producers to any proposals, 
the outcome of the current round of GA TT negotiations, 
and the direction which any future CAP reform is likely 
to take. Given the complexity of this issue, it is important 
for Ireland to explore where our best interest lies and to 
develop our own approach to the reform of the CAP. 
There are cmTently three sets of issues relating to 
agriculture which face the EC; the price review for 
1991/1992 which has now been decided, the on-going 
GATT negotiations and the question of long-term CAP 
reform. While these three issues are inter-related, the 
focus of this paper will be on the latter issue, long-te1m 
* The authors would like to thank Tom Arnold and Helen Nugent of the Department of Agriculture, Professor Alan Matthews of TCD, Dr. 
Gerry Boyle of Maynooth University, Dr. Jim Higgins of the Department of Finance, Professor R. O'Connor of the ESRI and the participants 
at a symposium of the Agricultural Economics Society of Ireland for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this article remain purely 
the responsibility of the authors. 
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reform. To date, no formal proposals have been put 
forward in this regard. However, the Commission has 
produced a document indicating the direction which 
future CAP reform should take. This document, which 
was widely leaked in February, does not have any 
official status as it represents only one possible scenario 
being examined by Commissioner MacSha1Ty. Never-
theless, it does contain specific proposals which we can 
attempt to quantify and it is for this reason we have 
chosen to focus on this document. 
Our objective is to analyse these proposals in terms 
of their impact on the domestic economy. We do this by 
comparing the likely outtum under these proposals with 
a notional base-line projection where the CAP is 
assumed to continue unrefo1med. However, the .Com-
mission document makes it clear that continuation of 
the CAP in its present form is not an option. Section 2 
of this paper considers the likely impact of the reform 
proposals on the Irish agricultural sector, using an 
appropriate model of that sector's behaviour. Section 3 
considers the wider implications for the Irish economy 
using the ESRI Medium Term Model, described else-
where in this Review. The concluding section explores 
the implications of these results for future Irish policy 
on the CAP. 
2 EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE 
One of the hallmarks of the agricultural sector is the 
importance of the inter-relationships between supply, 
demand, price determination, factor inputs and agri-
cultural income (Boyle, 1991, p.4). Rather like 
squeezing a balloon, when prices for one product are 
cut farmers react to the squeeze on profitability by 
switching production to other enterprises. They may 
also change their volume of inputs. Thus it is not 
possible to analyse the response of agriculture in Ireland, 
or the EC, to changes in prices or quotas without a model 
which takes these complex inter-relationships into 
account. 
Here we use a model, developed, by Boyle, 1991, 
which is described in separate box. One problem which 
we face is the absence of a model of the EC agricultural 
sector. As the full implications for Ireland of any 
changes in the CAP will depend on how farmers 
elsewhere react, the absence of such a framework must 
be taken into account in an ad hoe manner. 
2.1 Reform Proposals 
In this section, we begin by outlining the features of 
the proposals contained in the above mentioned Mac-
Sharry document on CAP reform. We wish to stress 
again that these are elements of only one option for 
reform and that what follows is a discussion of some of 
the principal features of this particular option. There are 
areas where it is unclear what is being proposed, or how 
particular proposals would operate in practice. Never-
theless, these proposals would, if implemented, repre-
sent the most radical overhaul of the mechanisms of the 
CAP since its introduction in 1962. They consist of a 
number of measures which would control production 
through substantial cuts in price support in conjunction 
with compensation for income losses. These compen-
satory payments would be inversely related to the size 
of the holding, so that smaller producers would receive 
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proportionately more aid than larger producers. These 
payments would also, in many cases, be linked to a 
particular level of stocking density, in a move to 
encourage less intensive farming in the Community. 
In the cereals sector, support prices would be cut by 
approximately 42%. Compensation would be intro-
duced to make up for lost income but would be graduated 
according to a producer's cmTent cereal area. The aim 
of the proposals would be to provide full compensation 
for all loss incu1Ted up to a production area of 30 
hectares. Aid for larger producers would be progress-
ively reduced as shown in Table 7.1 below. In order to 
obtain these compensatory payments, some farmers 
would have to agree to set aside, or take out of pro-
duction, a certain percentage of their cereals growing 
land. This could then be used for fodder crops, non-food 
crops or as temporary fallow. The requirements are as 
shown in the table below. 
Table 7.1: Compensation For Cereals 
Area of Cereals < 30 ha. 30 - 80 ha. > 80 ha. 
Compensation 0% 25% 35% 
Reduction 
Set-Aside 0% 25% 35% 
On the basis of these percentages, a farmer growing 
less than 30 hectares of cereals would receive full 
compensation under this scheme and would not be 
required to set aside any land. A producer growing 100 
hectares would be required to set aside 19 .5 hectares 
and would have aid reduced by the same percentage. 
Compensatory payments would be boosted by the 
abolition of the cereals co-responsibility levy. This 
requires all cereal producers to contribute to the disposal 
of surplus production once the production target for 
cereals, which is set in terms of volume, has been 
exceeded. 
In the dairy sector, intervention prices would be cut 
by 10%, while the global, or Community-wide milk 
quota would be reduced by 4.5%. Quota reductions for 
individual operators would not be applied uniformly but 
would be greater for larger producers. Producers of less 
than 200,000 kg. annually would not incur any cut in 
quota while those producing above this level would have 
quotas cut by 10%. Assuming an annual average yield 
per cow of 4000 kg. per annum, this would mean that 
quota cuts would only apply to those producers with a 
herd size of 50 or more cows. Income losses incurred 
by small producers would be compensated by a payment 
of 40 ECU per cow for the first 15 cows. This would be 
paid on condition that the farmer had a stocking density 
of not more than 1 livestock unit per forage hectare. 
Producers would gain additional compensation in the 
form of the abolition of the milk co-responsibility levy. 
In the beef sector, intervention prices would be cut 
by 15%. In order to provide compensation for income 
losses, the existing beef premium of 40 ECU/animal for 
male bovines, currently paid on a once off basis, would 
be payable annually for a period of three years. This 
means, over a three year period, a threefold increase in 
the premium to offset the effect of the price cut. This 
would only be payable on the first 90 animals, and again 
on the basis of a stocking density of 1 livestock unit per 
hectare. In the sheep-meat sector, the aim of the pro-
posals is to encourage less intensive methods of farming 
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Agriculture Sector Model 
The model of the agriculture sector used here is described in Boyle, 1991. The model consists of 
an integrated system of sub-models: 
1. A model determining the volume of total output and the volume of a range of inputs. The volumes are 
determined as a function of the price of aggregate output, the prices of inputs, and the capital stock 
(including livestock numbers). Higher output prices increase production. Higher input prices 
generally reduce it. 
2. A model which determines the volume of output of the different agricultural products. The volume of 
each product is a function of the price of each output and the volume of aggregate output. This 
effectively allocates total production, determined in the first sub-model, over the range of 
agricultural products. 
3. Separate sub-models can also be used to determine the mix of fertilisers used and the shares of tillage 
devoted to different crops. 
The model was estimated using data for the period 1960-82. 
The advantage of using an agricultural sector model for this analysis is that producers' response 
to the proposals can be captured within the modelling framework and treated in a consistent manner. 
What this model can show clearly is how producers respond to a change in the price of a commodity -
in terms of the extent to which supply changes, the extent to which they attempt to switch into alternative 
products and the extent to which they change the volume of inputs. Given that some of these alternatives 
will be subject to constraints on production, e.g., the quota system in the dairy sector, it is essential that 
our model is capable of handling these restrictions on output. 
A number of matters are not dealt with by the model and have to be handled separately. The effects 
on the capital stock and breeding herd have to be taken into account in and ad hoe manner. As with all 
models, care must be taken when using it to simulate the effects of very large changes in policy. 
and to slow down the expansion of flocks. Existing 
ceilings for payment of the ewe premium would be 
reduced and linked to eligible ewe numbers in the period 
1987 to 1989. Producers would be able to draw an 
"extensification premium" if they agreed to reduce 
stocking density. This would act as an income supple-
ment and would be payable in addition to the current 
ewe premium. 
2.2 European Context 
The full effects of these changes on Irish agriculture 
will depend on how farmers throughout the EC react. 
What ultimately happens to agricultural prices in the 
Community is crucially dependent on the extent to 
which the current proposals help to bring about supply 
balance in the various commodity markets. The amount 
by which over-supply falls in each market will, to a large 
extent, determine how far prices can rise from the "floor" 
of intervention. EC and world prices will also be largely 
dependent on the outcome of the GATT negotiations. 
The cereals sector is the cornerstone of the CAP, in 
so far as prices in this sector, directly or indirectly 
determine prices in the livestock sector. It is evident 
from these proposals that the most severe price cuts 
occur in the cereals sector. Given its structure in Ireland, 
with 95% of producers having holdings of less than 30 
hectares, and therefore eligible for full compensation, 
cereal producers in Ireland would appear to fare 
somewhat better than their counterparts in France or the 
UK where holdings are much larger. However, the 
compulsory set-aside requirements, which are a 
pre-condition for compensation for larger producers, 
could have a significant impact on cereals output, given 
that the largest 5% of Irish producers account for 40% 
of our cereals production. However, in the EC as a whole 
the surplus of production over consumption is so great 
that these changes are unlikely to lead to any movement 
of market prices above support prices. 
Apart from its direct effect on the incomes of cereals 
producers, the most important effect of these price cuts 
would be in relation to input prices. It is expected that 
a 42% cut in cereals prices would reduce the price of 
feedstuffs by approximately 15%. Because of differ-
ences in the composition of feedstuffs in different 
countries, the fall in input prices will vary across the 
Community depending on the cereal/non-cereal com-
position of feedstuffs. This reduction in feed prices 
would represent a considerable saving for livestock 
producers, with larger and more intensive producers 
gaining proportionately more. It has been pointed out 
that Ireland uses grass in its feed mix to a greater extent, 
and concentrate feedstuff to a lesser extent, than other 
countries such as Holland or Denmark. Therefore, it is 
likely that producers in these countries could see their 
input prices fall by a greater percentage due to large fall 
in cereals prices. This effect is likely to be amplified by 
the larger share of pigmeat and poultry production in 
these countries' agricultural output. 
Another consequence of this fall in cereals prices 
would be a decrease in the demand for cereal-substitute 
feedstuffs and a increase in demand for those based on 
cereals. There may also be some downward pressure on 
world prices of cereal-substitutes. One possible conse-
quence of lower feedstuff prices would be to increase 
the attractiveness of more intensive farming methods 
which would be in direct conflict with the environmental 
objectives contained in the proposals. This is more likely 
to apply in the case of dairy producers with the price of 
milk falling by only 5% while the price of feedstuffs 
falls by I 5%. In the beef sector, cattle prices fall by the 
same amount as feedstuff prices. However, this devel-
opment would probably be held in check by the 
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restrictions on stocking density contained in the reform 
package and the fact that production in some areas 
would continue to be constrained. 
In the dairy sector, it is estimated that approximately 
12% of producers in Ireland have a herd size of over 50 
cows and that these producers are responsible for 35% 
of milk production. Therefore, these producers would 
be liable to quota cuts of 10%, corresponding to a 
decrease in milk production of 3.5% at a national level. 
In both the dairy and the beef sectors, it is expected 
that reduced input prices would, to some extent, offset 
any income losses caused by price or quota cuts. In the 
case of dairying the reduction in output in the EC may 
reduce surpluses so that the eventual cut in prices could 
be less than l 0%. However, given that livestock pro-
duction in Ireland is predominantly grass-based, the 
reduction in input prices could be relatively smaller than 
for producers in those countries where production is 
grain-based. 
It is possible that compensatory payments for 
smaller producers in Ireland in these sectors could be 
adversely affected by the restrictions contained in the 
proposals. In many cases, compensatory payments 
would be conditional on a particular level of stocking 
density - 1 livestock unit per hectare. It is estimated that 
this restriction could substantially reduce the number of 
farmers who are eligible for compensation. 
In the sheep-meat sector, we expect that the growth 
in ewe numbers in the last year could mean that the ewe 
premium would no longer be payable on approximately 
one million ewes, a very substantial loss in income for 
farmers. This loss could affect producers elsewhere and 
so reduce EC production. The net effect could be a small 
rise in EC market prices for sheep while leaving income 
for sheep farmers substantially reduced due to the 
reduction in subsidies. 
An interesting feature of these proposals is that they 
attempt to break the traditional link between production 
or output and support, whereby those responsible for the 
most production receive the bulk of support. They also 
attempt to redirect support from larger producers to 
smaller and medium size producers by attempting to 
provide full compensation for smaller producers for any 
income losses incurred due to price cuts. While bene-
ficial for Irish farmers this reorientation will aggravate 
losses by farmers in the UK and the Netherlands. 
This change is in recognition of the fact that current 
CAP spending has tended to benefit most the largest of 
the Community's producers and has done little to 
prevent the decline in the agricultural population. The 
environmental problems caused by over-intensive 
production methods are also addressed in these propo-
sals. The link between compensatory payments and 
producers' stocking density is an attempt to encourage 
"extensification" in agriculture or less intensive 
methods of farming. 
2.3 Effects on Irish Agriculture 
For simplicity in analysing the effects of the Mac-
Sharry package we have used a 1990 basis. We have 
changed the prices and quotas and examined what the 
effects of the package would have been in that year if it 
had been implemented instantaneously. The use of a 
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different basis would have made little difference to the 
results but it would have increased the complexity of 
exposition. In the next section, where we analyse the 
macroeconomic effects, we assume that the package is 
implemented over the period 1991-95. 
As outlined above, we have assumed that the EC 
market price for the different products will be largely 
determined by the balance of supply in the EC for the 
product in question. So, given the extent of over-supply 
in the cereals sector, we would expect that cuts in 
intervention prices of 42% would translate into cuts in 
producer prices of approximately 40% for tillage 
products. 
Using this rationale, we estimate that producer prices 
for milk would not fall by the full 10% outlined in the 
proposals. Due to the fact that there would be additional 
cuts in milk quotas, we would expect producer prices to 
fall by approximately 5%. We would expect beef prices 
to fall by the full 15% proposed in the document. The 
price of residual outputs, i.e., pigs and poultry is 
expected to fall by approximately 6.5%. However, this 
fall could be somewhat larger because of competition 
from the beef sector where prices are expected to fall 
by 15%. It is possible that white meat prices would have 
to fall by a similar amount. In addition to this, given the 
fact that cereals make up a large proportion of the cost 
of producing white meat, the fall in feedstuff prices 
could mean a large increase in profitability in this sector. 
This would increase output which would drive down 
price. Prices in the sheep-meat sector would rise by 
approximately 5%. The price of other inputs, such as 
fertilisers are assumed to fall by 5% because of a general 
decline in demand within the EC as a result of the reform 
package. 
In most cases, we have allowed the model to deter-
mine the changes in quantity supplied as a result of 
changes in price. However, in the case of the dairy sector 
we have imposed a volume reduction of 3.5% corre-
sponding to a reduction in milk quotas. We have also 
assumed that production of pigs and poultry would 
increase by 2.5% reflecting producers' response to the 
price and quota cuts in other farming enterprises. The 
results of our analysis in terms of changes in the volume 
and value of agricultural output can be seen in Table 7 .2 
below. 
We estimate that the effect of these price reductions 
would be to reduce the value of Gross Agricultural 
Output (GAO) by almost 17%, with the price of GAO 
falling by almost 13% and volume falling by 4%. We 
estimate that the value of inputs - materials and services 
excluding labour, would fall by almost 16%, with price 
and volume falling by 8.8% and 7% respectively. 
The one surprising result is the increase in sheep 
production in spite of the substantial reduction in the 
profitability of this enterprise. While the model suggests 
that this arises because the reduction in profitability of 
cattle is even greater, resulting in a switch from cattle 
production to sheep this is unlikely to occur in reality. 
We would expect that levels of EC subsidies would 
increase substantially under the reform package and we 
estimate that the effects of increased compensatory 
payments for milk, beef and cereals producers, in 
addition to the abolition of the co-responsibility levies 
could increase the level of EC subsidies by approxi-
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Table 7.2: Effects on Agricultural Output 
1990 basis 
% Change 
Price Volume Value 
Milk -5.0 -3.5 -8.5 
Cattle -15.0 -6.5 -21.5 
Sheep 5.0 5.5 10.5 
Tillage -40.0 -5.0 -45.0 
Residual Output -6.5 2.5 -4.0 
Gross Agricultural Output -13.0 -3.7 -16.7 
Fertiliser -5.0 -10.5 -15.5 
Feedstuff -15.0 -3.6 -18.6 
Energy 0.0 -11.2 -11.2 
Labour 0.0 -6.0 -6.0 
Residual Inputs -5.0 -9.0 -14.0 
Inputs Materials/ Services -8.8 -7.0 -15.8 
mately £117m. However, as we have already pointed 
out, this figure could be significantly reduced given the 
conditions necessary for full compensation which we 
outlined earlier. (The 1990 figure for "Subsidies minus 
Levies" was inflated due to exceptional factors at work 
in that year related to the need to bring the bulk of 
payments onto a current year basis. As we are not 
concerned here with forecasting farm incomes for 1991, 
we have not made any adjustment to the 1990 figure for 
net subsidies.) 
Table 7 .3 summarises the effects of these proposals 
in terms of their impact on Gross Agricultural Product 
at market prices and factor cost, Net Agricultural 
Product and farm incomes. While the value of Gross 
Agricultural Output falls by 16.7% there is a very 
substantial reduction in usage of inputs. The net effect 
of these two changes is a reduction in Gross Agricultural 
Product at market prices of 17.4%. There is a big rise 
in subsidies. When combined with the abolition of the 
co-responsibility levy the final effect on farm incomes 
is likely to be a reduction of nearly 11.5% below the 
level they might have reached under an unreformed 
regime. 
The effect of these proposals on land values in the 
agricultural sector is an important question and one 
which is not captured in our modelling framework. 
Given the large fall in tillage prices which is proposed, 
it is likely that rent paid by large cereals producers for 
conacre could fall sharply. Another important 
dete1minant of land values will be the alternative uses 
to which agricultural land can be put. There is already 
a switch of land and resources into forestry. The 
incentives provided by the EC to move into forestry 
appear to be quite attractive to marginal farmers. This 
trend could receive a major stimulus from the cutback 
in the profitability of agriculture. However, the existing 
model cannot handle such effects and the likely outturn 
remains a matter for speculation. Unless farmers can 
find alternative products to produce, there could be a 
loss of farm employment not foreseen in our model. To 
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Table 7.3: Agricultural Output and Income 
Base Change Post 
Package 
£M % £M £M 
Value GAO. 3170 -16.7 -529 2641 
Value Inputs 1372 -15.8 -217 1155 
Gross Agricultural 1798 -17.4 -312 1486 
Product, Market Prices 
Subsidies Minus 329 +35.5 +117 446 
Levies 
Gross Agricultural 2127 -9.2 -195 1932 
Product, Factor Cost 
Depreciation 340 - - 340 
Net Agricultural Prod- 1787 -11.0 -195 1592 
uct, Factor Cost 
Wages/Salaries 147 -6.1 -9 138 
Income From Self 1640 -11.4 -186 1454 
Employment 
the extent that alternative uses are found for the land 
and farm labour, the loss of income could be amelior-
ated. 
While we have presented the changes in output and 
incomes in some detail it should be stressed that the size 
of the changes envisaged in the package is very large 
and there must be a considerable margin of error in the 
model's estimates. However, because of the inter-re-
lated nature of the decisions errors may, to some extent, 
be offsetting. 
3 MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS 
While the most immediate impact of the reform of 
the CAP will fall on the farming community it will also 
have consequences for the economy as a whole. Here 
we examine these wider economic consequences using 
the ESRI Medium-Term Model of the Irish economy. 
The knock-on effects of the fall in farm prices and 
the volume of agricultural output will take a number of 
forms affecting the food-processing sector, consumer 
prices, farmers' consumption and the government's 
finances. The effects of CAP reform operating through 
these different channels will interact producing a range 
of secondary effects. 
Because the reform of the CAP will affect the 
agricultural sector in all member states of the EC (and 
agricultural producers in the rest of the world) the Irish 
economy will also face changes in the world economic 
environment in which it operates. It is essential that these 
wider effects are taken into account in any simulation. 
To ignore them and assume that the fall in prices in 
Ireland was not matched in other members states would 
assume an exaggerated improvement in the competi-
tiveness of the Irish industrial sector. However, while a 
macro-model is readily available for the Irish economy, 
a much cruder approach is adopted here to the EC wide 
macroeconomic effects of CAP reform. 
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In this section we first consider the economic 
channels through which the changes in the agricultural 
sector will impact on the Irish economy. We then set 
out the assumptions we have made concerning the 
reaction to the changes in other EC member states. 
Finally we use the model to quantify the macroeconomic 
effects of these changes in agricultural output and prices. 
We have assumed that the refonn of the CAP takes place 
as set out in the leaked M acSharry proposals ( discussed 
in the previous section) and that the changes are 
implemented in five equal steps over the period 
1991-95. Because the supply side of the economy takes 
time to react to these shocks we trace the macroeco-
nomic effects out to the year 2000. Even after that date 
there may be some further changes, in particular due to 
the slow speed of adjustment in the structure of the 
food-processing industry. 
3.1 Channels of Influence 
The fall in the volume of agricultural output will 
reduce the turnover of the food processing sector of 
industry. In addition, some of the benefits of the CAP 
have, in the past, been captured by the food-processing 
industry as higher prices and margins. The resulting 
profits will be adversely affected by the fall in support 
prices for agricultural produce. The fall in throughput 
in the food-processing sector will lead to an even bigger 
fall in employment than would otherwise be the case 
(see Chapter 4 of this Review). 
The fall in the price of agricultural output both in 
Ireland, and elsewhere in the EC, will directly benefit 
consumers in Ireland (and in the rest of the EC). The 
fall in prices will lead to lower pressure for increases in 
money wages in future years. This reduction in the rate 
of wage inflation will, in turn, feed back into prices. The 
net effect will be a substantial reduction in the price of 
labour faced by the industrial and services sectors. This 
will tend to benefit employment growth. However, the 
precise effects will depend on the extent to which prices 
change elsewhere within the EC. To the extent that there 
is a gain in the competitiveness of domestic industry, 
there will be some rise in industrial exports to offset the 
fall in agricultural exports. 
As outlined earlier, the fall in farmers' incomes will 
be substantial. This will lead to a fall in economy-wide 
consumption which will, in turn, cut the demand for 
domestically produced goods and services. However, 
because of the openness of the Irish economy, the 
negative11111/tip/iereffect of this fall in consumption will 
not be very great. As with all consumption, much of the 
fall in farmers' spending will affect the demand for 
imported goods. 
finally, the decline in domestic economic activity 
will adversely affect the government's finances. The 
high level of debt, which is fixed in nominal terms, 
means that the fall in the value of GNP, not just the 
volume of GNP, increases the burden of debt interest 
payments. Because Irish nominal interest rates in the 
1990s will be effectively determined by rates in the EC 
as a whole they will not fall as a result of the fall in the 
domestic price level. Thus real interest rates will rise in 
Ireland. This will be particularly serious for the gov-
ernment finances. 
__ f_ 
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To offset the rise in the debt/GNP ratio the gov-
ernment would have to raise taxes or cut expenditure, 
giving rise to a further deflationary effect on GNP. In a 
separate sub-section we examine the combined effects 
of the CAP reform package and an increase in the rate 
of direct'taxation designed to hold the debt/GNP ratio 
unchanged in the year 2000. 
3.2 EC Wide Macroeconomic Effects 
The effects, described above, will be felt throughout 
the EC. While the fall in farmers' consumption will not 
be significant in the context of the major EC economies, 
the fall in prices will be detectable. Food accounts for 
between 15% and 25% of consumers' expenditure in 
France, the UK and Germany so that consumer prices 
will fall by a number of percentage points. 
A fall in consumer prices elsewhere in the EC will 
only affect Ireland indirectly through changing dis-
posable incomes abroad and through indirect effects on 
wage rates and output prices of manufactured goods in 
the EC. The effect of the fall in agricultural prices on 
output prices and wage rates will be more muted than 
on consumer prices. We have assumed that output prices 
and wage rates fall by around 2 % over the period of the 
adjustment of the CAP. The fall in Irish import prices 
is assumed to be only 1 %, reflecting the preponderance 
of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and the 
significance of imports from the US and other non-EC 
locations. Finally, we have not allowed for any fall in 
European interest rates as a result of the lower rate of 
inflation. 
With the exception of the agricultural sector, we 
have not taken account of any output response in the EC 
resulting from the fall in prices. The possible channels 
for such an effect are so diverse that quantification is 
difficult. To the extent that they occur they will tend to 
offset the adverse effects on the Irish economy of the 
CAP reform package, discussed below. 
3.3 Effects on Economy - Higher Debt 
The effects of the CAP reform are assumed to be 
phased in over a five year period 1991-95. In this 
simulation we made no change in domestic taxes or in 
the volume of government expenditure, allowing the 
debt/GNP ratio to rise as the level of economic activity 
is adversely affected by the problems of the agricultural 
sector. 
We present our results as changes compared to a 
baseline projection. The baseline used is the central 
forecast in Chapter 4 of this Review. This baseline 
projection is a characterisation of what might happen 
without a major reform of the CAP (assuming that the 
size of the EC budget is variable). Using the model we 
have changed the agricultural assumptions to see what 
are the effects on the economy in the period to the year 
2000. 
The volume of agricultural output falls by almost 4% 
by 1995 and there is a 13.5% fall in agricultural prices. 
While there is a substantial rise in EC transfers to the 
farming community in the same period, there is still a 
reduction in farmers' incomes in 1995 of around 10%. 
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The fall in income adversely affects consumption. At 
its lowest point in 1995, consumption is down by 2% in 
volume. The fall in the volume of agricultural output 
reduces the materials available to the food sector for 
processing. Food-sector output falls slowly as the 
capacity of the sector contracts (Figure 1). The fall in 
output in 1995 is 2.7%, rising to 4.2% by 2000. Even 
by the end of the decade the effects on the food sector 
are not complete. It could be expected to suffer a fall in 
output in the long-term of up to 7.3%. 
The fall in farm income and fa1m spending affects 
investment, particularly in building. The output of the 
services sector is also hit by the fall in consumption. 
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Together these forces result in a reduction in total 
employment in the economy of 4,900 or 0.43% by 1995 
(Figure 2). 
Real disposable income in the non-farm sector rises 
directly as a result of the price cuts. However, this is not 
nearly enough to compensate for the reduction in fa1m 
incomes. The reduction in prices also sets in train a series 
of forces which gradually offset the effects of the 
cut-backs in agriculture on national output. 
This fall in agricultural prices first affects consumer 
prices. The fall in prices, in turn, affects wage rates. 
Wage rates are also affected by the rise in unemploy-
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ment and the problems in the food processing sector. By 
1995 wage rates are reduced by over 5% below the level 
they would otherwise have been (Figure 3). The fall in 
wage rates reduces prices further. This cycle continues 
over a number of years. 
As indicated above, we have assumed that prices and 
wages fall in other EC countries. However, because of 
the much smaller role of agriculture and food-process-
ing in those economies, the reduction in prices and 
wages is assumed to be less than in Ireland. This gives 
rise to a gain in Irish competitiveness. In the long run, 
this is more important than the income effect of the fall 
in prices. However, considerable uncertainty must 
surround the assumption concerning the effects of CAP 
reform on foreign prices. If it proved greater than we 
have assumed and Irish competitiveness improved by 
less than shown here, the costs of CAP refo1m to Ireland 
would be greater than we have estimated. 
Because interest rates are effectively externally 
determined the fall in inflation increases domestic real 
interest rates. This has adverse implications for the 
government and also for the private sector as a whole. 
This improvement in competitiveness takes time to 
translate into increased output. It is only after 1995 that 
industrial output in the traditional and high technology 
sectors begins to rise. By 2000 the competitiveness 
induced increase in industrial output goes a long way to 
offsetting the loss to the Irish economy from the agri-
cultural cut-backs. By 2000 GNP is only 0.2% below 
the level it would otherwise have been (Figure 4). 
Because of the improvement in competitiveness 
industrial employment rises leaving a small net increase 
in total employment by the end of the decade (Figure 
2). The effects on emigration and employment are, as a 
result, small. 
While the effects on GNP are somewhat reduced by 
the year 2000, the debt/GNP ratio still remains nearly 
10 percentage points above the level in the baseline 
(Figure 5). The lower rate of inflation means that the 
value of GNP is below the level it would otherwise have 
been and that the burden of the debt, fixed in nominal 
terms is increased. This reflects the adverse effects on 
the terms of trade of the changes in the CAP. The 
agricultural exports, notionally attributable to paying 
foreign debt interest, are worth much less than they are 
today. In the next section we consider the effects of 
government action designed to hold the debt/GNP ratio 
unchanged at the baseline level. 
The fall in agricultural investment over the period is 
not surprising. However, there is also a fall in investment 
in the rest of the economy as the cost of capital rises due 
to rising real interest rates while the cost of labour falls. 
(It becomes profitable to slow-down the rate of sub-
stitution of machines for employees.) Because invest-
ment has a high import content imports are reduced in 
volume by around 2.7% by 1995. However, in the 
following five years the improvement in competitive-
ness results in a recovery in investment (other than in 
the food sector). This, together with the increase in 
industrial output, reverses the trend in imports. 
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Initially the cut-backs in agriculture arising from the 
CAP reform seriously reduce the volume and value of 
agricultural exports. However, the adverse effects on 
the balance of payments are offset in the earlier years 
by the fall in imports discussed above. As the economy 
adjusts the balance of payments is adversely affected 
from 1996 onwards (Figure 6). By 2000 the disim-
provement in the balance of payments amounts to 1.7 
per cent of GNP. 
Without remedial action to deal with the balance of 
payments position and the increased debt/GNP ratio the 
situation would deteriorate further. This is the ultimate 
measure of the long-term impact of the CAP reform 
proposals on the Irish economy. 
3.4 Effects on Economy - Unchanged Debt 
A second simulation was carried out to examine the 
possible combined impact of the CAP reform proposals 
and of measures to keep the debt/GNP ratio at the 
baseline (central forecast) level. There is obviously a 
wide range of possible measures to stop the debt/GNP 
ratio rising above the level it would otherwise have 
achieved. In this simulation, for illustrative purposes, 
we have assumed that the debt reduction is achieved by 
raising the rate of personal income tax above the level 
in the baseline projection. As shown in Figure 7, the 
increase amounts to 3 .2 % of personal income by 1995 
(£700 million in 1991 terms). This increase is quite 
severe and the economic impact of such a change may 
be greater than if the debt reduction were financed by 
cuts in expenditure. After rising up to 1995 the effect of 
this measure is to leave the debt/GNP ratio almost 
unchanged by the year 2000 (Figure 8). Thereafter the 
tax increases could probably be gradually reduced. 
The effect of the action to hold the debt/GNP ratio 
unchanged is to greatly increase the long-term impact 
of the CAP reform on the Irish economy. By the year 
2000 GNP is nearly 1.2% below its baseline level 
(Figure 9). The increase in taxes aggravates the situation 
in two ways. It directly reduces purchasing power. It 
also means that the reduction in the rate of inflation is 
less than in the previous simulation (Figure 10). Because 
workers bargain in terms of after tax wages the tax 
increases alter the wage moderation effects of the fall 
in agricultural prices. This means that there is a smaller 
improvement in Ireland's competitive position. 
The generally lower level of activity in the economy 
leads to a much reduced demand for imports which, in 
turn, leads to a small improvement in the balance of 
payments position by the year 2000 (Figure 11). 
The effect of the rise in taxes on wages is to choke 
off the competitiveness gains in the industrial sector 
leaving employment in that sector unchanged. How-
ever, employment in market services falls by 3% as a 
result of the fall in domestic economic activity. For 
example, lower consumption means fewer people 
employed in the distribution sector. Taken together total 
employment falls by 1.3% by the year 2000 (Figure 12). 
The unemployment rate rises by a maximum of 1 
percentage point in 1995 and falls thereafter as emi-
gration picks up (Figures 13 and 14). The rise in 
emigration results in the population in 2000 being 1.3% 
below the level it would have been without the changes 
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in the CAP. This means that GNP, while falling in 
absolute terms, is relatively unchanged in terms of GNP 
per head, due to the higher level of emigration. 
In the very long term it seems likely that the Irish 
economy could settle down to a new equilibrium level 
of GNP between 1 and 1.5% below its baseline level 
while leaving the debt/GNP ratio and the balance of 
payments unchanged. It would also lead to a major 
redistribution of income away from the farming sector 
to the rest of the economy. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Economic Effects 
This article has concentrated on an examination of 
the implications for the Irish economy of the leaked 
document for reform of the CAP. It is clear that these 
proposals must be seen as the opening shot in what will 
undoubtedly be a long debate. The parallel development 
of the GA TT negotiations means that the final decision 
on how the CAP should develop over the next ten years 
must take account, not just of the financing needs of the 
CAP itself, but also of the wider implications for the 
world market in agricultural products. 
Because of the global nature of the market for 
Ireland's agricultural output, much will depend on how 
farmers in other countries, both inside and outside the 
EC, will react to the changes in prices and production 
quotas. What is a very unpalatable package for Irish 
farmers is even more unpalatable for farmers in some 
other EC member states. As we outlined earlier, the 
reform package is oriented towards the smaller and 
medium size producer, of which Ireland has a greater 
number than do countries such as the UK or the 
Netherlands. We have discussed above the importance 
of the supply response in other EC member countries to 
major cuts in output prices. In the absence of a full model 
of the agricultural sector elsewhere in Europe, it is 
difficult to gauge the likely size of this response and the 
assumptions made in this paper remain tentative. 
Whatever the effect on farming sectors within the 
different member States, it is the overall macroeco-
nomic effect of CAP refo1111 within these States which 
is probably the more important issue, given its 
importance in shaping national attitudes to CAP reform. 
The absence of a model of the wider European 
economy (as opposed to the European agricultural 
sector) also gives rise to uncertainty concerning the 
response of prices, wages, and output elsewhere to the 
changes in the CAP. As these changes have important 
implications for Ireland's competitiveness they make 
the quantification of the long term impact of CAP reform 
on Ireland rather difficult. In our analysis we have not 
takyn account of the possibility of increased output in 
the EC consequent on an improvement in the efficiency 
of the EC agricultural sector. 
The analysis outlined above suggests that the pro-
posals would knock around 10% off farmers' incomes 
over the period of the adjustment. Agricultural output 
could fall by around 4%. When the wider economic 
effects of this shock to the Irish economy are taken into 
account the loss in GNP in the medium to long-term 
could be of the order of 1.5% of GNP, with a somewhat 
greater loss in the initial years of the adjustment. The 
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loss in foreign earnings will necessitate a more stringent 
domestic fiscal policy over the rest of the 1990s than 
would otherwise have been the case. The adverse effects 
on employment may be limited because numbers 
employed in farming have proved slow to respond to 
changes in income. However, the corollary of this is that 
the loss 'in income per head in agriculture will be quite 
severe. 
The adverse effects of CAP reform will do much to 
offset the beneficial impact of the Community Support 
Framework on the level of GNP. The cost of the CAP 
ref mm could offset up to half the benefits (measured in 
terms of GNP) expected to arise from the CSP by the 
end of the decade (Bradley, Fitz Gerald, and Kearney, 
1991). 
The problems posed for the Irish economy by the 
CAP reform are heightened by the extent of the gov-
ernment's indebtedness. A high level of debt aggravates 
the effects of shocks to the terms of trade and of shocks 
which raise real interest rates. The difference between 
the two simulations shown above highlights the fact that 
the long-term effects of the CAP reform on the Irish 
economy will be greatly aggravated by the size of the 
government's debt. 
There remain many areas of uncertainty as to how 
the agricultural sector will respond to the shock of CAP 
reform. Any model, such as that of the agricultural sector 
used in Section 2, has problems dealing with large 
shocks. The loss of income resulting from CAP reform, 
combined with the restrictions on shifting production to 
alternative products, makes it likely that the price of 
agricultural land will fall. This may induce a growth in 
other forms of land use, such as forestry, which could 
provide some offset to the loss of agricultural output. In 
addition, for the food processing sector, the effects will 
depend very much on the type of reform package 
eventually chosen. 
However individual farmers react to the reform of 
the CAP, it is clear that the farm sector will suffer a 
substantial loss of income. For the non-farm sector, if 
the government could ignore the adverse effects on the 
debt, there would be an increase in real disposable 
income because of the fall in prices. However, the 
non-farm sector of the economy will have to bear the 
brunt of measures to control the potential increase in the 
debt/GNP ratio above what it would otherwise have 
been. When this is taken into account, it is clear that 
they too will suffer from the reform of the CAP. 
However, the major impact of the CAP reform will, 
obviously, still fall on the farm sector itself. Farmers 
have real problems! 
4.2 Policy Response 
In the short term the uncertainty about the future for 
Irish agriculture raises questions about priorities under 
the EC Community Support Framework. It would 
appear to be wiser to devote resources currently being 
devoted to promoting agricultural output to other uses, 
which could provide a more lasting improvement in 
living standards in rural areas. If and when the CAP is 
reformed some of the investment currently being 
financed by the CSP could prove to be unproductive. 
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In the past consideration of how the CAP should be 
reformed has been hampered by a fear that any talk of 
changing the CAP could damage Ireland's negotiating 
position. However, it has been clear for many years that 
the CAP, as presently constituted, can not continue 
indefinitely. The failure to plan for a reform, both 
politically and economically, may prove expensive. 
It is clear that the CAP is inefficient. Pressures are 
building up for reform. The political power of farmers 
in the EC is being eroded. It is time to consider how the 
twin objectives of reforming the CAP and safeguarding 
Ireland's long-term position can best be achieved. If 
Ireland promoted a sustainable long-term reform of the 
CAP which dealt with the obvious inefficiencies in the 
current system it might set the agenda for the subsequent 
debate. In doing this we would be more likely to achieve 
the package of reforms which was least unfavourable 
for the Irish economy. By waiting for other nations to 
set the agenda the initiative may be lost. 
The set of proposals contained in the MacSharry 
package seem to some extent to be chosen with Irish 
interests in mind. They constitute a more serious direct 
threat to French and UK farmers, in particular grain 
farmers. For Irish grain farmers most of their losses will 
be compensated for by additional subsidies. For larger 
farmers, who account for much of the grain production 
in France and the UK, the proposals will represent a very 
serious cut in their incomes. 
Even for animal products, the provisions for limited 
compensation for small producers are designed to have 
a bigger impact in Ireland than for the large factory farms 
found in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Northern 
Europe. However, the fall in input prices may heighten 
competition in this sector from intensive producers on 
the continent. The price of pork and poultry products is 
likely to fall putting further pressure on beef prices. 
It may not be a palatable package for Ireland but it 
is likely to be a less unfavourable battle ground than 
might have been designed by, for example, the Dutch 
Minister for Agriculture. 
While these proposals go some way towards meeting 
the needs of GA TT, the cuts in grain prices may still 
leave a substantial surplus within the EC with corre-
sponding pressures on export credit refunds. Thus they 
can not be seen as the ultimate CAP reform. 
There are two possible routes that long-te1m reform 
could take. The first, what one may characterise as 
fortress Europe approach, involves the use of quotas 
and other restrictions on output to keep production in 
the EC broadly in line with consumption. The alternative 
approach is to go for free trade in agricultural produce. 
While any major reform package will lie between these 
two extremes it is worth considering the polar cases. 
To some extent the EC Commission has already 
chosen to follow the fortress Europe approach with the 
introduction of quotas for a wide range of products. 
While an extension of this approach would reduce the 
pressure from outside the EC for ref mm of the CAP it 
would not eliminate it. It would also lead to additional 
distortions and inefficiencies in European agriculture. 
It would further institutionalise a regime where farmers 
may operate well below their optimal level of produc-
89 
tion and where the determinants of output are not 
economic efficiency but the rather arbitrary allocation 
of property rights constituted by the quota system. 
In the absence of changes in EC membership, the 
institutionalisation of such a quota system could pre-
serve the structure of the CAP while keeping it within 
its budget. However, it is questionable whether it could 
provide a long-term solution. The inefficiencies 
institutionalised in it would tend to grow over time and 
to attract adverse reaction from non-farmers. With 
farmers numbers and, consequently, political power, 
falling in the EC, it could give rise to increasing 
pressures for renewed reform. 
In addition, with the EC likely to grow in size over 
the next twenty years, each new member admitted would 
pose new problems for a reallocation of the property 
rights enshrined in the quotas. We have already seen 
how the unification of Germany has aggravated the 
current crisis for the CAP. There will be increasing 
pressure to accord increased access to the EC market to 
Poland and Hungary. To refuse such access could hinder 
their process of economic adjustment and hence could 
attract major politic al opposition within the EC. Finally, 
such a solution could block the development of some 
Third World countries which might otherwise prosper 
through selling their products on the EC market. 
The alternative approach, which may attract political 
support in the EC, would be to recognise the inefficiency 
of the quota system and to try and design a system where 
the CAP would move towards a multilateral freeing of 
world trade in agricultural products while providing 
substantial compensation to the farmers of the EC who 
would lose from this change. Whoever first tabled such 
a set of proposals would have the opportunity to make 
the first proposals concerning how the compensation 
package would be operated. Would it be in Ireland's 
interest to set this agenda? 
This approach would involve a major fall in the EC 
price level. If undertaken as part of the GA TT there 
would be some rise in the world market price as 
subsidies in the USA and elsewhere were also removed. 
While leaving prices at less than half their current levels, 
this would reduce the losses suffered by Irish farmers 
below what they would be at current free market prices. 
However, the losses would, without compensation, be 
very large with prices for dairy produce being, at best, 
halved. 
To determine what the final effects of such a change 
would be on Irish fa1ming requires information on how 
farmers, not only in the EC, but throughout the world, 
would respond to such changes. Much would depend on 
the relative supply response in the different parts of the 
world. Iflrish producers were to prove more competitive 
than the average, then output might rise, with conse-
quential benefits for the food processing sector. On the 
other hand, if they were priced out of the market by other 
producers, the result could be further pain for food 
processors. Work on models to answer such a question 
is only at an early stage in the OECD. 
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As Irish farmers currently receive around 40% of 
their income directly or indirectly from the CAP budget 
there is already a high level of compensation from the 
EC budget. What is not clear is how much higher this 
compensation would have to go under a free market 
regime to hold incomes unchanged. It may well be 
possible to design a scheme which would achieve such 
an objective for Irish farmers, in particular if some of 
the major benefits to European consumers of lower 
prices from the freeing of trade were captured by the EC 
budget. However, gaining acceptance for such a scheme 
could prove difficult politically within the EC. 
Any such move towards direct compensation could 
pose long-term political, and even social problems. Such 
transfers could themselves come under scrutiny in the 
face of demands from other disadvantaged groups 
within the EC and even outside it. As the right to 
transfers became divorced from agricultural production 
the determination of who should receive such transfers 
would obviously pose major political problems. In 
making the dependency of the agricultural sector on 
transfers from the EC explicit it could also prove 
damaging socially. 
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We do not feel that the current state of research 
allows us to decide what is likely to be the best economic 
approach to increasing the efficiency of the CAP while 
safeguarding Irish interests. Even if we could give a 
clear answer on economic criteria it is for others to 
decide what is likely to be the approach most likely to 
succeed in the context of EC politics and the politics of 
the GA TT. However, what is certain is that the necessary 
research should be undertaken to establish where our 
best interests lie. When that is established Ireland should 
take a more active role in promoting our preferred 
reform of the CAP. 
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MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT AL POLICY ON ACID RAIN 
by Daniel McCoy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ESRI Medium Term macro-model is more than 
just a forecasting tool. One of its main uses is to permit 
coherent macroeconomic simulations of medium term 
policy options in a variety of areas, even when these are 
far removed from direct economic management. This 
ability of the model is illustrated in the article on the 
possible consequences of CAP reform. The purpose of 
this article is to demonstrate how the model can be 
applied to options in the area of environmental policy. 
Environmental concerns have only emerged to the 
forefront of the international political agenda during the 
last five years. However there has been a persistent 
concern over the last two decades about the implications 
of economic growth for the environment. This issue 
received much economic attention in the early 1970s 
before policy makers' became distracted by the oil 
supply shocks and their consequences for the world 
economy. 
Environmental issues will become increasingly 
important during the 1990s, both domestically and 
through EC and world organisations. Water pollution, 
mainly agricultural related, is Ireland's most important 
environmental problem. The important global issues 
include the "greenhouse effect" and depletion of the 
ozone layer. The problem of acid rain is an important 
issue for North America and Europe but it is a less 
significant problem for Ireland. 
Evolution of policy towards environmental issues 
will be driven both by national self interest and by 
international obligations. The motivation for Ireland 
adopting high profile positions on environmental 
matters could stem from the sizeable trade benefits of 
enhancing our "green" image. 
Whatever policy aims are adopted, choices will need 
to be made concerning the methods of achieving them. 
The specific purpose of this article is to show how 
model-based simulation can assist in making the correct 
choices. 
The case study chosen is the reduction in sulphur 
dioxide (S02) emissions in Ireland. This is the first major 
issue where Ireland has made a specific commitment. 
The fact that, on its own, this decision provides little 
domestic environmental benefit simplifies the analysis 
and this makes it particularly suitable as a pilot study. 
More complex use of this approach can then be applied 
to other environmental issues as they arise, such as the 
much more significant problems involved with carbon 
dioxide (C02) emissions. 
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The article has the following structure, Section 2 
describes the acid rain problem. Section 3 describes 
environmental policy on S02 reductions. Section 4 
describes the methodology used to analyse the effect of 
economic activity on the level of S02 emissions and the 
impact of the policy to reduce acid rain on the Irish 
economy. Section 5 describes a number of strategies 
proposed to achieve the environmental targets. Section 
6 describes the macroeconomic and environmental 
impacts of each strategy, while Section 7 outlines the 
conclusions from the analysis. 
2. THE PROBLEM OF ACID RAIN 
The term "acid rain" describes the acidity of 
depositions of pollutants. Wet deposition is formed by 
rain, snow and fog while dry deposition is made up of 
gases and solid matter like ash and soot. The damage 
caused by acid rain includes : the speeding up of the 
disintegration of buildings and statues; soil erosion; 
acidification of lakes; forest death and it is also a threat 
to human health. Acid rain is formed by the combination 
of S02 and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions into the 
air. The emissions of S02 are a by-product of the burning 
of fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, for energy use. 
Acid rain does not respect national borders so it is a 
transnational problem. The degree of environmental 
damage caused by acid rain depends on where it is 
deposited rather than from where its acid-forming 
pollutants are sourced. Where the depositions occur is 
important because receptors have various abilities to 
absorb depositions before "critical loads" are reached. 
These loads are reached when irreversible damage is 
caused to the environment. 
The deposition of acid rain depends on the source of 
the acid-forming pollutants and on air movements 
carrying the rain. The European Monitoring and 
Evaluation Programme (EMEP) has developed a model, 
using air movements, to track pollutants from their 
origin to their deposition. This model determines the 
spatial relationship between emissions and depositions 
of pollutants in the fmm of source/receptor matrices on 
a European scale. 
Table I shows such a matrix for a selection of 
European countries' S02 emissions and depositions for 
1987. The vertical columns show where a country's 
emissions are deposited while the horizontal rows show 
where a country's deposits are sourced. The diagonal 
entries show the depositions from domestic source while 
the off-diagonal show the spillovers between countries. 
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TABLE 1: Origins of S02 Depositions in Europe in 1987 (Thousand of Tonnes) 
Receivers: BL cz GD FR HU 
Benelux BL 194 8 29 61 0 
Czechoslovakia cz 10 732 243 21 86 
East Germany GD 21 160 1378 27 4 
France FR 53 36 78 631 10 
Hungary HU 2 59 30 6 361 
Iberia 1B 2 4 10 21 4 
Ireland IR 2 0 4 4 0 
Poland PL 19 276 589 29 76 
Scandinavia SC 11 40 106 10 11 
United Kingdom UK 15 10 29 27 0 
USSR (European) SU 15 203 317 19 160 
West Gennany FG 84 89 310 131 6 
Other Europe OE 19 198 194 112 285 
Total Deposition 447 1815 3317 1099 1003 
on Europe 
National Emissions 743 2755 4750 1754 1349 
Source: Acid Magazine, September, 1989 
For instance in 1987 Ireland emitted 11,000 tonnes of 
S02 to the UK while it received 32,000 tonnes from the 
UK. The domestic contribution to national depositions 
was 40,000 tonnes from a total emission of 171,400 
tonnes. The total amount of Irish emissions that landed 
in Europe (including Ireland) was 53,000 tonnes. The 
remainder of these emissions are either unidentified or 
are deposited in the sea or in North Africa. 
The striking features of the spillovers between 
countries are that Scandinavia receives large amounts 
of depositions compared to its emissions to mainland 
Europe. The UK emits quite large amounts compared 
to the depositions that it receives from other countries. 
The largest spillovers occur mainly between the East 
European nations. This is an indication of the very poor 
environmental performances of the former centrally 
planned systems. 
The table also indicates that there are no close 
correlations nationally between emissions and deposi-
tions. There can be very low national deposition levels 
but the concentration of these depositions can vary 
within countries such that acid rain can be a serious 
problem in certain regions. 
The ratio of domestic depositions to national 
emissions is 0.23, (i.e. 40,000/17 l ,400). This means that 
for Ireland unilaterally to reduce domestic depositions 
by 1 tonne it would require a reduction in national 
emissions of about 4 tonnes. 
The ratio of total depositions within Europe to total 
European emissions is 0.52, (i.e. 2 l ,298/40,806), so to 
reduce European depositions by 1 tonne it would take 
a reduction in European emissions of about 2 tonnes. 
The average ratio for individual European countries 
domestic depositions to national emissions is 0.33 so it 
would take a reduction in domestic emissions of3 tonnes 
to reduce European depositions by 1 tonne. This implies 
that by acting collectively the cost of reducing European 
depositions could be only two thirds of the cost of 
unilateral reductions. If the objective is European 
focused the advantages of multilateral response clearly 
outweighs those of unilateral action for the environ-
ment. 
Emitters 
IB IR PL SC UK SU FG OE TOTAL 
4 0 8 0 59 0 97 0 460 
2 0 181 0 13 4 53 48 1393 
2 0 61 0 29 2 116 10 1810 
127 2 29 0 82 0 76 49 1173 
0 0 48 0 2 2 11 76 597 
1125 0 6 0 11 0 6 6 1195 
0 40 2 0 32 0 2 0 86 
2 0 1501 2 29 34 89 59 2705 
0 0 106 228 67 171 40 46 836 
4 11 6 0 1085 2 21 42 1212 
2 0 640 57 30 4188 68 167 5866 
11 0 44 0 86 2 627 36 1426 
38 0 194 0 103 74 101 1222 2539 
1317 53 2826 287 1628 4479 1307 1721 21298 
3224 171 4313 623 3496 9690 1942 5996 40806 
3. POLICY ON S02 REDUCTIONS 
Any approach to the problem of acid rain should take 
account of its spatial impacts so that reductions in 
emissions could be focused on sources which contribute 
most to deposition on identified sensitive areas. These 
emissions are linked to economic growth through the 
energy factor of production. The production and use of 
energy has important environmental consequences for 
air pollution. The burning of fossil fuels emits high 
levels of S02 but also emits C02, which adds to the 
"greenhouse effect". There is international consensus 
that these activities need to be altered to help reduce the 
resulting environmental problems. 
The international response to the acid rain problem 
is fmmulated under the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on 
reduction in sulphur emissions. This protocol is an 
agreement among a group of thirteen OECD countries, 
plus a number of Eastern block countries, to reduce S02 
emissions by 30% of their 1980 national levels by 1993. 
This agreement is weakened by the failure of some of 
the largest emitters of S02 to accede to the protocol. 
These abstainers include the UK, Spain, Poland and the 
USA. 
Environmental policy in Ireland is formulated under 
the authority of the Department of the Environment 
(DoE). On taking up the Presidency of the European 
Community at the beginning of 1990 the Irish govern-
ment singled out the environment to be the theme of its 
tenure. An environmental policy document was 
published to outline the proposed actions that the 
government intended to pursue (An Environment Action 
Programme (EAP)). 
The EAP states that Ireland's policy on acid rain will 
be in line with the Helsinki Protocol. The target for 
national emissions of S02 is 157,000 tonnes in 1993. 
The EAP indicates that the reductions in S02 emissions 
are to be achieved by use of regulation rather than by 
use of price instruments. Emphasis is placed on the 
power generation and industrial sectors to achieve the 
national Helsinki targets. 
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The emphasis on the power generation sector is 
common internationally because it is usually the largest 
source of S02 emissions in a country. The power 
generation sector accounts for over 50% of the Irish 
national emissions of S02 and 80% of this sector's 
emissions come from just two sources. It therefore tends 
to be more cost effective to abate S02 emissions at large 
power stations compared with the smaller dispersed 
sources in the domestic sector. 
The emphasis on reducing S02 emissions from 
power plants is also consistent with EC policy. The 1988 
EC Large Combustion Plant (LCP) directive seeks 
reductions of between 40% to 60% on 1980 S02 levels 
by 1993 for most member countries. The directive 
applies to plants of 50 MW capacity or more, so in 
Ireland it only applies to the Electricity Supply Board 
(ESB). Ireland has received a ceiling limit of 124,000 
tonnes of S02 under the directive for such plant. This is 
well above the 1980 level of 99 ,OOO tonnes from the 
power generation sector. The reason for this generous 
ceiling is that allowance was made for the large 
Moneypoint power plant which was not built until after 
1980. 
The target emission level agreed by the ESB with 
the DoE to fulfil its contribution towards the Helsinki 
requirement has been set at 75,000 tonnes by 1993. This 
is much more stringent than its LCP commitment. These 
target S02 emission levels for 1993 are : 
Helsinki Target 
National 
Power Generation 
157,000 tonnes 
75,000 tonnes 
Large Combustion Plant Target 
Power Generation 124,000 tonnes 
The EAP does not clearly specify whether the focus 
of Irish environmental policy on air pollution is on the 
domestic environment or on the global environment. 
Ireland's accession to the Helsinki Protocol, although 
not explicitly stated, must have been motivated from a 
concern about the problem of acid rain in Europe. In this 
article we assume that it is this wider European objective 
that underlies government policy on reducing S02 
emissions. 
Whatever is the underlying motivation for an envi-
ronmental policy, its objectives should be that it is both 
effective in protecting the environment and that its 
implementation is efficient for the economy. These are 
the criteria which we use to evaluate Ireland's envi-
ronmental policy towards acid rain. Effectiveness 
requires that the policy will actually reduce the problem 
of acid rain in Europe. Efficiency requires that the 
implementation of the policy is at the "least cost" to the 
economy for given environmental benefit. The cost to 
the economy is measured in terms of lost economic 
welfare. 
The requirements of the Helsinki Protocol, which 
forms Ireland's policy, is not the most effective way to 
reduce the problem of transfrontier acid rain. The focus 
of the protocol is on S02 emissions, whereas to be more 
effective it should be on depositions. The equal per-
centage reductions on national emissions across 
countries, as used in the protocol, is a less effective 
solution than a "Critical Load" approach. This type of 
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approach involves reducing emissions from sources that 
deposit most on identified sensitive receptors to 
minimise damage. 
The Helsinki Protocol is due for revision in 1993 so 
emission targets may be altered to address these defects. 
However for the purpose of this analysis we assume that 
the requirements of the protocol will remain unaltered 
for the coming decade. 
The measure of responsibility for the damage caused 
by acid rain that we use is the ratio of a country's 
European depositions to national emissions. In Ireland 
this ratio is 0.31 compared with 0.58 for a block of 
Eastern European countries taken together, that we have 
chosen for illustrative purposes in Table 2. This Eastern 
European ratio is approximately twice the Irish ratio. 
TABLE 2: Ratio Of European S02 Depositions To 
Country 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
USSR (Eur) 
Yugoslavia 
Eastern Europe 
Ireland 
National S02 Emissions (Thousand of Tonnes) 
European National 
Depositions Emissions 
460 1083 
1815 2755 
3317 4750 
1003 1349 
2826 4313 
103 190 
4479 9690 
675 1117 
14678 25247 
53 171 
Source : Acid Magazine, September, 1989 
Ratio 
0.42 
0.66 
0.70 
0.74 
0.65 
0.54 
0.46 
0.60 
0.58 
0.31 
This implies that to achieve the same impact on the 
European environment only half of the required 
reduction in Irish S02 emissions would be required in 
Eastern Europe. This raises the issue of whether it would 
be more cost effective for countries to fully co-operate 
on a European-wide basis towards reducing the problem 
of acid rain. This co-operation could entail countries 
giving funds to others to achieve reductions in European 
depositions at much less cost than a dependence on 
separate national actions, as under the Helsinki Protocol. 
This article examines a number of the proposed 
strategies to achieve the Helsinki target of reductions in 
national emissions of S02• These strategies are focused 
on the power generation sector. These include : 
1. The installation of desulphurisation equipment in 
the ESB 's coal fired generating stations. 
2. The use of low sulphur coal to replace existing 
coal stocks for generating electricity. 
3. The combined use of natural gas and low sulphur 
coal to generate electricity. 
We include a fourth strategy to achieve a reduction 
in the problem of acid rain in Europe. This involves : 
4. A direct transfer of funds from Ireland to Eastern 
Europe to install desulphurisation equipment. 
This fourth strategy is not proposed to meet the 
national Helsinki targets but is included as an alternative 
strategy to reduce the problem of acid rain in Europe at 
the "least cost" to the economy. This strategy is only 
relevant if the objective of Irish policy is European 
focused rather than on the domestic environment. The 
transfers would replace, rather than being in addition to, 
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national abatement strategies. The countries in Eastern 
Europe, see Table 2, are chosen as the target for 
abatement funds because they are major contributors to 
the acid rain problem in Europe, they contribute about 
70% to European S02 depositions. Also some of these 
countries would be unlikely to have the sufficient 
national wealth to afford the necessary abatement 
without requiring aid from other countries. If the con-
cern is for the domestic environment then these transfers 
to Eastern Europe would not be a relevant option given 
their small spillovers of emissions with Ireland. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the methodology used to 
develop the link between economic activity in the Irish 
economy and the national emissions of S02• It considers 
how the costs of the proposed strategies to reduce S02 
emissions can be measured. 
The link between economic activity and acid rain is 
established through the use of energy in the economy. 
Energy is a factor input in the production process of 
most economic activities and the use of energy is 
directly linked to growth in the level of activity in the 
economy. Sulphur dioxide (S02) is a by-product from 
burning fossil fuels for energy use. The quantity of S02 
emitted for a given amount of energy depends on the 
mix of fuels used. The fuel mix depends on fuel 
availability, technology and relative fuel prices so in 
determining the fuel mix we have made assumptions 
about each of these factors. 
First, we established the levels of S02 emissions 
from the different sectors of the Irish economy. The S02 
emission levels were obtained from the Environmental 
Research Unit for 1987, which was the latest complete 
year, and for 1980, the base yearforemissionreductions. 
These are presented by sector in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: Irish S02 Emissions (Tonnes per Year) 
Sector 1980 1987 
Domestic 34700 28620 
Industrial 80900 40240 
Transport 5400 7345 
Power Generation 101500 95195 
Total 222500 171400 
Source : Environmental Research Unit 
TABLE 4: Energy Use in Ireland, 
Excluding Electricity 
(Millions of Tonnes of Oil Equivalent per Year) 
Sector 1980 1987 
Domestic 2.071 2.324 
Industrial 1.682 1.661 
Transport 1.761 1.781 
Power Generation 2.677 2.926 
Total 8.191 8.692 
Source : Energy Balances, Department of Energy 
The data on the energy used by each sector for these 
years is presented in Table 4. A striking feature from 
these tables is the dramatic reduction in the S02 
emissions from the industrial sector for a similar use of 
energy. This reduction has mainly occurred as a result 
of the change in the fuel mix in this sector towards the 
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use of natural gas and away from high sulphur oil use. 
The opportunity to achieve greater reductions in 
emissions from this sector is limited. 
From these data sources the S02 emission factors for 
energy use in each sector were derived using the 1987 
levels. The growth in energy use in each sector depends 
mainly on the growth in economic activity in the sector 
and on the growth in energy prices. The sectoral growth 
rates are determined from our central forecasts given in 
chapter 4 of this Review. The link then is as follows 
Economic Growth 
=> Sectoral Growth 
=> Energy Use Growth 
=> S02 Emission Growth 
The forecast for emission growth assumes that the 
relationship between sector output and energy use 
remains unchanged over the period. It also assumes that 
the fuel mix remains unchanged in the sectors other than 
power generation. The emissions from each fuel type 
are assumed to stay unchanged so that the emission 
factors for these sectors are the same as in the 1980s. 
These relationships will probably change over the 
coming decade due to factors such as energy efficient 
technical progress. However, any change in these fac-
tors, while affecting the benchmark, will not signifi-
cantly affect our quantification of the impacts of the 
strategies. .~ 
Since the required S02 reductions in Ireland have 
been explicitly focused on the electricity industry we 
developed the link between economic activity and the 
demand for electricity. The link between the fuel mix 
used to generate the electricity and the subsequent 
emissions of S02 was also established. The demand for 
electricity depends mainly on economic activity and on 
electricity prices. Using our forecasts for the economy 
we projected the demand for electricity over the period 
1991 - 2000. 
From this growth in electricity demand we derived 
the quantities of fuels required for generation, assuming 
that the fuel mix and operating efficiencies remained 
unchanged over the period. The S02 emission factors 
for these fuels were used to derive the emissions of S02 
from the sector for the period. 
The impact of the proposed strategies to reduce S02 
emissions nationally could then be implemented in this 
sector by altering the fuel mix and/or changing the 
emission factors to represent different sulphur content 
fuels. 
The next stage in our methodology was to gather 
information on the costs of the proposed strategies to 
reduce the emissions of S02. The costs of the strategies 
involve many uncertainties which could significantly 
alter the results of the analysis. These include issues 
about the availability of certain fuels and the expected 
price differentials between fuel types over the period. 
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To make comparisons easier we assume that the 
strategies can all begin in 1993. The cost of the three 
national strategies, which aim to comply with the 
Helsinki Protocol, are imposed on the ESB. These 
abatement costs will not generate any additional revenue 
for the ESB so electricity prices need to increase to 
recoup the additional costs. These additional expendi-
tures impact on economic activity through various 
mechanisms such as increases in energy prices, 
increases in imports, changes in private sector 
expenditure and changes in the exchequer's financing 
needs. As economic activity adjusts so too will the 
demand for energy and the S02 emissions in the econ-
omy. 
To quantify the impact of the direct transfer of funds 
from Ireland to Eastern Europe, information was needed 
on the relative cost of installing desulphurisation in both 
areas. The amount transferred would need to cover the 
cost of achieving the same impact on annual European 
S02 depositions in Eastern Europe as would the use 
desulphurisation equipment in Ireland. The cost of the 
transfer is assumed to be met by taxes on energy use in 
Ireland. 
This strategy would have implications for the 
exchequer borrowing requirement. If taxes are raised 
which only pay for the direct cost of the transfer then 
the exchequer borrowing requirement will increase. 
This occurs because the dampened economic activity, 
due to the energy taxes, will reduce other tax revenues 
and increase welfare expenditures. We have included a 
scenario on this strategy where taxes are raised to cover 
the direct cost of the transfer to Eastern Europe as well 
as keeping a neutral position for the exchequer finances. 
Comparison is made between the strategies to 
determine the "least cost" solution to achieving the 
objective of reducing European S02 depositions. There 
are two types of costs used in the analysis, the direct 
costs of each strategy to reduce emissions and the 
indirect costs to the economy from higher energy prices. 
These indirect costs are captured, using the ESRI 
medium-term model, by examining the macroeconomic 
effects of each strategy. 
Gross National Product (GNP), albeit inadequate for 
environmental issues, is used as a measure of the costs 
in terms of economic welfare. The cost of each strategy 
on the economy is assessed by discounting future 
reductions in GNP by a social discount rate. This 
discount rate is assumed to be 5%, which is the fore-
casted expected real interest rate over the period. The 
cost in terms of GNP is taken overthe period 1993-2002, 
because ten years is the expected lifespan of the 
desulphurisation investment. 
The costs are compared in terms of European S02 
deposition avoided. The direct costs are expressed in 
current values while the indirect costs are in constant 
1985 prices. 
Ireland's decision to accede to the Helsinki Protocol 
should be considered to be an unilateral action, in terms 
of its economic impact. This is because the UK, our main 
trading partner, has declined to accede to the protocol. 
However the mandatory LCP directive is even more 
stringent on other EC countries, including UK, so the 
competitiveness losses for Ireland will be similar to 
those from a multilateral action. 
95 
We examine the impacts for the economy of the 
benefits of taking multilateral action, along with our 
main trading partners, in comparison with taking uni-
lateral action for each of the three domestic strategies. 
There are competitiveness losses from unilateral action, 
as domestic production costs rise relative to our trading 
partners. 
The distinction between these scenarios is generated 
by removing the loss in competitiveness for the econ-
omy by keeping cost of production in line with that of 
our main trading partners in the multilateral case. 
The impact of keeping the effect on the exchequer's 
borrowing requirement neutral is examined using the 
direct transfer to Eastern Europe strategy. 
5. STRATEGIES FOR S02 REDUCTION 
This section presents the direct costs of three pro-
posed domestic strategies to meet the Helsinki target for 
Ireland. The necessary direct cost of the transfer to 
Eastern Europe is also evaluated. The costs used are not 
definitive but are the best estimates available for our 
analysis. Present price differentials are assumed to hold 
over the decade. However in the multilateral case these 
might not hold if other countries use similar strategies 
because price premiums may appear on low sulphur 
fuels. 
5.1 Desulphurisation Equipment 
This strategy involves the ESB installing desul-
phurisation equipment or "scrubbers" at three coal fired 
units at Moneypoint. The technical process used is flue 
gas desulphurisation which it is estimated can remove 
between 70%-90% of the sulphur content but it reduces 
the efficiency of the plant by I or 2%. The cost of the 
equipment is estimated to be £ 150m plus an additional 
once-off £30m in extra fuel costs during installation. 
The extra operating cost is expected to be £15m each 
year with the expected economic life of the equipment 
being 10 years. 
It is assumed that the entire set up and installation 
costs of£ 180m is borrowed abroad by the ESB at a 10% 
rate of interest, so that domestic interest rates are 
unaffected by the installation. The repayments are 
assumed to be made in equal amounts over 10 years. 
This strategy costs the ESB approximately £44m p.a 
without generating any additional revenue. In order to 
raise the revenue to finance the investment, electricity 
prices would need to increase by about 4% p.a. above 
the central forecast. In the year of installation about 75% 
of the increase in investment is on machinery and 
equipment, which is mainly imported. The remainder 
of the investment is in the building and construction 
sector. 
5.2 Use of Low Sulphur Coal 
This strategy involves the ESB using only coal with 
a sulphur content of 1 %. This requires no additional 
capital investment. It involves a direct substitution for 
existing coal stocks with premium priced low sulphur 
coals. The sulphur content of existing stocks vary, with 
some use of low sulphur coal already taking place. We 
assume that there is a combination of 1 % and 2% sulphur 
coals used with a price premium of $10 per tonne on the 
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1 % sulphur coal which is assumed to remain constant 
over the period. This is a tentative assumption about the 
price differential which could change significantly over 
the period depending on changes in market conditions. 
The impact of changing entirely to 1 % sulphur coal 
is to increase the ESB 's fuel costs between £9-1 lm p.a., 
which also increases the country's import bill. In order 
to raise revenue to meet this additional cost electricity 
prices would need to increase by about 1 % p.a. above 
the central forecast. 
5.3 Combining Natural Gas and Low Sulphur Coal 
This strategy involves the ESB making greater use 
of their existing natural gas generating capacity. The use 
of natural gas is then supplemented with sufficient use 
of low sulphur coal to meet the Helsinki target level of 
75,000 tonnes of S02 emissions. The use of natural gas 
alone would not be adequate to achieve this target 
without additional investment in a number of gas 
powered generating stations. 
An important issue that influences the feasibility of 
this strategy is the availability of natural gas in adequate 
quantities for electricity generation. The ESB currently 
receives its supply of natural gas from Bord Gais 
Eireann (BGE) which sources its gas domestically at the 
Kinsale and Ballycotton gasfields. However these will 
be depleted at the end of the decade. There are plans, 
currently at an advanced stage, to construct an under-
water gas interconnector with the UK to gain access to 
supplies of North Sea gas. This interconnector is 
expected to be operational by the end of 1994. 
For consistency we assume that a reliable supply of 
natural gas will be available from 1993 onwards. The 
price at which the gas is imported over the period is very 
difficult to forecast but we have assumed that it will 
increase in line with petroleum products with a once off 
jump of35% in 1993 to reflect higher UK prices. Natural 
gas emits no S02 in energy use so price premiums may 
emerge over the period reflecting increased demand due 
to its environmental advantages. However some com-
mentators suggest that gas supply will increase sub-
stantially at the encl of the decade from sources such as 
Norway so that prices may not rise substantially in the 
long term. 
The cost of the pipeline is anticipated to be about 
£240111 which we have assumed to be financed by BGE 
with 33% part funding by the EC under the REGEN 
Programme. The operating costs are anticipated to be 
between 1-2% p.a, with investment repayments taking 
place over 30 years. We assumed that domestic reserves 
will be adequate to cover the users in other sectors for 
the period so that the ESB initially becomes the marginal 
user of the gas from the interconnector. The annual costs 
of the pipeline we estimate to be about £16m. These 
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costs are recouped by an increase in the imported price 
of natural gas to the ESB of approximately 3p a therm. 
The gas is substituted for oil, the ESB' s marginal fuel, 
giving rise to an additional increase in fuel costs of about 
£2.5m p.a. over the latter years of the decade. 
Increasing quantities of low sulphur coal are used 
along with the natural gas to keep close to the Helsinki 
target over the period. The annual cost of this low 
sulphur coal increases from £Imp.a initially to £1 lm 
p.a. by the end of the decade. The combined fuel cost 
for the ESB rises to about £14m p.a by the end of the 
period which requires a rise of over 1 % p.a on electricity 
prices above the central forecast. 
5.4 Transfer to Eastern Europe 
This strategy involves a direct transfer of funds from 
Ireland to Eastern Europe to install flue gas desul-
phurisation at their coal fired power plants. Estimates 
of the cost of installing desulphurisation vary 
considerably. Using a valuation from one source for 
East Germany, the cost per tonne of S02 removed is 
estimated to be £225 p.a (D.Newbury, Acid Rain, 
Economic Policy, 11, October 1990). The use of 
desulphurisation in Ireland leads to reductions in S02 
emissions of 54,000 tonnes p.a. on average from the 
benchmark over the period 1993 - 2000. This leads to a 
reduction in European S02 depositions of about 17 ,OOO 
tonnes p.a., (i.e. 54,000 * 0.31). To achieve the same 
impact on acid rain in Europe, emissions in Eastern 
Europe would need to be reduced by about 29,000 
tonnes p.a., (i.e. 17•00°fo.58). The cost of the transfer to 
achieve this impact would be about £6.5m p.a which 
could be raised by taxes on energy. This compares with 
the direct cost of £44m p.a for the same environmental 
impact of the ESB using desulphurisation equipment. 
The cost of a direct transfer each year of £6.5m to 
finance abatement investment in Eastern Europe would 
also seem to require less in direct costs than the other 
proposed strategies. The direct cost of low sulphur coal 
use is about£ 1 Om p.a and the combined use of natural 
gas and low sulphur coal is about £12m p.a., see Table 
5. These costs are the direct costs of the abatement 
investment. However the macroeconomic and envi-
ronmental implications of the strategies differ and these 
are considered in the next section. 
TABLE 5: Direct Costs of S02 Reduction 
Strategies 
Strategy Direct Cost 
imp.a. 
Desulphurisation 44 
Low Sulphur Coal 10 
Combined Gas & Coal 12 
Transfer 6.5 
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TABLE 6: Benchmark S02 Emissions For Ireland 1987 - 2000 
(Thousand Of Tonnes per Year) 
Sector 1987 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Domestic 28.6 29.1 30.2 30.4 30.7 31.l 31.4 31.8 32.2 32.6 
Industrial 40.2 47.9 52.2 53.4 54.4 55.2 55.8 56.1 56.5 56.7 
Transport 7.3 7.7 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.5 
Power Generation 95.0 100.0 105.5 109.3 114.3 119.0 124.4 130.1 136.1 142.3 
National 171.2 184.7 195.9 201.2 207.7 213.4 219.9 226.4 233 .2 240.0 
TABLE 7: National S02 Emissions 
from the Desulphurisation Strategy 
(Thousand Of Tonnes per Year) 
Sector 1987 1990 
Domestic 28.6 29.1 
Industrial 40.2 47.9 
Transport 7.3 7.7 
Power Generation 95.0 100.0 
National 171.2 184.7 
6. IMPACTS OF THE S02 REDUCTION 
STRATEGIES 
1993 
29.9 
51.6 
7.9 
58.5 
147.9 
This section examines the impact of the S02 
reduction strategies on the macroeconomic perform-
ance of the Irish economy and on the national emissions 
of S02• The macroeconomic impacts are examined in 
terms of the differences from the central forecast. The 
impacts on the environment are considered in terms of 
attaining the agreed Helsinki target S02 emission level 
for the power generation sector of 75,000 tonnes and 
the overall Helsinki target for the country of 157 ,OOO 
tonnes by 1993. The ESB also needs to remain within 
the Large Combustion Plant directive ceiling of 124,000 
tonnes in 1993. 
The pattern of economic growth in the central 
forecast would increase the national emissions of S02 
by 40% of the 1987 levels by the year 2000, see Table 
6. This table shows the impact of economic growth on 
national S02 emissions if there was no environmental 
policy decision to reduce S02 emissions. 
National emissions in 1993 would overshoot the 
target by 25% and the power generation sector would 
overshoot its agreed target of 75,000 tonnes by 41 % if 
no preventive action were taken. The power generation 
sector would be comfortably within the mandatory 
target of the EC Large Combustion Plant directive of 
124,000 tonnes by 1993 but by the end of the decade 
this target would have been missed by 15%. The demand 
for energy in the economy grows on average at about 
2 % p.a. over the decade while the demand for electricity 
grows at about 3.5% p.a up to 1997 and by 4.5% p.a. 
thereafter. 
6.1 Desulphurisation Equipment 
The use of the desulphurisation equipment by the 
ESB is assumed to have a removal efficiency of 70% 
and to reduce operating efficiency by 2%. It would bring 
the power generation sector's 1993 emission level to 
58,500 tonnes well below the Helsinki target of75,000 
tonnes, see Table 8. It would also reduce the national 
emissions down to 147,900 tonnes, this would be below 
the Helsinki target of 157 ,OOO tonnes. This national 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
30.2 30.6 30.9 31.2 31.6 32.0 32.4 
53.0 54.0 54.8 55.4 55.7 56.0 56.2 
8.0 8.l 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 
60.8 64.l 66.8 70.0 73.5 77.0 80.8 
152.0 156.7 160.6 164.8 169.0 173.3 177.7 
emission threshold would be broken by 1996 but by the 
end of the decade the national emissions would still be 
20% lower than the 1980 levels. The S02 emission 
reduction, compared to the benchmark emissions, 
would on average be about 54,000 tonnes p.a. This level 
of emission reduction would give rise to an annual 
reduction of about 17 ,OOO tonnes of S02 deposition in 
Europe with a direct cost to the ESB of £2590 p.a. per 
tonne of deposition avoided. 
TABLE 8: Macroeconomic Impact 
of the Desulphurisation Strategy 
Unilateral Versus Multilateral Action 
Unilateral Action Difference from the Central 
Forecast 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
£m £m £m £m 
Balance Of Payments -145 10.5 29.5 31 
Exchequer Borrow- 15 -1.3 -3 6 
ing Requirement 
Gross National Prod- 49 -7 -16 -13 
uct 
Net Present Value Of -37.3 
GNP 1993-2002 
Multilateral Action Difference from the Central 
Forecast 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
£m £m £m £m 
Balance Of Payments -143 8.8 27.3 33 .3 
Exchequer Borrow- 16.7 0.8 -0.2 8.5 
ing Requirement 
Gross National Prod- 53 -2.5 -10.4 -8.6 
uct 
Net Present Value Of - l.6 
GNP 1993-2002 
The transm1ss1on effects through the economy 
would be similar in both the unilateral and multilateral 
cases, however the beneficial impacts for the economy 
would be larger in the multilateral case, see Table 8. In 
the unilateral case impact of the ESB investing in 
desulphurisation equipment at Moneypoint commenc-
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ing in 1993 would give an initial once-off boost to 
investment demand. The output of the building and 
construction sector would rise which would give a 
temporary increase in employment in 1993. The prices 
and wages in the economy would be increased initially. 
The balance of payments would disimprove initially by 
about £I45m reflecting the impact of the high import 
content of the investment along with the once-off 
imports of additional fuel of about£30m. The exchequer 
borrowing requirement would improve initially due to 
higher tax receipts from increased activity. 
The result of the entire investment taking place in 
1993 would be to increase GNP by about £49m com-
pared to the central forecast. The positive stimulus to 
the economy would be temporary as the annual increase 
in electricity prices would push up prices and wages, 
dampening economic activity throughout the remainder 
of the period. GNP would fall by about £I2m p.a on 
average over the period. The balance of payments would 
recover as the demand for imports would be reduced 
substantially, due to the slowdown in economic activity. 
The effect of higher domestic prices and wages as 
a result of the strategy would increase the cost of 
domestic output relative to foreign output leading to a 
loss in Irish competitiveness. This loss in competitive-
ness would be as a direct result of acting unilaterally. 
In the multilateral case the initial stimulus in 
economic activity would be greater in 1993 with 
investment increased by £132m, the exchequer bor-
rowing requirement would be improved by £17m, the 
balance of payments would be down by £I 44m and GNP 
would be increased initially by £53m. Prices and wages 
would increase over the period but economic activity 
would slow down. The balance of payments would 
recover much faster than in the unilateral case, imports 
would be reduced but exports would not be as heavily 
affected due to a loss in competitiveness so the trade 
balance would recover much quicker. The annual loss 
in economic activity would also be reduced due to the 
avoidance of the competitiveness loss, with GNP 
declining by about £10m p.a. on average. 
To determine the net position in terms of economic 
welfare we used the orthodox measure of GNP, dis-
counting its future reductions, using a 5% social dis-
count rate, against its initial increase. This would put a 
net present value on the loss in economic growth of 
installing desulphurisation equipment over the ten year 
period 1993 - 2002 in the unilateral case at £37.3m. 
Combining the larger initial boost to GNP and dis-
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counting the smaller annual losses, the net present value 
of the loss in GNP would be £1.6m in the multilateral 
case. The benefits in terms of sustainable economic 
growth are clearly enhanced by taking international 
environmental action multilaterally rather than unilat-
erally. 
6.2 Use of Low Sulphur Coal 
The use by the ESB of coal with a I% sulphur content 
is much less effective than use of the other strategies in 
achieving improvements in S02 reductions. The strat-
egy would be successful in keeping the ESB quite 
comfortably within the Large Combustion Plant ceiling 
tlu·oughout the period but it would not reach the ESB' s 
Helsinki target for 1993, see Table 9. The national 
Helsinki emission target would not met, There would 
be an 8% overshoot in 1993 and a 30% overshoot by 
2000. The reduction in S02 emission compared with the 
benchmark emissions would be about 30,000 tonnes p.a. 
on average. This level of emissions would give rise to 
a reduction of about 9,000 tonnes of S02 deposition in 
Europe each year with a direct cost to the ESB of £1110 
p.a. per tonne of deposition avoided. 
The impact of the ESB using low sulphur coal to 
achieve S02 emission reductions involves no capital 
investment but increases the cost of electricity gener-
ation. The additional costs are recouped through higher 
prices each year. However the magnitudes are small 
such that the impact on the economy is quite insignifi-
cant. Using the more expensive low sulphur coal would 
increase the price of fuel imports and reduce the level 
of activity in the economy. 
The rising domestic price level, albeit quite small, 
along with rising wage levels, would erode the country's 
competitiveness with output costs increasing such that 
the balance of payments would disimprove over the 
period. The reduction in GNP would rise each year to 
about £4m p.a by the end of the period. The level of 
consumption and investment from the private sector also 
would diminish throughout the period. The exchequer 
borrowing requirement would be marginally higher by 
about £5m p.a, due to diminished tax receipts brought 
about by the drop in economic activity. 
The net present value of the loss in GNP for the 
economy from using low sulphur coal over the ten years 
acting unilaterally would be about £ 18.5m compared 
with £5.5m from a multilateral action. 
TABLE 9: National S02 Emissions from the Low Sulphur Coal Strategy 
(Thousand Of Tonnes per Year) 
Sector 1987 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Domestic 28.6 29.1 30.1 30.4 30.7 31.0 31.4 31.7 32.1 32.5 
Industrial 40.2 47.9 52.1 53.3 54.3 55.1 55.7 56.0 56.4 56.5 
Transport 7.3 7.7 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5 
Power Generation 95.0 100.0 79.2 82.1 86.2 89.8 94.0 98.4 103.0 107.8 
National 171.2 184.7 169.5 173.9 179.3 184.0 189.3 194.5 199.9 205.3 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ACID RAIN 99 
TABLE 10: National S02 Emissions from Combined Gas and Coal Strategy 
(Thousand Of Tonnes per Year) 
Sector 1987 1990 1993 
Domestic 28.6 29.1 30.1 
Industrial 40.2 47.9 52.1 
Transport 7.3 7.7 8.1 
Power Generation 95.0 100.0 75.4 
National 171.2 184.7 165.7 
6.3 Combined Natural Gas and Low Sulphur Coal 
This strategy involves the ESB using as much natural 
gas as it can using existing generation capacity, along 
with sufficient 1 % sulphur content coal to keep the ESB 
close to its Helsinki target of75,000 over the period. By 
1997 all the coal use has been switched to 1 % sulphur 
content so that the emissions in the power generation 
sector would begin to rise from around 75,000 tonnes 
in 1993 to about 80,000 tonnes by the end of the decade. 
However the national Helsinki target, in Table 10, 
would not met by this strategy either with emissions in 
1993 at 165,000 tonnes increasing to 177,400 by the end 
of the decade. 
The reduction in S02 emissions compared with the 
benchmark emissions from this strategy would be about 
45,000 tonnes p.a. on average. This would give rise to 
a reduction of about 14,000 tonnes of European S02 
deposition.each year. The direct cost to the ESB is £860 
p.a. per tonne of deposition avoided. On the basis of the 
tentative assumptions used in this analysis this strategy 
is the "least cost" solution for the ESB meeting the 
Helsinki target. 
This strategy involves no capital investment so there 
is no temporary stimulus for the economy as under the 
desulphurisation strategy. The increased fuel costs have 
similar impacts on the economy as in the use of low 
sulphur coal strategy. Competitiveness would be eroded 
by higher output costs due to rising prices and wages. 
The exchequer borrowing requirement would increase 
by about£4.5m p.a by the end of the decade. The balance 
of payments would disimprove over the period and the 
loss in GNP would be about £4.Sm p.a. by the end of 
the decade. 
The net present value of the loss in GNP from the 
combined use of natural gas and low sulphur coal for 
electricity generation over ten years would be £ 19 .6m 
by acting unilaterally compared to £5.4m in the multi-
lateral case. 
6.4 Tran sf er to Eastern Europe 
This strategy assumes that there is international 
co-operation to deal with the acid rain problem. 
Abatement investment takes place at sources which 
have the greatest impact on reducing European S02 
depositions. In this case Ireland makes a direct transfer 
of about £6.Sm p.a to Eastern Europe. The government 
is assumed to raise taxes on energy by just enough to 
pay for the transfer. This strategy would lead to a steady 
deterioration in the balance of payments and the 
exchequer borrowing requirement would increase over 
the period, see Table 11. This strategy is directly 
comparable with the previous strategies analysed 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
30.4 30.7 31.0 31.4 31.7 32.1 32.5 
53.3 54.3 55.1 55.7 56.0 56.3 56.5 
8.1 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5 
74.0 76.6 76.7 77.5 78.3 79.1 80.0 
165.7 169.7 171.0 172.8 174.4 176.0 177.4 
because these have similar implications for the 
exchequer borrowing requirement and the balance of 
payments. 
TABLE 11: Macroeconomic Impact 
of Direct Transfer of Funds to Eastern Europe 
Direct Transfer Difference from the Central 
Forecast 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
£m £m £m £m 
Balance Of Pay- -3.8 -2.8 -2.1 -2.5 
ments 
Exchequer Borrow- -1.5 -3.7 -4 -4.7 
ing Requirement 
Gross National -2.4 -3.6 -4.5 -5.2 
Product 
Net Present Value -32.5 
Of GNP 1993-2002 
Direct Transfer Difference from the Central 
Exchequer Neutral Forecast 
Position 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
£m £m £m £m 
Balance Of Pay- -2.1 -0.02 1.6 2.5 
ments 
Exchequer Borrow- 1.3 -1.3 0 0 
ing Requirement 
Gross National -3.5 -4.8 -6 -6.3 
Product 
Net Present Value -42.0 
Of GNP 1993-2002 
The tax increase to fund this transfer each year would 
dampen economic activity. Both personal consumption 
and investment would decline over the period. The 
exchequer borrowing requirement would increase by 
about £4m p.a. The balance of payments would disim-
prove by about £3m p.a. The reduction in economic 
activity, reflected by the decline in GNP, would be about 
£5.Sm p.a. by the end of the decade. 
The net present value of the loss in GNP for the 
economy from this annual transfer to Eastern Europe 
over the ten years would be £32.Sm. This loss in GNP 
from transferring funds to Eastern Europe is lower than 
the loss of £37.3m in the domestic desulphurisation 
strategy for the same impact on European depositions. 
To keep the effect of this strategy neutral for the 
exchequer b01Towing requirement the government 
would need to raises a larger amount of taxation. The 
tax rate used to raise the funds for the transfer would 
need to be about 50% higher to achieve this neutral 
effect. This policy would be more deflationary for 
economic activity, see Table 11, due to the higher taxes. 
There would also have a neutral impact for the balance 
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of payments. The net present value of the loss in GNP 
over the ten years would be £42111. This is higher than 
the £32.Sm when there is no neutralising of the 
exchequer position. 
This strategy reduces emissions in Eastern Europe 
by about 29 ,OOO tonnes to achieve reduce European S02 
depositions by 17,000. 
6.5 Comparison of Strategies 
All of the proposed strategies to implement the 
policy to reduce acid rain would have direct effects on 
the balance of payments and the exchequer borrowing 
requirement. It is important to emphasis that these 
impacts cannot be endured by the economy over a longer 
period. Environmental policy must have a neutral effect 
for the exchequer's finances so it can be sustainable in 
the long term. All environmental policy must be 
self-financing from the exchequer's viewpoint. On the 
grounds of equity it should be financed by those whose 
activities cause the pollution, the "polluter pays prin-
ciple". The government should raise sufficient taxes on 
these activities to meet the direct costs of the strategy 
as well as ensuring that there is no deterioration in the 
balance of payments or in the exchequer borrowing 
requirement. 
The objective of the policy to reduce national S02 
emissions has been taken to be the reduction of acid rain 
in Europe. Comparison is made between the strategies 
in terms of the direct cost per tonne of European S02 
deposition avoided. The direct costs of each strategy are 
given in Table 12 below 
TABLE 12: Direct Cost Per Tonne of European 
S02 Depositions 
Strategy Reduction Reduction Direct Cost 
/11 Irish in European Per Tonne 
Emissions Deposition Of Euro-
Per A111111111 Per Annum pean 
('OOOs ('OOOs Deposition 
Tonnes) Tonnes) (£) 
Dcsulphurisation 54 17 2590 
Low Sulphur Coal 30 9 1110 
Combined Gas 45 14 860 
And Coal 
Transfer 0 17 390 
This shows that in terms of direct cost that the 
combined use of natural gas and low sulphur coal would 
be the "least cost" strategy for the Irish economy to meet 
the Helsinki targets. However the strategy of trans-
ferring funds to Eastern Europe would cut the direct cost 
per tonne of European S02 deposited by over half 
compared to this combined strategy. The direct cost per 
tonne of S02 deposition removed are substantially lower 
in Eastern Europe compared with the three strategies 
based on reducing Irish emissions of S02• 
The transfer made to Eastern Europe is intended to 
achieve the same impact on European depositions as 
would the use of desulphurisation in Ireland. The value 
of the transfer needed to achieve the same impact on 
European depositions as would the use in Ireland of the 
low sulphur coal strategy is £3.Sm p.a. and for the 
combined strategy is £5.4111 p.a, see Table 13. These 
transfers would be less than the direct costs for the ESB 
of £10111 p.a and £12111 p.a, see Table 5, respectively for 
these strategies. 
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TABLE 13: Required Transfers To Eastern 
Europe 
Strategy Reduction Reduction Transfer 
in Eastern in European Cost Per 
European Depositions Annum (£) 
Emissions Per Annum 
Per Annum ('OOOs 
('OOOs Tonnes) 
Tonnes) 
Desulphurisation 29 17 6.5 
Low Sulphur Coal 16 9 3.5 
Combined Gas 24 14 5.4 
And Coal 
The cost in terms of economic welfare of these 
strategies for Ireland can be measured by the estimated 
net present value of the reduction in GNP over the total 
reduction in European S02 deposits for the ten year 
period 1993-2002. These costs for a unilateral action are 
presented in Table 14 below. 
TABLE 14: Costs in Terms of Lost GNP from 
Unilateral Action 1993-2002 
Strategy Reduction Cost of Lost Cost of 
In Euro- GNP GNP per 
p ean Depos (£m) Tonne Of 
itions European 
(OOO's Deposit 
Tonnes) (£) 
Desulphurisation 170 37.3 220 
Low Sulphur Coal 90 18.6 210 
Combined Gas 140 19.9 140 
And Coal 
Transfer 170 32.5 190 
The combined use of natural gas and low sulphur 
fuel by the ESB would appear to be the "least cost" 
method, in terms of lost GNP per tonne of European S02 
deposited, of achieving the Helsinki targets for the Irish 
economy in the unilateral case. 
The efficiency of transferring funds to Eastern 
Europe in terms of lost Irish GNP is £ 190 per tonne of 
European S02 deposition compared with £220 from the 
use of desulphurisation by the ESB. The costs of 
transferring of funds to Eastern Europe is only directly 
comparable with Ireland in the use of desulphurisation 
equipment. It may well be the case that the application 
of the other strategies in Eastern Europe is more cost 
efficient but we have insufficient information on these 
costs to provide such comparisons. 
TABLE 15: Costs in Terms of Lost GNP from 
Multilateral Action 1993-2002 
Strategy Reduction Cost of Lost Cost of 
In Euro- GNP GNP per 
pean ( £111) Tonne Of 
Depositions European 
(000s Deposit 
Tonnes) (£) 
Desulphurisation 170 1.6 10 
Low Sulphur Coal 90 5.5 60 
Combined Gas 140 5.4 40 
And Coal 
Transfer 170 32.2 190 
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The use of desulphurisation equipment by the ESB 
appears to be the "least cost" method, in terms of lost 
GNP per tonne of European S02 deposited, of achieving 
the Helsinki targets for the Irish economy in the case of 
multilateral action. The choice of "least cost" strategy 
in terms of lost economic welfare depends on whether 
the action is taken multilaterally or unilaterally. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
By taking the policy decision to reduce S02 
emissions as a case study, this article highlights some 
of the important issues involved with environmental 
policy. The environmental reasons why Ireland acceded 
to the Helsinki protocol are not clear. We have suggested 
that the protocol, as it stands, is not the most effective 
way to achieve the objective of reducing acid rain in 
Europe. The proposed strategies to achieve the Helsinki 
targets may not be the most cost efficient ways of 
meeting the underlying environmental objective of the 
government when it acceded to the protocol. 
Internationally there has been an emphasis on 
regulation rather than on price instruments. The regu-
latory approach has been mainly based on the use of 
quotas to limit discharges of pollutants. However there 
is increasing pressure to make use of price measures to 
deal with environmental problems. The use of carbon 
taxes to deal with the problem of C02 adding to the 
disputed "Greenhouse Effect" is strongly advocated by 
many countries. If environmental policies are to be 
implemented equitably the distributional consequences 
of this type of price measure will need to be fully 
anticipated before any agreements are entered into. 
The analysis shows that, given the emphasis on the 
power generation sector, the national S02 emission 
targets could only be met if the strategy of installing 
desulphurisation equipment is used on coal powered 
generation stations. This strategy involves very sig-
nificant costs for electricity generation and the same 
impacts for the European environment could be 
achieved at much lower costs to the Irish economy by 
a direct transfer of funds to Eastern Europe. 
The strategy which involves combining natural gas 
and low sulphur coal in electricity generation is the 
"least cost" solution to the economy for national S02 
reductions in the case of unilateral action. However, 
while it allows the ESB to achieve its Helsinki target, 
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the national target would not be met by this strategy 
alone. The use of low sulphur coal alone in electricity 
generation is unlikely to achieve any of the targets under 
the Helsinki Protocol but it would allow the ESB to 
achieve its target under the Large Combustion Plant 
directive. 
The costs to the economy are significantly reduced 
by engaging in multilateral environmental action with 
our main trading partners rather than taking unilateral 
actions, because the latter action involves much larger 
losses in national competitiveness. The use of desul-
phurisation becomes the "least cost" solution to the 
economy under multilateral action. This strategy would 
meet Ireland's and the ESB 's Helsinki targets. The 
methodology used in the analysis highlights the 
importance of the assumptions made about external 
factors in detennining "least cost" solutions. 
Environmental actions will only be sustainable in the 
long term if they have neutral implications for the 
exchequer's finances. However the deflationary effects 
of exchequer neutral environmental policy will involve 
much greater losses in economic growth than in the 
cases where no neutralising of exchequer borrowing 
requirement occurs. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this case 
study for Irish policy makers is that environmental 
objectives need to be clearly specified and co-ordinated 
before commitments to take action are made. The 
implementation of policies to achieve these objectives 
needs to done efficiently at the least cost to the economy 
rather than merely identifying the least expenditure cost 
solution. These policy options should allow for the 
innovative action of direct transfers to other countries 
if it proves to be the most efficient solution. The 
consequences of unilateral actions, particularly without 
corresponding action by our main trading partners, and 
the distortionary effects of emphasis placed on par-
ticular sectors to achieve national objectives, need to be 
fully considered before decisions are made in the future 
on how environmental objectives are to be achieved. 
On this occasion the costs for the economy of the 
decision to accede to the Helsinki Protocol are likely to 
be small. However many important issues have been 
ignored in making this decision. If this was to set a 
precedent for future environmental decisions the costs 
for the economy could be excessive. 
ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS OF IRISH UNEMPLOYMENT1 
by Frank Barry 
ABSTRACT 
This paper charts the development of economists' views on the 
determinants of Irish unemployment. A Keynesian demand-side 
view influenced government policy in the late 1970s but the failure 
of these policies over the longer term has led some to deny the 
existence of any conventional demand-side effects. This conclusion, 
it is argued here, is unwarranted. Nevertheless, the aggregate-supply 
side is the engine of growth. Recognition of this has begun to focus 
attention on the sectoral structure of production as a crucial 
determinant of employment and unemployment performance. The 
paper argues that the impact of structural change in the economy on 
unemployment needs to be researched more fully. 
lTHEFOCUSOFTHESTUDY 
The unemployment rate is arguably the single most 
important barometer of the economy's performance, 
because unemployment has such far-reaching social 
ramifications. Economists have devoted an increasing 
amount of attention in recent years to analysing the 
causes of Ireland's poor experience in this regard, and 
the present paper presents a partisan summary and 
review of this research. 
The focus here is on how unemployment emerges as 
an outcome of the functioning of the entire macroeco-
nomy. This represents a different emphasis from that of 
Geary's (1988) literature survey which concentrates on 
the microeconomics of individual's behaviour within 
"the labour market", and of the studies by Newell and 
Symons (1990) and Walsh (1987). These papers ignore 
the economy's sectoral structure as a determinant of the 
overall response of unemployment to such aggregate 
shocks as changes in government policy and the world 
environment, and increasingly free trade. 
This study therefore focuses its attention on the 
demand for labour, which drives employment, and for 
the most part leaves aside issues of labour supply such 
as the determinants of the participation rate and the 
emigration decision. Labour supply is clearly not the 
important constraint at present and these issues are in 
any case reasonably well understood. 
The paper proceeds therefore by looking at the 
aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply factors that 
affected employment since the mid- l 970s, and then, in 
more speculative mode, questions whether there are 
issues of industrial structure as yet unexplored which 
might help us understand why unemployment has 
remained above the European average throughout the 
whole period under discussion. 
The analysis begins by looking at the demand side 
of the economy, focusing in particular on the extent to 
which government spending influences total employ-
ment. The Keynesian conventional wisdom of policy-
makers worldwide in the 1960s had posited a positive 
relationship between the two, and these ideas influenced 
government policy in Ireland in the mid-to-late 1970s 
when budget deficits were increased in an attempt to 
mitigate the employment effects of the OPEC oil shocks. 
To what extent can such policies protect employ-
ment, even in the short term? This is now a matter of 
considerable controversy. Newell and Symons (1990), 
in a study funded by the National Economic and Social 
Council, found no evidence that the policies had any 
such effect. McAleese (1990), in arguing that the 
post-1987 fiscal contraction was an important factor in 
the economic recovery of 1987-90, goes much further; 
the implication of his argument is that fiscal multipliers 
are negative. 
These studies would suggest that there is no validity 
to the old Keynesian textbook notion that government 
spending boosts aggregate demand and employment in 
the short run. This is not the right lesson to learn from 
the period, it is argued here. These demand-side effects 
can be identified, but they have been counterbalanced 
over time by the negative supply-side consequences of 
having to finance fiscal spending. 
One variant of this case was made in the study by 
Barry and Bradley ( 1991 ). The supply-side mechanisms 
that that study focuses upon in explaining why fiscal 
expansion has had only short-lived effects on unem-
ploymentare twofold; the impact on wage demands (and 
migration) of a tightened labour market, and the cost 
impact on firms of higher taxation, both directly and 
through increased wage demands as workers struggle to 
protect take-home pay. 
These mechanisms are explored in the section on 
aggregate supply, which also discusses how industrial 
structure influences the ability of firms to meet these 
cost increases. 
2 WORLD ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: 
BACKGROUND TO IRELAND'S 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
The first point to note about Irish unemployment, 
and indeed the inflation rate and other macroeconomic 
1 The author is grateful to seminar participants at UCG and the University of Limerick, and to John Bradley (ESRI), Joe Durkan (UCO), 
Deirdre McHugh (IDA), Sara Moore (U of L) and the ESRI staff for helpful discussions. The opinions stated are the author's responsibility 
alone. · 
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variables, is the extent to which they are externally 
determined; we need look for domestic causes of our 
performance only to the extent to which it deviates from 
that of our trading partners. 
The influence of the external environment is illus-
trated graphically in Figures 1 and 2 which depict the 
inflation and unemployment experiences of the OECD 
and Irish economies since the 1960s. According to 
Bruno and Sachs (1985), who analyse the OECD 
experience in detail, the movements over time in these 
variables can be understood as follows: the generally 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies of the 1960s 
led to the falling unemployment and rising inflation of 
the period. A real wage push followed in the late 
60's/early 70's due to the increased proportion of the 
workforce that had become unionised; this supply shock 
raised production costs and inflation, and priced labour 
out of employment, and another supply shock with much 
more dramatic consequences, the oil price increase of 
1973/1974, followed soon afterwards. 
Contractionary policies to reduce the oil-fuelled 
inflation raised unemployment, but wage moderation 
and a later relaxing of policy eased the journey from the 
mid-1970's. The next oil shock hit in 1979, and in the 
early 1980's further contractionary policies pushed us 
once again down to the south-east in the diagram. 
Figure '1 
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It comes as no surprise, of course, that the Irish 
experience should mirror the general OECD experience 
in many respects, as is apparent from Figure 2. The oil 
shocks hit our economy at the same time as they hit 
everywhere else; we can all accept that our inflation rate 
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is largely dete1mined abroad; and it is clear that if our 
export markets go into recession, we will sink alongside 
them. 
What mainly needs to be explained then is not the 
Irish unemployment experience per se, but rather how 
our unemployment rate has moved relative to our 
trading partners. The gap between Irish and UK 
unemployment is plotted in Figure 3. The timing of the 
narrowing and widening of this gap should give us 
strong clues as to the domestic variables that influence 
employment and unemployment; this is the main subject 
of the present paper. 
Figure 3 
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3 THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC 
AGGREGATE DEMAND 
a) Identifying the Impact of Fiscal Stance 
1990 
We see from Figure 3 that the gap between Irish and 
UK unemployment narrowed between 1976 and 1982, 
and then exploded. The gap between the Irish rate and 
the EC average also followed roughly this course. What 
clues does this provide as to the domestic forces playing 
a role in the story? 
This discussion can be structured around the three 
very simplified relationships depicted in Figure 4. The 
vertical line represents the size of the labour force; the 
labour-demand function for the economy slopes 
downwards because reduced labour costs allow an 
expansion of employment; and the upward-sloping line 
depicts a wage relationship based on bargaining 
between workers and firms: a higher level of employ-
ment tightens the labour market and increases the power 
of unions to secure wage increases. Employment is 
determined at the intersection of the labour-demand and 
wage schedules, and unemployment is measured as the 
gap between this level and the total labour force. 
In terms of this diagram, then, the reasonably good 
Irish performance relative to the EC and the UK in the 
1976-82 period must have been due either to a gain in 
cost competitiveness (a rightward shift of the wage 
function relative to our trading partners), relatively 
slower growth of the Irish labour force (an inward shift 
of the labour-force function), or an expansion in labour 
demand in Ireland relative to elsewhere. Which of these 
factors was actually responsible for the events of the 
period? Not the first, because relative hourly earnings 
measured in a common currency reveal losses in Irish 
cost competitiveness at the time; not the second, because 
IRISH UNEMPLOYMENT 
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Irish labour force growth was greater than the average 
in our trading partners over the period; therefore the 
third. The only factor working in the direction required 
to provide an explanation was labour demand. 
Where did this buoyancy in labour demand come 
from? One source was the continued inflow of foreign 
direct investment; employment in this sector of manu-
facturing peaked only in 1981 ( c.f. Figure 7). The other 
source however was domestic demand, which propped 
up employment in marketed services, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Irish indigenous manufacturing (Figures 5 and 
7). 
To analyse the issue further we need to look in detail 
at one important component of domestic demand -the 
stance of fiscal policy. 
One reflection of this stance is non-marketed ser-
vices sector employment (comprising public adminis-
tration, defence, health and education); this continued 
to rise until 1982 (Figure 5) and accounted for some 
three-quarters of total employment growth between 
1970 and that date; it is therefore consistent with the 
timing we need to explain. It is obviously a very crude 
measure, however, which leads us to ask whether a 
better one exists. 
Figure 5 
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It has been accepted since the Keynesian/Monetarist 
debates of the 1960' s that changes in the government 
budget deficit are inadequate as a measure of fiscal 
stance; this is so because tax take falls and social welfare 
expenditures increase automatically as the economy 
moves into recession, so that the overall deficit also 
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moves automatically. A more acceptable measure of the 
stance of fiscal policy focuses on the cyclically-adjusted 
(or structural) government budget deficit; this removes 
the effects of these automatic changes by measuring 
what the deficit would be, given tax and subsidy rates 
etc., were the economy at a high level of employment. 
Data from Muller and Price ( 1984) show that in terms 
of this measure of fiscal stance Irish policy became 
strongly expansionary in 1975, dipped in 1976, became 
more expansionary thereafter until its peak in 1982, and 
then became progressively more contractionary. The 
same story applies when we consider the Irish stance 
relative to the UK and EC average (also in table 3 
below), which is important since it is the relative 
unemployment experiences with which we are now 
concerned. 
Table 1: Cyclically-adjusted Budget Deficits as % 
of GNP/GDP 
Ireland Ireland-EC Ireland-UK 
average average 
1975 10.3 6.9 7.1 
1976 5.7 2.8 2.3 
1977 6.5 4.5 4.8 
1978 9.2 6.0 5.4 
1979 10.7 7.4 7.5 
1980 11.7 9.2 10.6 
1981 13.3 10.4 15.1 
1982 14.3 12.1 17.6 
1983 10.6 8.9 12.2 
1984 9.1 8.1 11.1 
Even the structural deficit is an inadequate measure 
in one crucial respect however. Rising government debt 
and/or higher interest rates mean that a growing pro-
portion of any given deficit goes to debt-servicing, and 
less goes therefore to demand-stimulation through 
purchases of goods and services. This suggests, as 
Muller and Price recognise, that the underlying budget 
stance would more accurately be measured by structural 
deficits net of interest paid by government. The figures 
they give for this variable show much the same timing 
as those discussed above, but the proportionate drop in 
the years after 1982 is of course much greater, as more 
and more of the Irish deficit went on debt service. 
A recent OECD publication, Chouraqui, Hagemann 
and Sartor (1990), contains data on budget and 
primary-budget balances, both cyclically adjusted, 
which shows that the stance of Irish fiscal policy has 
been even more contractionary over the course of the 
1980's when this point about debt interest payments is 
taken into account. These are shown in Table 2 below.2 
The timing of these changes in fiscal stance is clearly 
consistent with the movements in Irish unemployment 
relative to the UK and the EC. There are of course more 
formal tests of the relationship between the two, though 
opinion is divided over the relative validity of the two 
methodologies used to analyse this type of issue: the 
statistical and structural-model approaches. 
2 Unfortunately, the series shown in Tables 1 and 2 are constructed differently and so are not directly comparable. 
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Table 2: Changes in Cyclically-adjusted Budget 
Surpluses(% of GNP/GDP) 
A B 
1979 -2.85 -2.70 
1980 -2.61 -2.20 
1981 -1.99 -0.81 
1982 0.81 1.97 
1983 4.68 4.53 
1984 2.05 2.65 
1985 -0.58 0.17 
1986 1.86 1.73 
1987 0.69 0.87 
1988 6.71 5.45 
1989 -1.37 -1.13 
Note: Column A refers to the cyclically-adjusted budget surplus, 
and B to the primary cyclically-adjusted budget surplus [i.e. net of 
net interest payments]. 
The former is a simple test of how closely two series 
are related. It does not spell out the economic mech-
anisms presumed to lie behind the relationship, and, 
though rough and ready, its perceived advantage is 
precisely that it is not based on a plethora of assumptions 
about how the economy works; since it is not based on 
a formal economic model, however, critics warn against 
using its results to make assertions about cause and 
effect. 
Brendan Walsh (1987), employing this approach, 
found that the structural budget surplus was statistically 
significant and of the right sign in his empirical equation 
of the determinants of unemployment, as the present 
analysis would suggest, concluding that "an increase in 
the Irish (structural) budget surplus increases the level 
of Irish unemployment for a given rate of EC unem-
ployment". The magnitude of the effect he found to be 
small, however. 
The present analysis suggests that the structural 
budget surplus net of interest payments would be a more 
desirable measure of fiscal stance however, and eco-
nometric tests reveal that this measure indeed shows a 
stronger effect of fiscal stance on unemployment as well 
as an improved ability to track the data.3 
The simple statistical approach, then, suggests that 
there is validity to the Keynesian notion of a positive 
relationship between employment and fiscal stance, 
operating on the aggregate- demand side of the econ-
omy. As will be seen later, though, these gains are 
largely wiped away when account is taken of the supply 
side impact of the need to finance fiscal spending. 
What of the alternative methodology that builds a 
multiple- equation structural model of the economy? A 
criticism levelled at this approach is that since any single 
equation in the system will contain effors, in the sense 
of not being able to track the data with complete 
accuracy, the interaction of all these errors may yield 
distorted results. The advantage of the approach, on the 
other hand, is that the model is clearly grounded in 
economic theory and identifies and estimates explicitly 
the mechanisms by which fiscal policies affect macro 
variables. 
3 Details available from the author upon request. 
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Two recent analyses of Irish unemployment have 
used the structural approach, and have come to different 
conclusions on the effects of fiscal spending. Newell 
and Symons (1990), on the basis of a three-equation 
model of the labour market as depicted in Figure 4, argue 
that changes in budget deficits operating on aggregate 
demand did not influence unemployment in the period 
they discuss, i.e. 1979-1986. This contradicts the results 
of the simple statistical approach already discussed; the 
analysis above, however, suggests that they used an 
inadequate measure of fiscal stance. 
Several other weaknesses of the Newell and Symons 
analysis are identified by Ba1Ty and Bradley (1991) who 
use the ESRI medium- term model in their attempt to 
account for the rise in unemployment; this makes it 
unnecessary to use summary measures of fiscal stance 
because the mechanisms by which the various compo-
nents of government spending, taxation, debt interest 
payments etc. influence unemployment are fully 
articulated. 
Their results contradict those of Newell and Symons 
by identifying that the fiscal contraction of the 1980s 
did have important contractionary demand-side effects 
on unemployment, while the fiscal expansion of the 
1970s brought the unemployment rate 2.5 percentage 
points down from what it would otherwise have been. 
b) Elucidating Other Empirical Results 
The discussion so far suggests the following con-
clusions; firstly, that the recent behaviour of the Irish 
unemployment rate (relative to the UK and the EC 
average) cannot be understood without reference to the 
changing stance of Irish fiscal policy, and second! y, that 
empirical identification of this relationship requires that 
careful use be made of measures of fiscal stance, if they 
are to be used at all. 
These lessons elucidate the various empirical results 
of Bean, Layard and Nickell (1986), Newell and 
Symons (1990) and McAleese and McCarthy (1989). 
Bean, Layard and Nickell (p.57) note that their own 
desired measure of fiscal impact would be some variant 
of the cyclically- adjusted budget deficit, but they do 
not adopt this approach because the measures are not 
available for some of the countries in their cross-country 
sample; instead, they employ a particular linear 
combination of various exogenous demand factors 
including government spending. This makes it 
impossible to isolate the impact of fiscal policy in their 
work. 
The importance of taking government debt servicing 
into account in evaluating the stance of fiscal policy has 
been argued in the previous section. It is further high-
lighted by considering the results reported by Newell 
and Symons, and McAleese and McCarthy. 
The former ascribe 15% of the rise in unemployment 
over the period 1979-86 to the impact on Ireland of UK 
demand shocks, and a further 23% to high real interest 
rates. How are these results to be interpreted, since UK 
real interest rates were in fact higher than those in Ireland 
during this period [Leddin and Walsh (1990), chapter 
12] and the high real interest rates were presumably a 
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major factor driving the UK demand shocks? In other 
words, why do high real interest rates seem to have had 
a much greater impact on the Irish economy than on the 
UK? The interpretation offered here, and surely an 
intuitively appealing one, is that the increased debt 
service payments meant that fiscal policy was much 
more contractionary than measures which ignore this 
would indicate. 
The same conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis of McAleese and McCarthy, who enumerate 
the various external shocks which hit the economy 
during the 1980's. The interest rate shock with which 
the economy had to contend rose from $2.3m in 1981 
to $164.8m in 1982, and stood at $186.8m in 1985. The 
size of the shock clearly depends not just on what 
happens the interest rate in a particular year, but also on 
the extent to which the economy has accumulated 
foreign debt. 
To say that the contractionary fiscal stance has 
played a major role in the increased unemployment of 
the last decade is not, of course, to imply that it was 
unwarranted; nor is it to imply that long-term benefits 
will not follow. What it does argue is that swings in 
fiscal policy have large (Keynesian) demand-side 
effects as well as supply-side effects working in the 
opposite direction, as Bean, La yard and Nickell ( 1986) 
and Bruno and Sachs (1985), for example, have found 
for other "small open economies" such as Belgium and 
Denmark. 
The quantification of these effects by Barry and 
Bradley suggests that the expansionary fiscal policies 
of the 1970's reduced unemployment by around 2.5 
percentage points, while the contractionary policies of 
the 1980's raised unemployment by over 4 percentage 
points by 1987. The reason for the disproportionate size 
of the two effects was of course the fact that world 
interest rates jumped so dramatically and so unexpect-
edly in the early 1980s after the debt build-up by which 
the fiscal expansion had been financed was begun. 
As the analysis here implies that the short-term 
effects of fiscal policy operate in the convention-
ally-expected direction, it suggests buoyant world 
demand as the major driving force behind the post-1987 
recovery. This is in contrast to McAleese' s (1990) 
suggestion of an "expansionary fiscal contraction". 
4THEROLEOFAGGREGATESUPPLY 
a) Input Costs, Taxation and Labour Costs 
i) Input Costs 
The costs of non-labour inputs can influence 
unemployment by reducing the demand for labour and 
hence the equilibrium or "warranted" real wage, as 
happened with the oil price increases of the 1970's [See 
Bruno and Sachs (1985), Figures 2a.2 and 2a.3] 
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There is some evidence to suggest that the cost of 
several inputs into the production process rose faster in 
Ireland than elsewhere during the 1980's; see the 1984 
report of the National Planning Board (p.162-165) on 
the cost of electricity, for example, and the NESC 
Strategy for Development (1986) on relative postal and 
telecommunications charges. McCarthy (1986) also 
provides details on Ireland's relatively high road haul-
age and insurance costs, although it is not clear what the 
trend is in these relative costs. 
Restrictive practices and regulatory barriers to entry 
probably also hinder competition in areas such as law 
and banking, raising the costs to industry of these inputs 
(Planning Board, p.243). 
ii) Taxation and Labour Costs 
Fiscal spending must ultimately be financed by 
taxation, and while the expansionary policies of the late 
1970's and early 1980's raised employment initially, 
these demand-side effects were reversed over time 
through the supply-side mechanism of the tax-wedge. 
This section examines the extent to which wage 
demands and the tax-wedge may have contributed to 
unemployment. 
The Central Bank publishes two series of importance 
for our discussion, relative hourly earnings and relative 
unit wage costs, both measured in a common currency. 
These are designed to measure movements in cost 
competitiveness relative to our trading partners. It has 
become more common in recent years to focus on the 
first measure because of the difficulty of interpreting 
movements in the second; a loss in cost-competitiveness 
that displaces the least efficient firms first will raise 
measured productivity and may thereby reduce 
measured unit costs;4 rapid productivity growth, fur-
thermore, is confined to only a few manufacturing 
sectors. 
Consider therefore the relative hourly earnings 
series, running from 1978 to 1989, which is depicted in 
Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6 
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4 Note that this implies counter-cyclical movements in labour productivity, in contrast to the pro-cyclical movements encountered in the more 
highly developed economies. The traditional sector of Irish manufacturing in fact seems to exhibit the former and the more modern sector 
the latter. The explanation could possibly be that the modern sector is driven primarily by world demand fluctuations while traditional 
manufacturing is affected more strongly by movements in cost competitiveness. 
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The series reveals some loss in competitiveness over 
the period, which we would expect to be reflected in 
employment, although it seems likely that only sus-
tained changes in wage trends would influence pro-
duction and multinational location decisions. 
There are three questions to be asked with reference 
to these movements in competitiveness: firstly, what 
accounts for the competitiveness loss?; secondly, what 
are the likely effects on employment?; and thirdly, in 
the light of the answer to the preceding question, can 
the Central Bartle measure be regarded as adequate? 
A major driving force behind the competitiveness 
loss has been the upward pressure on wage demands 
induced by the dramatic rise in the tax burden during 
the 1980's. The tax/GNP ratio grew faster in Ireland 
than in any other OECD country in this period [Walsh 
(1987b)] and, with large sectors of the Irish economy 
effectively not comprising part of the tax base, a major 
proportion of the increased tax has been in the form of 
income taxes. Clearly workers have passed part of this 
increase onto employers in the fonn of increased wage 
demands, but equally clearly have had to accept a 
substantial proportion of the burden themselves in the 
form of reduced real disposable income. 
Taxation affects employment through the "tax 
wedge", which is the gap between the cost incurred by 
employers in hiring labour and the real purchasing 
power of the after-tax income received by employees. 
It is clear that the wedge rises whether it is payroll taxes, 
income taxes or indirect taxes that are increased; we 
would expect this to reduce both labour demand and 
labour supply, with the impact on unemployment 
emerging from the interaction between these effects. 
The consensus among researchers is that around 
50% of any increase in the tax wedge is passed on to 
employers in the medium term through increased wage 
demands, so that its growth during the 1980s would be 
expected to have substantial effects.5 
Murphy ( 1987), in a paper for the Foundation for 
Fiscal Studies, concluded that a 1 % increase in the tax 
wedge would reduce employment by between 0.2 and 
0.25%. ; taking the NESC (1986, p.183) estimate that 
the wedge grew by 27.3% between 1980 and 1985, (of 
which 2.7 points were due to payroll tax increases, 14.7 
to income taxes, and 9.9 to indirect taxes) we can 
therefore conclude that this could have been respon-
sible, at most, for a 6.8% fall in employment in this 
period. His study relied on manufacturing data, 
however, and the actual fall in manufacturing employ-
ment in this period was 17%. The wedge in his analysis 
is therefore capable of explaining at most 30% of the 
actual fall in manufacturing employment in the period 
with which his analysis is concerned. 
The study by Barry and Bradley (1991) looks not 
just at manufacturing but at the entire economy, and 
concludes that domestic policy in the 1979-1986 period, 
operating primarily through tax increases, accounted for 
4.4 percentage points of the 10.2 percentage point 
increase in unemployment at this time. 
5 See e.g. Hughes (1985), Murphy (1987) and the ESRI Macromodel. 
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b) Sectoral Structure, Structural Change and 
Unemployment 
i) The Importance of Sectoral Structure 
The analyses discussed so far have all been highly 
aggregative in the sense of treating the manufacturing 
sector as a homogenous entity. With the increased 
concentration on the supply side of the economy that 
we have seen over the course of the 1980s it has come 
to be recognised that this type of aggregative analysis 
masks some of the dramatic sectoral changes occun'ing 
in the makeup of Irish industrial employment, as Baker 
(1988) argued. Breaking the manufacturing sector into 
a "traditional" and a "modem" grouping reveals 
important differences in their experiences over recent 
decades. In particular, productivity growth was much 
more rapid in modem industry. Alongside starkly dif-
ferentrates of productivity growth, however, wage costs 
rose together in the two sectors. 
Clearly, then, the undramatic competitiveness loss 
shown in the relative hourly earnings series would have 
a much greater impact on traditional manufacturing 
because productivity gains there are less able to finance 
wage increases; with traditional industry more 
labour-intensive to begin with, disequilibrating 
labour-cost movements would in any case exert a greater 
impact there.6 
What this discussion would suggest is that fairly 
small movements in relative cost-competitiveness could 
have a substantial impact on employment in the tradi-
tional sector of manufacturing, with only perhaps a 
small effect on employment in the modern sector. This 
would go some way towards explaining why employ-
ment in the former sector has declined at an annual 
average rate of 4.2% in the period 1980-87, while 
growing at a rate of 2.9% in modem industry.7 
While much of this modem industry is of overseas 
origin, it is important in discussing multinational 
investment to draw a distinction between UK and other 
overseas companies. The former are much closer to 
indigenous companies in terms of their characteristics, 
and as seen in Figure 7, the decline in overseas per-
formance in the 1980s was overwhelmingly caused by 
the poor performance of UK companies. This category 
would appear to be in irrevocable decline, although the 
rate of decay may well be affected by cost competi-
tiveness. 
The other element required to understand overseas 
performance is an appreciation of the extent to which 
some of the processes governing the flow of multi-
national investment into the economy, and the conse-
quent level of employment in that sector, are exogenous. 
The Survey of Current Business conducted by the US 
Department of Commerce reveals no clear relationship 
between movements in these variables and in Irish 
competitiveness. 
6 This dualistic structure of Irish industry may make corporatism less appropriate a form of labour market organisation than in the more 
advanced small European economies. 
7 Note that these statistics, from Baker ( 1988), p.42, are not based on the same categories as used in Figure 7. 
IRISH UNEMPLOYMENT 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Figure 7 
Manufacturing Employment (ooo's) 
r--+---+--+--+---+-..~ 
01--~~~~-t---+~~~~-1--~-+-~--+--; 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
- indigenous --+- UK firms -*"" other overseas firms 
Source· IOA 
To see how employment in the "other overseas" 
category fell between 1981 and 1987 we need firstly to 
look at the level of multinational investment taking 
place, and then at its labour-intensity. For data reasons 
our focus must be on subsidiaries of US multinationals, 
which comprise the single most important group oper-
ating in the Irish economy: 
Table 3: US Investment in Ireland 
A B 
1983 0.90 99.48 
1984 1.21 109.51 
1985 1.29 115.76 
1986 1.23 145.43 
1987 1.14 152.12 
1988 1.19 189.92 
Note: Column A shows Ireland's% share of overseas investments 
(in manufacturing) by US multinationals; B shows Irish invest-
ments by US multinationals (in millions of 1980 Ir£). 
The table shows that US multinational investment 
in the economy has been growing in real terms 
throughout the 1980's. Nevertheless, the IDA data 
shows a decline in employment in the "other overseas" 
category in the period up to 1987, which is presumably 
due then to the fact that production processes have been 
becoming more capital-intensive;8 (Figure 8 shows that 
this has in fact been the case for all industrial sectors.) 
There is widespread agreement among researchers, 
though, that the capital-intensity of multinational pro-
duction processes is largely determined by techno-
logical considerations rather than by domestic 
("sink-country") factor-price ratios; see for example 
Lall (1978), and the very low gross factor-price elasti-
cities reported by Bradley and FitzGerald (1990).9 
The implication of this discussion, then, is that 
employment losses within the non-UK multinational 
sector have not been caused by changes in domestic 
factor costs. What this in turn suggests, however, is that 
since aggregate estimates of the elasticity of labour 
demand are averages across indigenous, UK and other 
Figure 8 
Labour/Capital Ratio in Industry 
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overseas industry, then the low elasticity posited here 
for the latter implies a correspondingly high elasticity 
for the others. 
The fact that the aggregate-supply side of the 
economy has come to be recognised as the main 
domestic driving force behind long- term growth has 
led the ESRI research team of Bradley, FitzGerald and 
Kearney (1991) to disaggregate the manufacturing 
sector data into the two categories of traditional and high 
tech. This makes it possible to explore empirically the 
determinants of employment in the two sectors. 
As we would expect from the general discussion 
above, they find the overall long-term elasticity of 
labour demand in the traditional sector to be substan-
tially higher than in the high technology sector. 10 The 
former has a value of unity compared to .6 for the latter. 
Alongside this it must be remembered that the two 
sectors export into very different markets, so that the 
Central Bank's statistic on hourly earnings growth 
relative to that in our trading partners is insufficiently 
detailed, since it is primarily movements in Irish versus 
UK competitiveness that matter for the more vulnerable 
traditional sector. 
An appreciation of the dollar alongside a fall in 
sterling, for example, could keep the real trade-weighted 
exchange rate constant but could nevertheless have 
serious consequences for Irish unemployment. 
The studies discussed so far have paid little attention 
to exchange rates and the possible impact on unem-
ployment of the 1979 change in Ireland's exchange rate 
regime. Leddin ( 1991) attempts to redress this balance, 
but the criticism of over- aggregation developed above 
applies here also. His argument is that the "hard currency 
regime" followed since EMS entry has led to an over-
valuation of the trade-weighted exchange rate with 
consequent competitiveness loss and a deterioration in 
employment performance. 
8 Note that the figures in the table above include reinvested earnings, which are unlikely to yield as much employment as greenfield investments 
because they tend to be used to change processes or to change capital equipment to allow a different range of products to be produced. 
Furthermore, since Ireland relies to such a large extent on US investment, it is worth noting that the US share in the total capital outflow of 
OECD countries in greenfield investments has declined substantially since the 1960s (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1983, p. 269). 
9 These elasticities, of the order of -0.06, measure the response of industrial labour demand to real wage changes for a given level of output. 
I O The high-technology sector consists of chemicals plus metals and engineering, and the traditional sector comprises the remainder, minus 
food processing. 
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From the point of view of this paper, trade-weighted 
exchange rates are a poor measure of competitiveness 
- as it impacts on employment, at least. What matters 
most in this regard is the competitiveness of traditional 
industry, and this should be measured relative to the UK. 
Leddin' sown analysis shows that price competitiveness 
(adjusted for exchange rate changes) has not fluctuated 
much against the UK since 1979, which is perhaps not 
so surprising given the degree of integration of the two 
economies; what must be looked at therefore is relative 
cost competitiveness, for which real exchange rates 
calculated on the basis of consumer price indexes are 
inadequate. 
An implication of all of this is that the Central Bank 
series should be augmented by one that shows Irish 
earnings relative to the UK in a common currency. 
The overall conclusion of this section is that dis-
equilibrating changes in Irish cost competitiveness 
probably have little effect on non-UK multinational 
industry but can have quite substantial effects on 
traditional industry; there is however no published 
statistical series adequate to track these movements. 
ii) Structural Change and Unemployment 
The North/South divide would seem to have a role 
to play in the explanation of current British unem-
ployment; are there such factors at work in Ireland? The 
issue here concerns the nature of, and the difficulty of 
adjusting to, sectoral or structural shocks (these diffi-
culties being compounded by the unfavourable 
macroeconomic environment already discussed). 
Lilien (1982) has shown that sector-specific shocks 
to the US economy have varied substantially in 
magnitude and frequency from one period to another, -
being particularly high in the 1970's clue to rapid 
technical change, the oil shocks, increasing competition 
from the NIC's, etc. - and that periods of greater 
dispersion in the rate of employment growth across 
sectors are associated with periods of high aggregate 
unemployment. (Lilien's argument that causation runs 
from the former to the latter through a slow rate of 
transfer from declining to expanding sectors has gen-
erated considerable controversy.) 
The hypothesis draws attention to a possible rela-
tionship between structural change and long-lasting 
unemployment; this would be particularly so if 
hysteresis is important - i.e. if those who have been out 
of work for a long period of time no longer play any 
effective role in the labour market. Although difficult 
to encapsulate in a simple model, this way of thinking 
about the economy seems a potentially fruitful source 
of insights. 
Why might the Irish economy have found structural 
adjustment in the 1970's and 80's more difficult to 
handle than clicl EC economies on average? An 
important reason is suggested in Paul Krugman' s ( 1987) 
discussion of the likely effects of 1992: 
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"In its original formation, the Common Market was 
virtually tailor-made to foster intra-industry trade based 
on economies of scale rather than inter-industry spe-
cialization that might have posed large adjustment 
issues ... The addition of Southern Europe to the scene, 
however, means that now trade within the EEC will 
involve partners with major differences in productivity, 
wages and resources ... The point is that the trade 
expansion produced by EC enlargement is simply not 
likely to be as painless as the trade expansion produced 
by the formation of the Community and earlier 
enlargement. There will certainly be income distribu-
tion problems created by the changes, and also quite 
possibly some real costs in terms of unemployment." 
Ireland, of course, was "the oclcl one out" in the 
previous enlargement, bearing a greater similarity to the 
peripheral countries which joined later, and so Krug-
man's warning would seem to apply retrospectively to 
us. 
This is incleecl corroborated by the research pub-
lished in the NESC report ( 1989, esp. Chpt. 6) on Ireland 
in the European Community. The modem theory of 
international trade implies that the integration of fairly 
similar economies should lead not to massive relocation 
of whole industries (which would give rise to inter-in-
dustry trade) but to each country's industries specia-
lising in a narrower range of products within each 
industry category (thereby engaging in intra-industry 
trade). The industrial restructuring required, and 
consequent adjustment difficulties, would be much 
greater in the former case. 
McAleese's research (1979) reported a pronounced 
increase in the ratio of intra-industry to total trade (IIT) 
from 1964 to 1977 as Ireland integrated first with Britain 
and later with the EC economies, implying that the 
economy faced relatively minor adjustment problems. 
The NESC report, however, finds that a substantial 
decline in IIT has occurred between 1977 and 1986 so 
that inter-industry adjustment has assumed much 
greater importance since that time. How can this be 
explained? 
Inter-industry adjustment in the earlier period may 
have been held in check by the buoyant domestic 
demand which served to prop up traditional firms, if 
their base in the domestic market allowed them attain 
sufficient scale to develop into export markets; this 
would have delayed their ultimate annihilation wrought 
by import penetration alongside their inability to break 
into world markets to the extent necessary to ensure their 
survival. 11 The greater inter-industry adjustment in the 
later period may be due to the collapse of this sector 
alongside the growth of a new (multinational) sector in 
new branches of industry. 
The issue is not simply one of sluggish employment 
adjustment within Ireland to structural change, how-
ever. Within a unified economic area jobs lost in one 
region (Ireland, Northern England) may be replaced by 
new job opportunities opening up elsewhere (Germany, 
Southern England), with unemployment stimulating 
migration as part of the equilibrating mechanism. (Thus 
I I Krugman (1987b) presents a model in which temporary swings in macroeconomic policy can have pennanent effects on the sectoral 
structure of production. 
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the NESC(1989, p.168) report remarks, in discussing 
Ireland's integration into larger free trade areas, that "it 
would seem that in many industries even the larger Irish 
producers, instead of eliminating the tail of smaller 
higher cost local producers, were themselves a part of 
the tail of smaller producers in a British and Irish, or 
European Market"). 
Again these processes cannot be captured within 
highly aggregative macro models. We have already seen 
that dividing Irish manufacturing into traditional and 
modern sectors for the purpose of analysis quickly 
proves itself worthwhile. 
Employment in traditional industry suffered only a 
small decline between 1966 (when free trade with the 
UK opened up) and 1980. In the 1980's demand con-
traction and a continuing profits squeeze have generated 
a decline of over 40,000 jobs in this sector. 
At the same time, due primarily, it would seem, to 
changes in the capital intensity, availability, and sources 
of multinational investment, employment growth in the 
most modern sector of the economy - the non-UK 
overseas firms - has been considerably slower than 
during the 1970's. 
Such structural changes would seem to have a large 
role to play in explaining movements in labour demand, 
and, a fortiori, in suggesting policy conclusions. 
5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has attempted to trace out and critically 
evaluate the shifting focus of economists' beliefs on the 
determinants of employment and unemployment. In the 
1960s and 1970s the Keynesian view was widely held 
that domestic demand, and fiscal policy in particular, 
was a fundamental determinant of the employment 
level. Although many economists had already begun to 
question its validity for a small open economy, 
Keynesian fiscal policies were used by government 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s in an attempt to 
counter the impact of the generally depressed world 
economic environment. 
By now the pendulum of belief has swung to the 
opposite end of the spectrum, and economists such as 
McAleese (1990), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and 
Newell and Symons (1990) are questioning whether 
fiscal policies have any such demand-side effects on 
employment at all. 
The perspective that aggregate supply factors are of 
exclusive importance began to be developed in the 
1970s, with a number of studies showing that inflation 
was largely externally determined. If domestic policies 
did not influence inflation, it was implied, this was 
because they did not tighten goods markets; therefore a 
fiscal expansion would simply affect the balance of 
payments and not employment. This is the "small open 
economy" view, and it implies that employment is 
completely determined by supply- side factors, par-
ticularly labour costs; domestic aggregate demand has 
no influence. 
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It has been argued here that that view is too 
extreme. 12 Drawing on the results of Walsh ( 1987) and 
Barry and Bradley ( 1991 ), based on different empirical 
methodologies, the paper shows that demand-side 
effects of fiscal policies on employment can be identi-
fied; the late 1970s fiscal expansion did stimulate the 
economy in the short run. The mechanism by which 
these effects are largely wiped out over time operates 
when the fiscal spending comes to be financed, as it must 
ultimately be, by tax increases. These of course raise 
production costs and wage demands. 
The interaction between aggregate supply and 
demand is therefore more complex than that posited by 
the "small open economy" view. The policy error 
committed in the late 1970s was so severe because it 
involved the adoption of a pro-cyclical fiscal stance, 
meaning that the fiscal expansion was pursued when the 
world economy was already emerging from recession; 
the classic Keynesian prescription is for counter-cy-
clical policies, so that deficit spending used to moderate 
the impact of recession can be financed by the revenue 
buoyancy that occurs during the expansionary phase of 
the business cycle. The earlier expansion, with its 
implications for the debt/GNP ratio, forced the adoption 
of another pro-cyclical (but this time contractionary) 
stance when the next world recession struck; this 
plunged the economy into a far more severe recession 
than would otherwise have occurred. 
To defend the importance of the demand-side is not 
to downplay the paramount significance of aggregate 
supply. More and more research has been devoted to 
this area in the last decade, since it has come to be 
recognised as the engine-room of the economy, and the 
importance of the sectoral structure of production for 
employment has begun to be explored. The supply-side 
crowding out effects that occurred through the tax 
wedge had quantitatively very different effects on dif-
ferent sectors. For traditional industry, which comprises 
much of both indigenous and UK industry in Ireland, 
cost competitiveness appears to be of major signifi-
cance, while for non-UK overseas firms, labour-cost 
competitiveness appears to be much less important, 
probably being dominated by factors such as the low 
rate of corporation tax and economies of agglomeration. 
The long- term trends in the relative sizes of these sectors 
will affect the strength of these crowding out effects in 
the future; the fact that employment was heavily con-
centrated in traditional industry when the tax wedge 
expanded rapidly in the early to mid- 1980s magnified 
its negative effects. 
The increasing focus on the supply side also drew 
our attention in this paper towards some structural 
factors which have until now been rarely discussed. One 
major topic in particular has been identified as requiring 
further research; that is the extent to which the econo-
my's adjustment to the progressive liberalisation of 
trade alongside the large fluctuations in domestic 
demand has entailed substantial inter-industry adjust-
ment, in contrast to the less difficult intra-industry 
restructuring experienced by the core EC economies 
whose factor endowments (in the sense of capital-labour 
ratios) are closer to the EC average. 13 
12 Barry ( 1987) discusses how the SOE view of inflation can be consistent with demand-effects on employment. 
13 On the relationship between factor endowments and intra-industry trade, see e.g. Helpman and Krugman ( 1985). 
I 12 
This issue has not been treated at all in the econo-
metric research on Irish unemployment. An analysis 
along the lines of Lilien (1982) should be possible, and 
could represent a significant contribution to our 
understanding of this major national problem. 
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